

# The Roles of Islamis Moderate Organizations in Countering Violence Extremism

CASE STUDY:  
NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) AND MUHAMMADIYAH

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We are grateful to God Almighty for His blessings so we can accomplish this research. Since the beginning of the research, this research introduces a “mirror” to reflect oneself with academic research method. Nevertheless, academic perspective remains. Therefore, this research is characterized by data instead of theory.

With the theme “The Role of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in Countering Violence Extremism Movement”, this research departs from a positive positioning about the mainstream of Indonesian Islam is Islam *wasathiyah* (moderate). Various cases of intolerance and violence in the name of religion are only sparks of fire, which threatening to our freedom and Indonesian values. However, these cases in no way reflect our Indonesian values of Islam which represented by two large Islamic mass organizations: NU and Muhammadiyah. The research was conducted in Central Java and East Java provinces. The objectives of the research is to establish NU and Muhammadiyah’s support in enforcing themselves as moderate Islamic organizations in countering intolerant-radical Islamic groups in society.

In data collection, this research conducted an in-depth interview method with more than 100 informants. They were NU members, executive boards, activists, from national to local level. The researchers also part of NU and Muhammadiyah. Both directly and indirectly, this study also involved senior and junior activists from both organizations.

We would like to thanks all the parties who are involved and supported in this research: PBNU and its autonomous and institutional bodies; PP Muhammadiyah and its autonomous organizations and institutions; Central Java and East Java PWNU and bodies; PW Muhammadiyah in Central Java and East Java; PCNU Situbondo and Sragen along with their atonomous bodies and institutions.

We thank the management of Muhammadiyah Surakarta, Sukoharjo, Malang, and Lamongan along with their autonomous and institutional bodies.

In particular, we would like to thank Hasnan BAchtiar, Khelmy K. Pribadi, aki Khoirudin, Maman Abdurrahman, Khoirul Anwar, Ahmad Yadi, Helmi Suhaimi, M. Dawud, and other parties.

With all due respect, we are aware that this research has its limitations. Nevertheless, we really hope that this research can be beneficial for all parties. For NU and Muhammadiyah, this research is expected to be a “mirror” as a reflection. For government and other interested parties, this research can be a material for initiate partnership and providing support in countering violent extremism based on religion.

*Jakarta, 26 July 2019*

**Research Team**

# ABBREVIATION

AMAN	: <i>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara</i>
Aswaja	: <i>Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah</i>
BA	: <i>Baitul Arqam</i>
Banom	: <i>Badan otonom</i>
BNPT	: <i>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme</i>
CDCC	: <i>Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilisations</i>
HAM:	: <i>Hak Asasi Manusia / Human Rights</i>
DA	: <i>Dar al-Arqom</i>
FPI	: <i>Front Pembela Islam</i>
IAIN	: <i>Institut Agama Islam Negeri</i>
IPM	: <i>Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah</i>
IRI	: <i>The International Republican Institute</i>
JAD	: <i>Jamaah Ansharut Daulah / Ansharut Daulah adherents</i>
JAT	: <i>Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid / Ansharut Tauhid adherents</i>
JI	: <i>Jamaah Islamiyah</i>
JIMM	: <i>Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah</i>
Kokam	: <i>Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah</i>
LDNU	: <i>Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama</i>
LkiS	: <i>Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial</i>
LPPA	: <i>Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pimpinan Pusat</i>
LTM NU	: <i>Lembaga Takmir Masjid Nahdlatul Ulama</i>
MDS	: <i>Majlis Dzikir dan Sholawat</i>
MKNU	: <i>Madrasah Kader Nahdlatul Ulama</i>
MMI	: <i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i>
MPB	: <i>Madrasah Perempuan Berkemajuan</i>
MTA	: <i>Majlis Tafsir Al-Qur'an</i>
MTPPI	: <i>Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam</i>
Munas	: <i>Musyawaharah nasional</i>
MWC	: <i>Majelis wakil cabang</i>
NA	: <i>Nasyiatul Aisyiyah</i>

NKRI : *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*  
NU : *Nahdlatul Ulama*  
P3M : *Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat*  
PBNU : *Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama*  
PCNU : *Pimpinan Cabang Nahdlatul Ulama*  
PKP-NU : *Pendidikan Kader Penggerak Nahdlatul Ulama*  
PP : *Pimpinan pusat*  
PP GP Ansor: *Pengurus Pusat Gerakan Pemuda Ansor*  
PPIM : *Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat*  
PPWK : *Pendidikan dan Pengembangan Wawasan Keulamaan*  
PTM : *Perguruan Tinggi Muhammadiyah*  
PWNU : *Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama*  
RMI NU : *Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyah Nahdlatul Ulama*  
UIN : *Universitas Islam Negeri*

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**CHAPTER I**

# **INTRODUCTION**

## 1.1. Background

### 1.1.1 Emerging Religious Intolerance and Violence

Some scholars believe that Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, which is able to continuously defend and preserve the ideas and practices of diversity.<sup>1</sup> The reality of multiculturalism in Indonesia has come to the attention of many circles and made them recognize Indonesia as a Muslim populated country that is able to keep itself far from all forms of terror and destructive religious conflicts.<sup>2</sup>

Indonesia is recognized as a Muslim-majority country with relatively moderate, inclusive, and tolerant religious thoughts, attitudes and practices, especially compared to other Muslim countries such as Middle-East countries.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless history in the post-reform era shows a slightly different reality, especially related to the many cases of religious intolerance and violence.

#### Intolerance

Religious intolerance is any intolerant actions in the name of religion. It was considered as one form of manifestation of religious radicalization. Religious intolerance in Indonesia can take the form of cases, including 1.) sweeping, which conducted in various places that are considered to do things that are contrary to Islamic law; 2.) attacking houses of worship other religions; 3.) mass actions or demonstration to oppose certain

<sup>1</sup> K.A. Steenbrink, "The Pancasila Ideology and an Indonesian Muslim Theology of Religions," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 85, No. 3-4 (1998); D.E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002); B.F. Intan, *Public Religion and the Pancasila-Based State of Indonesia: An Ethical and Sociological Analysis* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> Irwan Abdullah, "Politik Bhinneka Tunggal Ika dalam Keragaman Budaya Indonesia," *Jurnal Masyarakat dan Budaya*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2003): 1-13; Parsudi Suparlan, "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: Keanekaragaman Suku Bangsa atau Kebudayaan?," *Antropologi Indonesia*, Vol. 72 (2003); Abdurrahman Wahid, *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2009); Farid Masdar Mas'udi, *Syarah Konstitusi: UUD 1945 dalam Perspektif Islam* (Ciputat: Pustaka Alvabet, 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Nurcholish Madjid, "Islamic Roots of Modern Pluralism: Indonesian Experience," *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1994); Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

religious groups that are considered to defiling chastity of Islam; 4.) active in various groups that explicitly seek the formalization of Islamic law.<sup>4</sup>

Before 2008, the rising of intolerance cases in Indonesia did not change because it was less than 50 cases.<sup>5</sup> The number of cases that occurred fluctuated from 55 to 93 cases during 2008–2010.<sup>6</sup> Intolerant actors include state apparatus, Islamic organizations, hardline Muslim groups, and others. Meanwhile, the victims of this intolerance are mainly minority groups such as adherent of the Ahmadiyya, Shia, Christian, and local religion or beliefs. In 2011, the number of cases doubled, namely 185 cases.<sup>7</sup> In 2012, cases decreased to 110,<sup>8</sup> but in 2013 doubled, namely 245.<sup>9</sup> The number of cases increased gradually, i.e. from 158, 190, 204, to 213, respectively throughout 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017.<sup>10</sup>

In 2018, The Center for Islamic and Community Studies (PPIM) Jakarta State Islamic University (UIN) and Convey Indonesia conducted research on the issue of intolerance and its relationship to the discourse of jihad and terrorism. The study involved 1.859 students, as well as 322 teachers and lecturers in 34 provinces and 68 cities in Indonesia.<sup>11</sup> The result of the study showed that 86% of the students and 87.89% of the teachers and lecturers who were respondents, agreed that government should prohibit the existence of minority religious groups that deviated from Islamic

<sup>4</sup> The Wahid Foundation, *A Measure of the Extent of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism within Muslim Society in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation dan Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2017), 10.

<sup>5</sup> The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Tahunan The Wahid Institute 2008: Pluralism Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2008).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*; The Wahid Institute, *Annual Report Kebebasan Beragama dan Kehidupan Keagamaan di Indonesia Tahun 2009* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009); The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Toleransi 2010* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2010).

<sup>7</sup> The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Kebebasan Beragama dan Toleransi di Indonesia 2011* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2011).

<sup>8</sup> The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Akhir Tahun Kebebasan Beragama dan Intoleransi 2012* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Tahunan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Intoleransi 2013* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Tahunan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Intoleransi 2014* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2014); The Wahid Institute, *Laporan Tahunan Kemerdekaan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (KBB) di Indonesia* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2015); The Wahid Foundation, *Laporan Tahunan Kemerdekaan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (KBB) di Indonesia* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2016); The Wahid Foundation, *A Measure of the Extent of Socio-Religious Intolerance and Radicalism within Muslim Society in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation and Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> PPIM UIN Jakarta dan Convey, *Api dalam Sekam: Keberagamaan Muslim Gen-Z, Survei Nasional tentang Keberagamaan di Sekolah dan Universitas di Indonesia* (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta and Convey Indonesia, 2018).

teachings.<sup>12</sup> Among all respondents, 91.23% of them agreed that Islamic sharia must be applied the state level, 31.71% agree that jihad meant “qital” or took up arms to fights against non-Muslims, 37.71% agreed that suicide bombings were part of the teachings in Islam, and 61.92% understand that the caliphate system is a system of government that is recognized in Islam.<sup>13</sup>

Based on the data explanation above, it is clear that access of religious intolerance is increasing constantly. This implies that the actual level of religious radicalization accompanied by violence in Indonesia is still high. It is very possible to have a negative impact on the country and society.

## Terrorism

When Suharto’s authoritarian regime fell in 1998, various religious conflicts that were driven by political contestation surfaced. Several riots exploded in various regions, including Ambon, Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi.<sup>14</sup> In 2002, Indonesia had to deal with the Bali Bombing case.<sup>15</sup> The bomb blast killed 202 people. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia claimed responsibility for the incident. This really ruthless thing was followed by various other major terrorism cases, until 2009.

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> K.E. Schulze, “Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon,” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002): 57-69; Rizal Sukma, “Ethnic Conflicts in Indonesia: Causes and the Quest for Solution,” dalam Kusuma Snitwongse (ed.), *Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2005), h. 1-41; K.E. Schulze, “The ‘Ethnic’ in Indonesia’s Communal Conflicts: Violence in Ambon, Poso, and Sambas,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 12 (2017), h. 2096-2114.

<sup>15</sup> K. Ramakrishna, and S.S. Tan, *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: World Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003); B. Singh, “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004): 47-68; J. Magouirk, S. Atran, dan M. Sageman, “Connecting Terrorist Networks,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008): 1-16; B. West, “Collective Memory and Crisis: the 2002 Bali Bombing, National Heroic Archetypes and the Counter-Narrative of Cosmopolitan Nationalism,” *Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2008): 337-353; F. Galamas, “Terrorism in Indonesia: an Overview,” *Research Papers*, Vol. 4 (2015): 215; A.S. Zora, “Terrorism in Indonesia: A review on Rehabilitation and Deradicalization,” *Journal of Terrorism Research*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2015): 36-56.

In 2003, JI's clandestine action with a bomb blast at Hotel J.W. Marriot, Jakarta. This bomb killed 11 people and seriously injured 152 others.<sup>16</sup> In 2004, five people died and hundreds were seriously injured as a result of a high explosive bomb at the Australian Embassy, Jakarta.<sup>17</sup> A year later, the second largest bomb has devastated Kuta, Bali and killed at least 22 people.<sup>18</sup> That was the most traumatic terrorist bomb because it has significantly disrupted Indonesia's national security.

The aforementioned cases have involved several networks of JI militant groups. In 2009, Indonesia was again hit by a bomb blast. A pair of bombs detonated at Hotel J.W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton, Jakarta.<sup>19</sup> The two bombs killed seven people and injured 50 others. All the destruction and trauma caused by terrorism has shown the darkest period that must be faced by Indonesia in the first decade after the reform.

In the second decade after Reform (2010-2017), cases of terror motivated by extreme religious ideologies gradually declined. However, a number of minor cases emerged mainly as a result of the global political problems involving the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). On January 2016, for example, one ISIS network in Indonesia attacked the general public on Jalan Thamrin, Jakarta.<sup>20</sup> This attack resulted in the loss of eight people lives. Smaller cases occurred in Surabaya on June 8, in Surakarta on July 5, in Medan on 28 of August, Samarinda on November 13, all happened in the same year.<sup>21</sup> There were no fatalities caused by these cases. Nevertheless, in 2018 there were three cases, namely the attack on the church by terrorist on May 13 and 16, and

<sup>16</sup> G.S. Oak, "Jemaah Islamiyah's Fifth Phase: The Many Faces of a Terrorist Group," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, No. 11 (2010): 989-1018.

<sup>17</sup> M. Subhan, "Pergeseran Orientasi Gerakan Terorisme Islam di Indonesia (Studi Terorisme Tahun 2000-2015)," *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2016): 59-67.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*; Rizal Sukma, J. Ma'ruf, dan K. Abdullah, "The Attitude of Indonesian Muslims Towards Terrorism: An Important Factor in Counter-Terrorism?" *Journal of Human Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2001): 21.

<sup>20</sup> A. Fenton dan D. Price, "ISIS, Jihad and Indonesian Law: Legal Impacts of the January 2016 Jakarta Terrorist Attacks," *Issues in Legal Scholarship*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2016): 1-26; Y.P. Suratman, "The Effectiveness of De-radicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does It Work? The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2017): 135-156; H.F. Sundoko, R. Akbar, D. Zulkaidi, dan T.A. Argo, "Toward a Defensive Global City: Urban (In)security in an Age of Terror—The Case of Jakarta, Indonesia," in *Metropolitan Governance in Asia and the Pacific Rim* (Singapore: Springer, 2018), h. 33-56; Gary van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>21</sup> Subhan, "Pergeseran Orientasi Gerakan Terorisme".

June 3. The first case occurred that killed 11 people and injured 50 others.<sup>22</sup> In 2019, a bomb blast in Sukoharjo on June 3.<sup>23</sup> There were no fatalities in Sukoharjo bombing cases. End of this year on Wednesday morning, November 13, a suicide bombing shook a police headquarter Medan, which killed the perpetrators and injured a number of Medan police officers.

Based on the cases of bomb blasts and armed attacks, branches of ISIS terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) claimed they were responsible of the attacks for the last two decades.

However, there are important cases that are triggered by the ISIS phenomenon. The National Police Headquarter in Jakarta has released an official document that lists terrorist leaders and other international actors.<sup>24</sup> At the same time, the National Police Headquarters represented by Setyo Wasisto as the Head of Public Relations stated that there were 671 Indonesian citizens who joined ISIS and left for Iraq and Syria.<sup>25</sup> The latest data coming from former Presidential Chief of Staff, Moeldoko, stated that there were 590 Indonesian jihadists leaving for Syria; 103 were returned dead, 86 returned to the country, and 539 others have been deported.<sup>26</sup> In addition, 57 people from radical groups from Indonesia have left for the Philippines; 5 are still alive; 32 have been killed, and 7 others are deported<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> I.A. Irawan, "Pergeseran Orientasi Terorisme di Indonesia 2000-2018," *kumparan.com* 17 May 2018, <https://kumparan.com/erucakra-garuda-nusantara/pergeseran-orientasi-terorisme-di-indonesia-2000-2018> (Accessed on 7 June 2019).

<sup>23</sup> *The Jakarta Post*, "Central Java Police Investigate Failed Suicide Bombing in Kartasura," *thejakartapost.com* 4 June 2019, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/06/04/c-java-police-investigate-failed-suicide-bombing-in-kartasura.html> (Accessed on 7 June 2019).

<sup>24</sup> POLRI, *Daftar Terduga Teroris dan Organisasi Teroris* (Jakarta: Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Markas Besar, 2017).

<sup>25</sup> A.N.K. Movanita, "671 orang WNI Bergabung dengan Kelompok Teroris di Irak dan Suriah," *nasional.kompas.com* 20 September 2017, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/09/20/07582791/671-orang-wni-bergabung-dengan-kelompok-teroris-di-irak-dan-suriah?page=all> (Accessed on 7 June 2019).

<sup>26</sup> *Kumparan*, "Moeldoko: 590 WNI masih berada di Suriah untuk gabung ISIS," *kumparan.com* 22 May 2018, <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/moeldoko-590-wni-masih-berada-di-suriah-untuk-gabung-isis> (Accessed on 7 June 2019).

<sup>27</sup> *Kumparan*, "Moeldoko: 590 WNI masih berada di Suriah untuk gabung ISIS," *kumparan.com* 22 May 2018, <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/moeldoko-590-wni-masih-berada-di-suriah-untuk-gabung-isis> (Accessed on 7 June 2019).

### 1.1.2. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah: “The Guardian of the Moderate Indonesian Islam”

Many people say that the important character of Indonesian Islam is its moderateism. Indonesian Islam itself has been known as Islam which is able to live side by side with ideas of pluralism and tolerance. Indonesian Islam is believed to be a tolerant Islam since its inception to Indonesia. Islamic ideas that greatly value diversity enter Indonesia, a region that has a long history of tolerance. This moderate position is mainly represented by two major Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which has a traditionalist style and a modernist Muhammadiyah.<sup>28</sup>

NU and Muhammadiyah are recognized as the most important Islamic organizations in developing moderate Islam in Indonesia. Both moderateism was directly born from the Islamic formula which they developed from Islamic normative sources. The teachings developed by these two organizations eventually became a guide for adherents in developing moderate religious thoughts and actions.

These two organizations are classified as moderate at least because of their non-violent theological teachings. In addition, these two organizations also agreed on the idea of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), one of the important issues that has always been refused by extreme Muslims in Indonesia. For these two organizations, the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and Unity in Diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) are actually manifestations of the basic principles of moderate Islam, as *rahmatan lil alamin* (a blessing for the universe).<sup>29</sup>

In the context of modern values, these two organizations do not refuse democracy and human rights, the two main values of modernity. Democracy is seen as not only a universal value that can only grow in the Western, but also in accordance with Islamic teachings. According to them,

<sup>28</sup> Azyumardi Azra, *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 60-64.

<sup>29</sup> Masdar Hilmy, “Whither Indonesia’s Islamic Moderatism? A Reexamination on The Moderate Vision of Muhammadiyah and NU,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 07, No. 01 (June 2013), 32.

the teachings of Islam are in accordance with the values of democracy and modern human rights, two important pillars for humanity and nationality in the modern era. Islam itself is democratic, so there is no reason to refuse democracy.<sup>30</sup>

NU was founded on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya and it is from the beginning was not only driven by religious motives. There are at least three important motives behind NU's founding: religion, nationalism, and maintaining the understanding of *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Aswaja).<sup>31</sup> Literally, Aswaja are adherents of the Sunnah of the Prophet and the congregation, which is a teaching of piety and truth exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad, the Companions, and the early generation (*al-salaf al-shalih*) which is considered a guarantee of Islamic truth.

As is the organizations whose foundation was driven by the Islamic leaders (*kiai*), many NU members came from religious groups who received Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) education. They have an important position in their community and play a key role in social transformation. They act as religious leaders of their people. They are Islamic leaders (*kiai*) or Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) alumni who were highly prominent in classical Islamic studies.<sup>32</sup>

After accepting Pancasila as the state ideology at the 1984 Conference in Situbondo, East Java, an event which was subsequently widely known as "Returning to the 1926 Khittah", NU's religious orientation became increasingly clear toward Islamic moderateism. In order to support the foundation of moderate Islam, NU redefined the doctrine of *Ahlu al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Aswaja). Aswaja itself has a variety of thought and movement, including Islamic groups that can be identified as radical, but Aswaja in the hands of NU contains moderate Islamic messages.<sup>33</sup> It is not surprising that NU consciously distinguishes its Aswaja from the term *Aswaja al-Nahdliyyah*.

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 32-33.

<sup>31</sup> Baca Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan & Perkembangan NU* (Surabaya: Duta Aksara Mulia, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> Abdurrahman Mas'ud (2004), *Intelektual Pesantren: Perhelatan Agama dan Tradisi*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS), 9.

<sup>33</sup> K.H. Achmad Siddiq, *Khittah Nahdliyyah* (Surabaya: Khalista & LTN-NU East Java, 2006), 27.

The theology of NU's moderateism is supported by three important principles: *tawassuth* (moderate), *i'tidal* (casual), dan *tawazun* (balanced). The concept of *tawassuth* is derived from the Qur'an surah al-Baqarah; 13; *i'tidal* from the Qur'an surah al-Ma'idah;8; and *tawazun* from Qur'an surah al-Hadid: 25. These three principles fully put NU in a position as a moderate Islamic organization. The manifestation of this principle is then applied to all aspects of social-religious life: *aqidah*, *sharia*, Sufism, morals, socials, national and state, culture and civilization, missionary teachings, and others.<sup>34</sup>

The implementation of the moderateism principles is clearly seen in NU's ideas and acts towards culture. For NU, maintaining tradition has important significance in religious life. A tradition cannot be completely erased nor can it be totally accepted. The principle of NU in treating the traditions contained in the rules of '*al-muhafadlat ala al-qadim al-shalih wa al-akhdhu bi al-jadid al-ashlah*' (mainting goodl old traditions and creating new traditions that are better).<sup>35</sup>

NU's moderate attitude in preaching is usually relied on Walisongo's methods of infiltrate Islam in Indonesia. What Walisongo has done is acculturation between Islam and culture. This is the way that made Islam accepted by the people at the time. The presence of Islam eos not disturb the existing culture.<sup>36</sup>

In discussing NU's moderateism, it is also important to consider how NU approaches the sources of Islamic teachings, the Qur'an and Hadith. Even though it is not possible to understand NU's moderateism without considering non-religious external factors, all efforts to formulate the concept of Islamic moderateism are ultimately determined by how Muslims approach and understand the Qur'an and Hadith. However, the Qur'an and Hadith are the main sources of Islamic teachings.

<sup>34</sup> K.H. Abdul Muchith Muzadi, *NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah & Ajaran: Refleksi 65 Th. Ikut NU* (Surabaya: Khalista, 2007), 69-73.

<sup>35</sup> Zamakhsyari Dhofier (1994), *Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiai*, (Jakarta: LP3ES), 65.

<sup>36</sup> Abdul Mun'im DZ (2007), "Pergumulan Pesantren dengan Kebudayaan", dalam Badrus Sholeh (ed.), *Budaya Damai Komunitas Pesantren*, Jakarta: LP3ES, pg. 41.

In understanding the two primary resources of Islam, NU built a balance between the use of revelation (*naqliyah*) and ratio (*'aqliyah*) so that it was able to respond to changes in society creatively without losing its normative values. The methodological tools used by NU include *ushul al-fiqh* (Islamic legal principles), *al-maslahah* (general good values), *istihsan* (goodness), and others.<sup>37</sup> The use of this methodological tool provides opportunities for various experiments and articulations of thought that can bring creativity and freedom of thought. NU's intellectual tradition is shaped in many ways of thinking, especially in responding to actual issues. The progressive and even liberal tendencies within NU can be explained in this framework.

Muhammadiyah is an organization founded by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan on 18 November 1912 in Yogyakarta and its came with the slogan "Back to the Qur'an and Hadith". Indeed, slogans like this can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, this slogan can play a renewal role in the midst of the strife of Muslims, by returning to the true elan of Islam. But on the other hand, when Islamic reform has been institutionalized, the slogan can lead to the establishment of orthodoxy and create Muhammadiyah a puritan group.<sup>38</sup> This is the epistemological trap of the slogan "Return of the Qur'an and Hadith".

Even so, it should be noted that Muhammadiyah was born with a very strong progress DNA. Muhammadiyah from the beginning echoed Islamic reform. The *tajdid* aspect (renewal) is the spirit with which Muhammadiyah was born and grows until now. The character of Islamic moderateism is Muhammadiyah because its ability to combine puritanism and modernism. In the other words, Muhammadiyah is able to capture the rationality of modern life through refining Islamic understanding.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ahmad Zahro, *Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa'il 1926-1999* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), 170.

<sup>38</sup> James L. Peacock, *Purifying the Faith: the Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam* (California: The Benjamin/Cumming Publishing Company, 1978), 110.

<sup>39</sup> James L. Peacock, *Muslim Puritan: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam*, (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1978), 18.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Muhammadiyah is commonly referred to as modernist<sup>40</sup> or reformist or progressive Islam.<sup>41</sup>

Muhammadiyah aims to purify Islam and openly oppose the various manifestations of heresy (*bid'ah*) and superstition that have permeated the Javanese society. Some examples of heresy and superstition: food in rituals (*slametan* or festivity), visits to the graves and worship of saints, belief in amulets and heirlooms as magical powers and holy energy, and religious relics originating from the Hindu and Buddhist periods in Indonesia. However, since Ahmad Dahlan era until now, Muhammadiyah shows a moderate religious attitude. For example, despite being anti-superstition, heresy, and *churafat*, Muhammadiyah never made an official statement condemning the celebration of the Grebeg Maulud ritual by the Sultan of Yogyakarta as heresy or superstition.<sup>42</sup>

Like every reform movement in Islam, the birth of Muhammadiyah was motivated by the concern of the Muslim elite about the backwardness of Indonesian Muslims at that time. This concern inspired the Islamic reform movement throughout the Islamic world. In the Indonesian context, without the reform movement undertaken by Muhammadiyah, it is impossible to see the face of moderate Indonesian Islam as it is today. It was from Muhammadiyah that Indonesian Muslims came to know the idea of Islamic renewal.

Muhammadiyah's title as a modernist group is partly because of its positive outlook towards the ideas and values of modernity. Through its methodological tools, *tajdid* (renewal), Muhammadiyah began to introduce a series of reform movements into the body of Indonesian

<sup>40</sup> Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980); Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, *Rezim Gender Muhammadiyah: Kontestasi Gender, Identitas dan Eksistensi* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2015); Irwan Abdullah, *The Muslim Businessmen of Jatim: Religious Reform and Economic Modernization in a Central Javanese Town* (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1994); M. Amin Abdullah "Paradigma Tajdid Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam Modernis-Reformis," Makalah Seminar Satu Abad Gerakan Tajdid Muhammadiyah Menuju Peradaban Utama: Paradigma, Model, dan Strategi Tajdid, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 21-22 November 2009; Fauzan Saleh, *Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

<sup>41</sup> Achmad Jainuri, "The Formation of the Muhammadiyah's Ideology 1912-1942," (Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1997); Ahmad Najib Burhani, *Muhammadiyah Pergeseran dari Puritanisme ke Kosmopolitanisme* (Bandung: Mizan, 2015).

<sup>42</sup> Herman L. Beck, "Islamic Purity at Odds with Javanese Identity: the Muhammadiyah and the Celebration of the Garebeg Maulud Ritual in Yogyakarta," dalam Jan Platvoet and Karel van der Toorn (eds.). *Pluralism and Identity: Studies in Ritual Behaviour* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 261-284.

Muslims. Despite facing resistance from traditionalist Muslim groups, Muhammadiyah's renewal continues to the point of no return. Even slowly but surely, the ideas of Muhammadiyah renewal received much sympathy and support from its opponents, especially from traditionalist Muslim circles. One of the Muhammadiyah reform movements that was initially refused by traditionalist Muslims but now accepted together is the language change in the Friday prayer sermon or Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, from Arabic to Indonesian or local languages.<sup>43</sup>

The moderate character of Muhammadiyah can be seen from the development of Muhammadiyah in the middle of Javanese society which is thick with heterodox traditions. Muhammadiyah is able to negotiate with Javanese culture, even in rural areas. "Pure Islam" in the style of Muhammadiyah in rural areas can survive after various "modifications" and "adaptations" to local socio-political realities. Farmers accept pure Islam after adjusting to the lifestyle of farmers. On the contrary, the pure Islamic party through the role of the elite at the local level made modifications (flexibility) to obtain more masses.<sup>44</sup>

Based on his studies in Wuluhan Village, Jember, East Java, Mulkhan received four categories of Muhammadiyah residents. *First*, Muhammadiyah "ikhlas" (*mukhlis*), namely Muhammadiyah residents who have a strong puritanical tendency. *Second*, Muhammadiyah members "Ahmad Dahlan" (*Muda*) who have moderate-inclusive character in interesting with other groups but still hold on to religious foundation and organizational norms of Muhammadiyah. *Third*, "Muhammadiyah-Nahdlatul Ulama" (*Munu*), ie Muhammadiyah residents who continue to carry out various syncretic traditions and traditionalist worship. *Fourth*, "Marhaenis-Muhammadiyah" (*Marmud*), which is a Muhammadiyah citizen who has a leftist political outlook, admirer of the first President

<sup>43</sup> W. Sairin, *Gerakan Pembaruan Muhammadiyah* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995); Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Kiai Ahmad Dahlan: Jejak Pembaruan Sosial dan Kemaanusiaan, Kado Satu Abad* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 236.

<sup>44</sup> Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Islam Murni dan Masyarakat Petani* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000); Abdul Munir Mulkhan, "Gerakan Pemurnian Islam di Pedesaan", *Disertasi* (Yogyakarta: UGM, 1999); Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town 1910-2010* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).

Soekarno, and sympathizers of the nationalist party, and also has a strong secular nationalist political orientation.<sup>45</sup>

Burhani considered that the Islamic character of Muhammadiyah was a pragmatic moderate. Muhammadiyah is moderate in practice although conservative in belief.<sup>46</sup> Or in Mu'ti language, Muhammadiyah is "pluralist puritan". Theologically, Muhammadiyah is puritanist and committed to upholding a pure Islamic creed, monotheism far from polytheism. Even so, Muhammadiyah has a clear pluralist attitude. The pluralist attitude within Muhammadiyah has three foundations. *First*, in the religious field Muhammadiyah is not bound to any of the studies. *Second*, Muhammadiyah believes in the understanding of the relativism of thoughts in which the truth of a thought or the outcome of *ijtihad* is subjective-relative and open to review. *Third*, in the field of *muamalah-duniawiyah* (social-citizenship) Muhammadiyah has an open principle for learning from various sources.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the various dynamics, it is impossible to deny the key role of NU and Muhammadiyah in developing a moderate Islamic life in Indonesia. From the beginning, these two organizations have been developed within the framework of Islamic moderateism which is far from the violence.

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Considering that NU and Muhammadiyah are Islamic organizations with a very large number of members, the high level of violence with religious sentiments in Indonesia today can be said to be an irony. There was never any concrete data on how many NU and Muhammadiyah members were. However, if individual recognition is used as a reference, the Indonesian Political Indicator can be a reference to how large the followers of the two organizations are. Based on a survey of Indonesian Political Indicator at the 2019 Presidential Election, out of 207.2 millions (87.2%) Indonesian Muslims, 52.8% identified themselves as affiliated with

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 355.

<sup>46</sup> Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Pluralism, Liberalism and Islamism: Religious Outlook of Muhammadiyah", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2018), 457-458.

<sup>47</sup> Abdul Mu'ti, "Akar Pluralisme dalam Pendidikan Muhammadiyah", *Afkaruna*, Vol. 12 No. 1 (June 2016).

NU and 6.1% affiliated with Muhammadiyah.<sup>48</sup> That means the adherents of the two organizations amounted to 58.9% or around 122.04 millions

If Islamic moderation NU and Muhammadiyah are able to colour religious life (Islam) in Indonesia, we can be sure that religious intolerance and violence will only be a marginal case in religious life in Indonesia. However, religious intolerance and violence rates are high.

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<sup>48</sup> “Indikator Politik: NU Kunci Kemenangan Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin di Pilpres 2019,” <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1421990/12/indikator-politik-nu-kunci-kemenangan-jokowi-maruf-amin-di-pilpres-2019-1563550867>, Accessed on 22 July 2019.

## 1.2. Research Objectives

From the various considerations above, this research intends to measure the differentiation between moderate Islam developed by NU and Muhammadiyah both in ideal and real situation. This research departs from data that religious (Islamic) public spaces are increasingly filled with discourses and movements that are driven by the agendas of radical groups. This research departs from the assumption that NU and Muhammadiyah are beginning to lose influence compared to radical groups, both in terms of discourse and movement.

In the end, this research aims to find out what support is needed by NU and Muhammadiyah in establishing itself as a moderate Islamic organization in strengthening religious moderation in Indonesia in the context of strengthening the influence of radical-intolerant Islamic groups in society. Therefore, what must be known in advance is the view of NU and Muhammadiyah about the current situation of religious life in Indonesia and its impact on the life of the nation and state. From here, this research goes to identify the efforts that have been made by NU and Muhammadiyah in counter radicalism and various obstacles they face.

### Existing Research

A research that has raised the theme of NU and Muhammadiyah in relation to the phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia has been carried out by several experts. At the very least, these studies can be divided into two major groups: *first*, radicalization within NU and Muhammadiyah; *second*, the efforts of the two organizations in counter radicalism.

“The Illusion of the Islamic State” is one of the books that directly highlights the phenomenon of infiltration of radical Islamic groups into NU and Muhammadiyah, two Islamic organizations that have been known as the main pillars of Indonesian moderate Islam. This book illustrates that these two organizations were the target of radicalization of extreme Islamic

groups. Not only infiltrated the NU and Muhammadiyah organizations, those groups also “took over” mosques and schools, and even Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*).<sup>49</sup>

The radicalization phenomenon in NU and Muhammadiyah was straightforwardly highlighted by Hilmy.<sup>50</sup> The phenomenon found in his book states that adherents of NU and Muhammadiyah, even though they have a moderate Islamic theological foundation, they tend to behave more or less typical of radical Islam. This phenomenon will be clearly seen if our views are brought closer to specific cases. Hamid’s study shows the meeting between NU’s relations with the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam/ FPI*) in Madura, which is the basis of NU in East Java.<sup>51</sup>

This phenomenon is clearly troubling among NU and Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah’s internal voice clearly shows the unrest. Through a short writing, “Muhammadiyah and Terrorism”, Benni Setiawan, a member of the Muhammadiyah wrote various things that Muhammadiyah should have done to fortify its cadres from the trappings of radicalism and terrorism.<sup>52</sup>

Several studies that looked at the roles of the two organizations have also been carried out, one of which was written by Taufiqurrahman.<sup>53</sup> This study shows NU’s efforts in introducing NU-style Islamic moderateism into the world Muslim community. Siregar’s writing also highlighted NU’s efforts to fortify its people from the ideology of radicalism. This study looks at the nature of NU’s missionary endeavor in Medan against radical Islam.<sup>54</sup> While

<sup>49</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid (Ed.), *Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di Indonesia* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute), Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Maarif Institute, 2009).

<sup>50</sup> Masdar Hilmy, “Whither Indonesia’s Islamic Moderatism? A Reexamination on The Moderate Vision of Muhammadiyah and NU,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 07, No. 01 (June 2013).

<sup>51</sup> Ahmad Z. Hamdi, “Radicalizing Indonesian Moderate Islam from Within: The NU-FPI Relationship in Bangkalan, Madura,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 07, No. 01 (June 2013).

<sup>52</sup> Beni Setiawan, “Muhammadiyah dan Terorisme,” *Republika*, 17 November 2015.

<sup>53</sup> Taufiqurrahman, “Peran Nahdlatul Ulama Dalam Menangkal Gerakan Radikalisme Global di Indonesia,” Bachelor Thesis on International Relation Major in FISIP UMM 2017.

<sup>54</sup> Raja Inal Siregar, “Strategi Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama dalam Membentengi Warga Nahdliyin dari Radikalisme” (Studi Kasus PCNU Kota Medan),” *Dakwah and Communication Faculty State Islamic University North Sumatera* 2017.

NU's deradicalization in the world of Islamic education was appointed by Shidqi.<sup>55</sup>

Muhammadiyah's various efforts in countering radicalism and terrorism can be seen in a collection of writings published by the Maarif journal. In one of its editions, this journal specifically discussed Muhammadiyah's various efforts to stem the flow of radicalism. At least, there are three writings that need attention, namely Zuhri's writings which highlight Muhammadiyah's deradicalization strategy;<sup>56</sup> Rosviana who explained the various efforts of Aisyiyah, Muhammadiyah women's organization, in stemming radicalism-terrorism;<sup>57</sup> As for Qibtiyan, he reviewed the Madrasah Women Progress experiment to spread Islam peacefully.<sup>58</sup>

Equally important to mention is Biyanto's writing that highlights Muhammadiyah's experience with the idea of pluralism.<sup>59</sup> According to him, Muhammadiyah is committed to moderate Islam and friendly religious and cultural diversity. Aside from the actions of its leaders, Muhammadiyah's commitment is also shown through its various educational institutions that serve children of various ethnicities, groups, and religions. Muhammadiyah's work in this area is particularly pronounced in areas with a Muslim minority population.

What distinguishes it from the various studies above, this research looks at the flow of radicalization in NU and Muhammadiyah also looks at the various efforts that have been made by the two organizations. However, the aim of this research is to strengthen the efforts of the two organizations through various support needed. This study did not conduct a comparative analysis related to the effectiveness and massivity of the efforts of the two organizations. Indeed, the emphasis here is finding

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<sup>55</sup> Ahmad Shidqi, Respons Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) terhadap Wahabisme dan Implikasinya bagi Deradikalisasi Pendidikan Islam," *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, Vol. II, No. 1 (June 2013).

<sup>56</sup> Saefuddin Zuhri, "Muhammadiyah dan Deradikalisasi Terorisme di Indonesia: Moderasi sebagai Upaya Jalan Tengah," *Maarif*, Vol. 12 No. 2 (December 2017), 73-82.

<sup>57</sup> Sri Rosviana. "Muhammadiyah-Aisyiyah Membendung Radikalisme dan Terorisme," *Maarif*, Vol. 12 No. 2 (December 2017), 94-108.

<sup>58</sup> Alimatul Qibtiyah, "Madrasah Perempuan Berkemajuan (MPB): Upaya Menyebarkan Agama Damai," *Maarif*, Vol. 12 No. 2 (December 2017), 109-127.

<sup>59</sup> Biyanto, "Pengalaman Muhammadiyah Membumikan Nilai-nilai Pluralisme", *Islamica*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (March 2013).

various supports to strengthen the two organizations in facing the current religious radicalization in Indonesia.

### 1.3. Research Methodology

This research is a qualitative research. The data in this study were collected through in-depth interviews with the management and/ or activists of Muhammadiyah and NU, from the central board to the lowest level. Group discussion is also a data collection technique in this study. A total of 133 respondents were interviewed.

Data was also collected through a literature review, both related to official documents issued by NU and Muhammadiyah, essays written by NU and Muhammadiyah elites, and various media news. Data was also collected through observation because this study wanted to see the “gap” between the official Islamic discourse developed by NU and Muhammadiyah with empirical reality on the ground. Observations were mainly carried out in several religious activities of NU and Muhammadiyah residents at the grassroots to see the suitability of Islamic discourse spread with the official Islamic ideas of the organization.

The research was carried out from March to August 2019. Interviews were conducted after 17 April 2019 (the day of National Election). This was to avoid bias in the 2019 Presidential Election which was full of religious issues related to the political identity. Nevertheless, the data document has been collected since March 2019. Data collected mainly related to the news of the involvement of NU and Muhammadiyah (institutional or personal) in issues of intolerance and radicalism.

Data collection was carried out in stages according to the organizational structure, from the center to the lowest level. This is to adjust to the research objective which is to see how strong the influence of Muhammadiyah and NU in the community in counter radicalization. In this

data classification, this research is not possible to avoid the choice of region when it comes to collecting data at the provincial, district/ city level to the community. This research is not intended to make regional reports, but the general trends that exist in Muhammadiyah and NU.

In order to avoid confusion in drawing conclusions, the chosen provincial and district/ city levels are determined based on the subjective assessment of the two organizations that the selected region is the base area of NU or Muhammadiyah. In the context of this choice, both Muhammadiyah and NU chose Central Java (and Yogyakarta for Muhammadiyah) and East Java the provinces that were the locus of research.

Although it is subjective, the selection of the two provinces has several reasons. Many of the important figures of these two organizations came from the regions of East Java and Central Java. NU and Muhammadiyah have quite a large of adherents in East and Central Java. The rapid development of NU and Muhammadiyah's influence in these two regions can also be seen from the many educational institutions owned by these two organizations. East Java and Central Java are filled with hundreds of Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) affiliated to NU. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah schools and colleges also developed rapidly in these two provinces.

For Muhammadiyah, this study chose Surabaya, Malang, and Lamongan as the research locus in East Java. The three cities were chosen as the locus of research based on the consideration that the three cities were the structural, intellectual, and cultural base of Muhammadiyah. As for Central Java, the cities chosen were Surakarta and Sukoharjo. Surakarta is one of the cities in Central Java where Muhammadiyah residents are quite numerous and have a very long history of struggle.<sup>60</sup>

As for the NU research area in East Java, it is Situbondo Regency, with

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<sup>60</sup> Abdul Basit Adnan dalam Muhammad Ali, SATV, "Cikal Bakal Muhammadiyah Surakarta (Catatan Tambahan untuk Muarif", <http://solo-kota.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/artikel-satv-cikal-bakal-muhammadiyah-surakarta-catatan-tambahan-untuk-muarif-detail-317.html>, published on 06 December 2012, Accessed on 22 June 2019 time 15.32 WIB.

consideration of the large number of NU masses. It is estimated that NU Sitobondo residents are above 90% of the total population in the region. The NU research locus in Central Java is Sragen Regency. The consideration was that the Sragen Regency NU branch was quite well organized, especially related to its success in conducting social donation experiments through the NU Coins Program (*Program Koin NU*). The choice of Sragen Regency is also based on the area bordering Solo Raya, which is known as the basis of intolerant groups.

## 1.4. Conceptual Framework

### Definition

The word radical means rooted or fundamental, comprehensive, total political or social reform, or extreme view.<sup>61</sup> As a neutral term, the term radical does not only refer to certain socio-religious movements or groups. The term radical has been used by Nakamura in labeling NU positively. According to Nakamura, NU was a radical-traditionalist, in the sense that NU remained religiously a traditionalist Islamic mass organization, but its attitude and political actions towards the state were classified as radical. Radical here is interpreted as a fundamental critical attitude, which is opposed to opportunism and has been regarded as NU's political attitudes and actions.<sup>62</sup>

Associated with the spread of various religious violence and the explosion of terrorism everywhere, the term radical gets additional meaning. It is not merely interpreted as an attitude and demand for fundamental and comprehensive change, but also accompanied by acts of violence.

<sup>61</sup> AP. Cowie (ed.), *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English*, Ed. IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 1032.

<sup>62</sup> Mitsuo Nakamura, "The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26<sup>th</sup> National Congress, June 1979, Semarang", *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September 1981), 200-201.

The term “radical Islam” referred to in this research is:

*A group or Islamic movement that strives to reform or social-cultural-political life systems in a fundamental and comprehensive manner (including demanding the establishment of an Islamic state, the enactment of Islamic Sharia as state law, compliance with Islamic teachings in social life), and they approve violence as a means to an end, whether they commit violence or not.*

In relation to the use of violence, the term ‘radical’ can mean a synonym with militants which literally means “using force or strong pressure to achieve one’s aims” (using force or pressure to achieve goals).<sup>63</sup> The term ‘militant’ in this sense is also used by Saeed when he labels jihadi groups such as Osama bin Laden as extremist militants.<sup>64</sup>

The International Republican Institute (IRI) divides radicals into two. *First*, cognitive radicals and behavioral radicals. Cognitive radical refers to people who approve of violence but do not take part in acts of violence. *Second*, behavioral radicals are those who approve acts of violence and engage in or carry out acts of violence against radical ideologies they believe in.<sup>65</sup>

Nevertheless, there are also differences between radicalism, extremism and terrorism. Radicalism is literalism, intolerance, anti-system and revolutionary. When these four indicators are added with violence, they become extremism. If the violence is intended as terror, it has been transformed into terrorism. By using this perspective, radicals in the sense of an act of violence that is born from an intolerant attitude is the same as extremism or terrorism.

Defining moderate Islam is no less complicated, because this term also does not refer to certain groups. It can manifest in a conservative muslim or liberal muslim. Conservatism and liberalism in religious understanding have absolutely no consequence on acts of violence.

<sup>63</sup> Cowie (ed.), *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, 784.

<sup>64</sup> Abdullah Saeed, “Trends in Contemporary Islam: A Preliminary Attempts at a Classification”, *The Muslim World*, Vol. 97 (July 2007), 398.

<sup>65</sup> Team, *Violent Extremism in Indonesia* (Washington: The International Republican Institute, 2017), 4.

Therefore, the term ‘moderate muslim” does not have to exclude conservative muslims and only include liberal muslims. One thing that characterizes moderate Islam is that this group does not approve of violence as a means to an end.

In this paper, the term “moderate Islam” is interpreted as explained by Esposito:

*“At a minimum, moderate muslims are those who live and work in society, seek change from below, refuse religious extremism, and regard violence and terrorism as unlawful. ...[Muslims] moderate is a very diverse and diverse group of people who... can reach the spectrum from conservative groups to liberal reformers.”<sup>66</sup>*

Moderate Islam refers to Islamic groups or movements that make changes from below as a consequence of missionary endeavors. However, the methods used are not extreme and refuse violence as a means to an end.

## Radicalization

No one is immediately radical. There are stages of radicalization. For example, this can be seen in the process of radicalization of al-Ikhwân al-Muslimûn (hereinafter referred as Ikhwân) in Egypt. The radicalism of the Ikhwân adherents is rooted in the teachings or doctrines of the Ikhwân itself. Even though the founder Ikhwân Hassan al-Bannâ preferred the approach from below, his demand for total political reform, in which Islam was carried out as the law, finally Ikhwân directed his adherents to make political efforts directly confronting legitimate political power. It was this violence between the Ikhwân group and Egypt government that led to the death of al-Bannâ in 1949.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> John L. Esposito, “Muslim Moderat: Arus Utama Kelompok Modernis, Islamis, Konservatif, dan Tradisionalis”, dalam Suaidi Asyari (ed.), *Siapakah Muslim Moderat?* (Jakarta: Kultura, 2008), 78-79.

<sup>67</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today*, second edition (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1971), 207.

While there were efforts to put more emphasis on the preaching activities after al-Bannâ's death, the radicalization of the Ikhwân adherents motivated by Sayyid Quthb. Quthb is an ideologist of Islamism-radical. Through his well-known book, *Ma'âlim fî al-Tharîq*, Quthb elaborated al-Maududi's idea of *hâkimîyah* (God's sovereignty) by stating that an Islamic state is a country that follows God's law, not a state that makes its own laws. God's law is a provision that cannot be changed by human approval. From here then Quthb's analysis leads to the distinction between the socio-political order of *Islâmî* and *jâhilî*, where the latter is an order that is not based on God's law. Quthb believes that the Islamic order and the *jâhilî* are two conflicting and hostile entities in which the choice is to win or lose totally. He firmly stated that the community of *jâhilî* had to be destroyed. Islamic preaching is not enough, but it must also be a jihad with violence.<sup>68</sup>

The processes of radicalization can be described as follows: in the early stage a person or group has an awareness or thought of the perception of injustice or inequality in an ideal situation. This thought is followed by anger towards those who are perceived as perpetrators of injustice. Furthermore, they feel that having moral involvement justifies terrorism. The next step is to join an extreme group. Finally, dehumanizing the enemy to justify their target of violence.<sup>69</sup>

The process from the radical of the mind to radical and extreme actions as above can also be described at the radical levels as follows. *First*, the level of sympathizers, i.e. those who agree (even if they do not take part in violence) with the aim or reason of groups that use violence. *Second*, the supporting level, which is to justify or justify acts of violence committed by those who want to achieve their goals. *Third*, the level of activists, namely those involved in illegal activities. They provide things needed by those who want to achieve their goals by illegal actions (recruitment, providing political or financial support, etc). *Fourth*, radical level, namely those who are not only sure but are willing to commit acts of

<sup>68</sup> Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?: The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (New South Wales: Lowy Institute, 2005), 15-18.

<sup>69</sup> Mogadhan (2005) "The Staircase to Terrorism"

violence and other illegal actions.<sup>70</sup>

## 1.5. Writing Structure

This research report is systematically structured into three parts. The first part is an introduction that contains background on the importance of this research. No less important in this section is the clarification of the concepts and methodologies operated in this research.

The second part contains research reports on the role of NU and Muhammadiyah in counter the strengthening of violence in the name of religion. Nevertheless, both of these studies took the regions of East and Central Java, they were arranged as a picture of NU and Muhammadiyah in general. Although there are slight differences in writing approach, the two sections are tailor-made into the same sub-chapters.

The fourth part contains several recommendations in order to strengthen the role of NU and Muhammadiyah to fight religious violence in Indonesia. The recommendations formulated in this section were compiled based on in-depth interviews with a number of figures or officials or NU and Muhammadiyah activists from the central management level to the lowest level. []

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<sup>70</sup> McCauley & Moskaleiko (2009) *Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction between Activism and Radicalism*.

**CHAPTER II**

**NAHDLATUL  
ULAMA**

## 2.1. Introduction

In the midst of radicalism phenomenon, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) faces a serious challenge as a moderate Islamic mass organization. Since the freedom tap opened along with the collapse of the New Order regime, the phenomenon of radicalism showed a tendency to get stronger. One of the instruments used by radical groups to spread their religious understanding is the mosque. P3M research (2017) indicates that of the 100 government mosques that were researched in Jakarta, 41 of them were indicated as radical.<sup>71</sup>

There is no social organization can claim not to be affected by this situation, including NU. At the very least, the phenomenon of the emergence of NU fundamentalist (*NU Garis Lurus*) was considered a symptom of the exposure of several groups within NU from a strict and intolerant religious attitude. The group identified as NU Fundamentalist by some groups is considered to be inclined towards intolerance in religion, both to minority muslim groups and to non-muslims.

Nevertheless, in general, NU showed a very strong consistency towards moderate attitudes in religion. The interpretation of the *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Aswaja) doctrine within a moderate Islamic framework (*tawasut/* moderate, *tawazun/* balanced, *tasamuh/* tolerant, and *ta'adul/* fair or balanced) succeeded in making NU as an Islamic organization that moderately strong in maintaining his religious moderateism.

The Islamic moderateism of NU has led to a firm characteristic towards the phenomenon of religious radicalism which is increasingly strengthened in Indonesia. NU's characteristics is not only narrated and applied by its elites, but also manifested in various organizational policies which until now have been consolidated.

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<sup>71</sup> Research Report "Survei 100 Masjid Kementerian, Lembaga Negara dan BUMN", Jakarta: P3M, 2017.

## 2.2. The Role of Nahdlatul Ulama in Countering Radicalism

### 2.2.1. Nahdlatul Ulama's Responses

NU's perception of radicalism is contrary to the religious understanding. Violence in religion is considered contrary to Islamic teachings. People who teach violence under the pretext of jihad are considered not really understanding Islam.<sup>72</sup>

On one occasion, K.H. Said Agil Siradj, Chair of PBNU, stated:

*"All kinds of actions using violence, especially those in the name of religion by spreading terror, hatred, and violence are not characteristics of the teachings of Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin. Islam condemns all forms of violence. There is not even a single religion in this world justifies violence in life. Whatever the motive, violence, radicalism and terrorism cannot be tolerated nor justified. Because violence injures humanity".<sup>73</sup>*

Radical attitude is believed will give birth to nothing but problems.<sup>74</sup> Radicalism and terrorism are threats to all humanity, no matter what their religion. The ideology behind radicalism and terrorism is an ideology that denies all who disagree.<sup>75</sup> On a national scale, they do not have a national commitment.<sup>76</sup> Therefore, the response taken by NU was very strict, namely facing it directly because what was at stake is the national integration.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>72</sup> <https://tirto.id/ketua-pbnu-said-aqil-kutuk-keras-aksi-napi-terorisme-di-mako-brimob-cKa4> Accessed on 20 March 2019 time 11.23 WIB

<sup>73</sup> <https://infonawacita.com/pasca-ledakan-gereja-di-surabaya-ketum-pbnu-instruksikan-ini-kepada-nahdliyin/> Accessed on 20 March 2019 time 11.28 WIB

<sup>74</sup> <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/15/09/17/nut7al346-kiai-maruf-ingin-nu-menjaga-umat-islam-dari-radikalisme>

<sup>75</sup> <http://www.suaraislam.co/k-h-yahya-cholil-staquf-radikalisme-dan-terorisme-jadi-ancaman-bagi-umat-manusia/> Accessed on 29 March 2019 time 10.10 WIB

<sup>76</sup> <https://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/17/03/27/onhbgc318-kiai-maruf-amin-radikalisme-sekuler-ingin-agama-tak-berkontribusi-di-kehidupan>. Accessed on 22 March 2019 time 9.20 WIB

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/maruf-amin-radikalisme-jangan-sampai-tumbuh-dan-berkembang-di-indonesia.html> Accessed on 22 March 2019 time 9.23 WIB; <https://news.detik.com/berita/4307280/maruf->

NU's official response and statement towards radicalism can be seen from the policy documents issued by PBNU. At the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU National Congress in Makassar, NU firmly took a stand against phenomenon of radicalism. This congress can be said as the first step of the NU resistance movement against the phenomenon of radicalism.

The official response stated, *first*, some of the radical conservative groups have led to an acts of intolerance, violence, and extremism and even terrorism with the legitimacy of jihad. The spread of violent ideology and extremism is carried out through various means, not only through mosques, but also through formal education channels. As is known, students are one of the groups most vulnerable to being influenced by the ideology of violence and extremism. This of course has disturbed the harmonious life, religious harmony and even national integration.<sup>78</sup>

*Second*, radical conservative groups fight for the replacement of the Republic of Indonesia into a religious state. Debate on this issue had actually taken place in the preparatory days for independence and the constituent assembly. But the debate was always stalled and finally a solution was found by initiating Pancasila as the value of the state. This happens because Indonesia is a pluralistic country with differences in religion, ethnicity, and social classes. This diversity is the wealth of Indonesian people. But if not managed properly, this pluralism can threaten social cohesion. Even some of these radicalisms have led to a form of terrorism that is claimed to be a form of jihad. Therefore, there are some muslims in Indonesia who sympathize and provide support to terrorists as religious fighters. In fact, Islam opposes and refuses acts of terrorism, and these actions even damaged Islam itself.<sup>79</sup>

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amin-masjid-terpapar-radikalisme-harus-dibersihkan Accessed on 22 March 2019 time 9.13 WIB; <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/871809/ketua-pbnu-lebih-ringan-pornografi-dibanding-radikalisme/full&view=ok> Accessed on 20 March 2019 time 11.06 WIB

<sup>78</sup> Abdul Mun'im DZ, *Hasil-hasil Mukhtamar 32 Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Letjen PBNU: Jakarta, 2011), hlm. 120.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

The National Congress issued following recommendations:

1. Official authorities, religious leaders, preachers, and educators: (1) aware of the dangers of developing radical Islamic understanding of the life of the nation; (2) striving to intensify the spread of Islamic teachings in line with its mission as *rahmatan lil 'âlamîn*, namely by promoting the principles of *tasamuh* (tolerance), *tawassuth* (moderation), and *tawazun* (balanced) in accordance with pluralistic objective conditions; (3) be aware of the emergence of religious radicalism and extremism, so that steps can be taken as needed.
2. The government needs to act decisively to resolve the problem of radicalism. A strategy is needed to deal with this problem comprehensively from various aspects, namely politics, security, culture, and socio-economy.<sup>80</sup>
3. The government and all parties who have a commitment to the Republic of Indonesia must always be aware of the development of understandings that threaten the existence of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila. In this context, religious leaders and organizations have a major task to provide enlightenment about religious insight and nationality in a moderate manner.
4. The government, including the Ministry of Religion, needs to take a more active role as the leading sector in the national strategy to counter religious radicalism, especially overseeing the rising of religious groups and developing an early response system to them whom endanger national integrity.

NU Congress in Makassar resulted important documents regarding NU's response and statement towards radicalism. From here, various policies to encounter radicalism continue to roll. In the PBNU plenary meeting in Yogyakarta March 27-28, 2011, it was decided to recruit and train cadre for NU board members so that they detach from radical ideology.

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<sup>80</sup> Abdul Mun'im DZ, *Hasil-hasil Muktamar 32 Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Setjen PBNU: Jakarta, 2011).

National Meeting of NU Leaders (*Munas Alim Ulama*) in Kempek Islamic Boarding School in Cirebon, Central Java, 15–17 September 2012 called on all parties to contribute to save the Republic from radicalism threat. At the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Jombang, East Java, 1–5 August 2015, radicalism received strong attention. One of the important decisions was to make a program to prevent radicalism systematically, namely through regeneration which is an absolute requirement to become NU board member. Another important decision is to refuse using “kafir” term to non-muslim citizens.

As if radicalism issue has never subsided, NU continues to receive attention. National Meeting of NU Leaders (*Munas Alim Ulama*) in West Nusa Tenggara on November 23–25 2017, raised the theme “Strengthening National Values through Deradicalization Movement and Citizens’ Economic Empowerment”. One of the issued discussed seriously was the revision of the Terrorism Law and hate speech issue. Radicalism, especially in social media, is still attentive in the National Meeting in Banjar City, West Java, February 27 to 1 March 2019. Some of its recommendations include counter hoaxes and encouraging digital literacy, the peace of Papua, campaigning Islamic Cultural thought which moderate and tolerant.

Faced with this situation, there was no other choice for NU than firmly strengthening their moderate Islam’s values. As K.H. Said Aqil Siradj statet, “realizing moderate Islam, tolerant Islam, Islam that gives grace to all humanity. That is what we have in mind, not extreme Islam, radicalism, or even terrorism”.<sup>81</sup>

NU’s response can also be traced in the view of its management regarding the phenomenon of religious violence under the pretext of *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar* (proclaiming for the good and preventing the bad). At present, this issue is a controversial issue in the community because many groups are being vigilant under the pretext of *amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*.

K.H. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh, *Rais Syuriyah* NU in Central Java

<sup>81</sup> <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/article-14-ormas-islam-bersatu-lawan-terorisme-132418008/99820.html>  
 Accesed on 21 March 2019 time 12.05 WIB

emphasized that in implementing *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* must consider the impact of it. He stated, "*Amar ma'ruf* is the way to look for goodness instead of badness."<sup>82</sup>

Most of research informants were agreed to the above statement. K.H. Marzuki Mustamar, Chairperson of PWNU in East Java, analogically said that committing an *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* by violence is the same as washing unclean by urinating. Implementing *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* by violence will only impacted to a greater damage. K.H Marzuki Mustamar said:

*"If by means of violence eventually people will get hurt, right? If someone get hurts, he/she do not accept advice, do not accept Islamic teachings. People do outward wrongdoing, because you misunderstood, their hearts might refuse faith. The heart which refusing faith is far more outrageous than the birth of immorality. So do not do amar ma'ruf in a way that hurts. Eliminating badness but later worse than before, like washing unclean things with urinating."*

<sup>83</sup>

All NU informants in this study did not agree if *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* was manifested in vigilante actions carried out by civil society. Vigilance alone in the name of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* is completely unjustified.

Tolerance is another form of moderate attitude in religion. For NU, the importance of tolerance is mainly related to the fact that life is not only full of diversity, but because human being is a part of society. Everyone is related to each other. Only through tolerance, where people respect each other, prosperity and justice as a nation will be achieved.<sup>84</sup>

Muslimat, the underbow of NU women's organization, also expressed the same commitment. In commemoration of the 73<sup>rd</sup> Anniversary of

<sup>82</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh di office PWNU Central Java Tuesday, 21 May 2019.

<sup>83</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Marzuki Mustamar di office PWNU East Java, Thursday, 9 May 2019.

<sup>84</sup> <http://www.laduni.id/post/read/43660/ketum-pbnu-selalu-tekanan-toleransi-menghormati-kebudayaan-dan-menghargai-perbedaan> Accessed on 25 March 2019 time 13.32 WIB; <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/89164/pbnu-nu-akan-terus-kembangkan-ajaran-toleransi> Accessed on 25 March 2019 time 13.045 WIB

Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama in Gelora Bung Karno, Jakarta, December 27, 2019, the Chairperson of Muslimat NU, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, firmly stated that NU's teaching *tasamuh* (tolerance). Differences must be interpreted as a part of competing for good, not the other way around for reasons of conflicting. For her, moderation is the key to balance between diversity and tolerance in life.<sup>85</sup>

The tolerance idea motivated NU's young generation to give Christmas card for Christians. Mushonifin, a member of GP Ansor in Central Java stated:

*"Our tolerance is quite heavy with the presence of groups that carry the frill of Islam. So now the phenomenon appears that there must be a limit, don't go too far. What, like too far, what do you like? For example, when we visit our Christian friends, we continue to say "Merry Christmas". That would be a strange thing. Many people use very narrow reasoning in looking at it... They don't want to be neighbors with Christians. This is a problem... So then what happened was destroyal of worship houses, persecution of other religious communities in one village. Non-muslims who live there. So I think now we have a very heavy test related to their very limited understandings regarding tolerance."<sup>86</sup>*

Nevertheless, it doesn't mean this issue is accepted in general among villagers or NU members. There are some members who are refuse to greet "Merry Christmas". Adib Sulhi Makki, one of the NU members in Sletreng Village, Kapongan, Situbondo, thinks that Merry Christmas greeting means that Islam justify Christian beliefs. Adib Sulhi Makki stated:

<sup>85</sup> *Media Indonesia*, 27 January 2019; <https://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/213148-muslimat-nu-ajak-anak-bangsa-rawat-toleransi-dan-keberagaman> Accessed on 21 March 2019 time 11.35 WIB

<sup>86</sup> In-depth interview with Mushonifin di office Lembaga Studi Sosial dan Agama (eLSA) Semarang, Saturday, 25 May 2019.

*"I don't think as muslims we should say Merry Christmas or anything like that. Why? Because I believe by greeting it to them, it means we believe to their beliefs. It is not only about social interaction it is also about our beliefs. That's why I don't think it should be done".<sup>87</sup>*

Although there are differences in Merry Christmas greeting, no one accepts violence against other groups. Anggia Ermarini, Chairperson of PP Fatayat NU firmly stated that muslims as the majority should protect minorities and provide mutual respect.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, attacking against different groups, including different religions, are completely unacceptable.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, NU has a concept of brotherhood that is not only fellow muslims (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*) but also fellow citizenship (*ukhuwah wathaniyah*), even fellow humans (*ukhuwah basyariyah*).<sup>90</sup>

NU's commitment has become an inseparable part of its moderation in Islam.<sup>91</sup> In this framework, we must understand that in NU's perception, Indonesia with its Pancasila is non-negotiable. This NU's perception was decided upon by the highest forum after the conference: *Munas Alim Ulama* in Situbondo 1983. The conference resulted following Declaration about Pancasila and Islam.

<sup>87</sup> In-depth interview with Adib Sulhi Makki Ahad, 30 June 2019.

<sup>88</sup> In-depth interview with Anggia Ermarini di office Kemenpora, Wednesday, 15 May 2019.

<sup>89</sup> In-depth interview with Savic Ali at PBNU Jakarta, Thursday, 23 May 2019.

<sup>90</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Syafruddin Syarif at PWNU East Java, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

<sup>91</sup> <http://wartakota.tribunnews.com/2016/10/22/ketua-pbnu-tolak-radikalisme-dan-terorisme> Accessed on 20 March 2019 time 10.59 WIB.

## Declaration about Pancasila and Islam <sup>92</sup>

*Bismillahirrahmanirrahim*

1. Pancasila as the basis and philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia. It cannot be replaced by religion and used to replace the position of religion.
2. The Principle of God as the state basis of the Republic of Indonesia according to article 29 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, which reflects other precepts, monotheism in terms of faith in Islam.
3. For Nahdlatul Ulama, Islam is *aqidah* and *sharia*, including human relation aspects with God and society.
4. The acceptance and implementation of Pancasila is an embodiment of Indonesian muslims efforts to implement their religious sharia.
5. As a consequence of the above attitude, Nahdlatul Ulama is obliged to secure the correct understanding of Pancasila and its pure and consistent practice by all parties.

*National Conference of Alim Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama Sukorejo, Situbondo, 16 Rabiul Awwal 1404 H (December 21, 1983)*

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<sup>92</sup> Abdul Mun'im DZ, *Piagam Perjuangan Kebangsaan*, (Jakarta: Setjen PBNU-NU Online, 2011).

One of the Islamic preachers (*kiai*) who initiated to this declaration, K.H. As'ad Syamsul Arifin from Salafiyah Syafi'iyah Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in Sukerojo, Asembagus, stated emphatically that: "If Pancasila damaged, NU must be responsible!" Muslims must defend Pancasila! This is already *mujma' alaih* (consensus of the Islamic preachers/ *ulama*)! Muslims must accepts Pancasila and is forbidden to refuse."<sup>93</sup>

The national meeting was reaffirmed at the 27<sup>th</sup> NU Congress in Situbondo, 1984. This conference resulted in the decision NU's acceptance of Pancasila. One important figures in NU's acceptance of Pancasila as the sole principle was K.H. Achmad Siddiq. He poured his thoughts on Pancasila in an Islamic perspective with the title "Norms of Pancasila in the view of of Islam". He detailed the Pancasila precepts of Pancasila and is associated with Islamic teachings.<sup>94</sup>

NU's commitment to the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila is indeed strongly and continuously voiced by NU figures. The consideration, if seen again, is inline with NU's arguments against radicalism, namely the desire to uphold the common good (*al-maslahah*). K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) repeatedly explained that there was no reason for muslims to refuse Pancasila. Muslims have the right to practice their religious beliefs without discriminating against other religious beliefs. For Abdurrahman, running Pancasila is the same as implementing Islamic law in the concept of national and state life<sup>95</sup>

Strictly speaking, Gus Dur stated:

*"Without Pancasila, the country will disband. Pancasila is a set of principles and it will last forever. It is the idea of a country that we must have and fight for. And I will fight for Pancasila with my life, no*

<sup>93</sup> <http://www.muslimoderat.net/2017/04/kh-asad-syamsul-arifin-umat-islam-wajib-menerima-pancasila.html>  
 Accessed on 22 March 2019 time 10.56 WIB

<sup>94</sup> Achmad Siddik, *Norma-norma Pancasila Menurut Pandangan Islam*, (tth), 4.

<sup>95</sup> <https://www.gomuslim.co.id/read/news/2016/06/01/514/ternyata-ada-kiai-ini-di-balik-perumusan-lima-sila.html> Accessed on 22 March 2019 time 10.56 WIB

*matter what it will be castrated by the Armed Forces or manipulated by muslims people.* <sup>96</sup>

NU's support for Pancasila continues to gain strengthening momentum. At the NU's Leaders National Meeting (*Munas Alim Ulama*) in Kempek, Cirebon, West Java in 2012 also discussed what is referred to as the Pancasila state according to Islam. The following results of the national meeting were:

- The presence of the state is a necessity, both sharply and *'aqli*, because many teachings of the Shari'a are not possible without the presence of the state.
- The presence of the state is a necessity in Islam, it is not a purpose (*ghayah*) but a space (*wasilah*). Thus, Islam does not determine the state and government models for its people.
- The purpose of the state is the realization of the interest of its people, physically and mentally, both at the world and hereafter. For this reason, every government policy towards its people must refer to their interest.
- The Republic of Indonesia is the consensus of the nation's agreement (*mu'ahadah wathaniyyah*) with Pancasila as the basic value.
- Although Indonesia is not an Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah*), it is legitimate from an Islamic perspective. Likewise Pancasila as the basic value of Indonesia, even though it is not a Sharia/ religion, it does not contradict, even in harmony with Islam.
- As a consequence of our unity as the Republic of Indonesia, all elements of the nation are required to defend their sovereignty. The government and civil society have their respective rights and obligations. The government is obliged to realize the prosperity and welfare of its people in a fair and devout manner. And civil society

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<sup>96</sup> Douglas E. Ramage, *Percaturan Politik Di Indonesia: Demokrasi, Islam, dan Ideologi Toleransi* (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2002), 80.

are obliged to obey their government, as long as it does not contradict to Islamic teachings.<sup>97</sup>

NU's statement and response above were consolidated structurally. K.H Zaini Shonhaji, Chair of Situbondo PCNU, said Pancasila was the same as *Mitsaqa Madinah*, the Charter of Media, therefore by accepting Pancasila was actually imitating Prophet Muhammad.<sup>98</sup>

NU's firm response towards Pancasila and Indonesian Republic has implications for the rejection of any efforts that will change Pancasila and Republic of Indonesia. Imron Rosyidi, Deputy Secretary (*Katib*) of the Syuriyah MWC NU Panji Situbondo, the discussion about Pancasila was final by the scholars as the founding fathers of the nation. He stated, "anyone who wants to replace Pancasila and our nation state must be resisted and the authorities must take action because it is threatening our nation."<sup>99</sup>

Because of such a view, there is no longer necessary to replace Pancasila with Islamic sharia.<sup>100</sup> As a consequence of Pancasila, formalization of Islamic sharia is automatically unnecessary.<sup>101</sup> According to Ismail Marzuki,<sup>102</sup> Secretary of Takmir Institute for PWNU Central Java Mosque, Islamic law has been running in Indonesia. "We are already shari'a... What else do we want to fight for? Everything is in harmony with Islam. The Shari'a is finished and Islamic law is recognized by material law".

Nur Rofiah,<sup>103</sup> Executive Board of NU Muslimat Center, also emphasized that Indonesia was indeed not an Islamic state. However, according to Nur rofiah, the essence of the applicable law is in accordance with Islam, such as, not being allowed to commit a crime and giving punishment to those who harm others. In fact, Rais Syuriyah PWNU Central

<sup>97</sup> Ulil Abshar Hadrawy (ed.), *Hasil Keputusan Munas Alim Ulama dan Konbes NU* (Jakarta: LTN PBNU, 2012), 3-5.

<sup>98</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Zaini Shonhaji, in Situbondo, Thursday, 9 May 2019.

<sup>99</sup> In-depth interview with Imron Rosyidi, di Mimbaan Situbondo, Friday, 17 May 2019.

<sup>100</sup> <http://www.satuharapan.com/read-detail/read/ketua-nu-terusik-banyak-guru-agama-dukung-hukum-syariat> Accessed on 28 March 2019 time 10.38 WIB

<sup>101</sup> <https://m.merdeka.com/politik/kh-hasyim-muzadi-tidak-perlu-perda-syariah-0nkcazy.html#> Accessed on 25 March 2019 time 12.56 WIB

<sup>102</sup> In-depth interview with Ismail Marzuki in Semarang Thursday, 16 May 2019.

<sup>103</sup> In-depth interview with di kediaman Nur Rofiah, Friday, 17 May 2019.

Java, K.H. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh,<sup>104</sup> , found it strange that a group of people were fighting for the formalization of Islamic law. According to Ubaidillah, everything is in accordance with Islamic law.

Meanwhile, Tazkiyatul Muthmainnah, Chairman of the Central Jawa PWNU Fatayat, expressed his disapproval of the efforts to formalize Islamic law because it would hurt the diversity of the nation. He firmly stated, “we are diverse, our founding fathers are diverse, who struggle not only muslims. So I still agree with Pancasila. For Islamic law in the context of nationalism it is not appropriate.”<sup>105</sup> The same opinion was also expressed by Yeni Lutfiana, Secretary of PWNU Fatayat East Java.<sup>106</sup>

Deputy Secretary (*Katib*) Syuriyah of the MWC NU Panji, Situbondo, Imron Rosyidi, emphasized the same thing. For him, Indonesia is a pluralistic country, in which there are many religions. Thus, according to him, the implementation of Islamic law is not appropriate because it will only cause jealousy, hatred, and even hostility among fellow citizens.<sup>107</sup>

At the end, the implementation of Islamic law cannot ignore aspects of the common good (*al-maslahah*). This is what is explicitly stated by K.H. Marzuki Mustamar, Chair of PWNU East Java. For him, the law must ultimately be beneficial to *maslahah* or common good. *Maslahah* means that the better the community, the more harmonious the state remains united. If the implementation of Islamic law actually gives negative impact, he expressly stated, “don’t force it!”<sup>108</sup>

Because of this, it is understandable that NU’s stance firmly fused the existence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and supported its dissolution by the government.<sup>109</sup> NU’s consolidated view in this matter could be said that they received broader support from its followers when it opposed HTI. All

<sup>104</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh in PWNU Central Java Tuesday, 21 May 2019.

<sup>105</sup> In-depth interview with Tazkiyatul Muthmainnah at Fatayat PWNU Central Java Saturday, 18 May 2019.

<sup>106</sup> In-depth interview with Yeni Lutfiana at PWNU East Java, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

<sup>107</sup> In-depth interview with di kediaman Imron Rosyidi, Mimbaan Situbondo, Friday, 17 May 2019.

<sup>108</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Marzuki Mustamar at PWNU East Java, Thursday, 9 May 2019.

<sup>109</sup> Said Aqil Siradj, *NU: Pembubaran HTI Bukan Pembatasan Dakwah Islam*, <http://mediaindonesia.com/read/detail/104506-nu-pembubaran-hti-bukan-pembatasan-dakwah-islam>, 2 April 2019, Accessed on 11:50 WIB

informants in this research expressed their support for the dissolution of HTI. HTI itself was officially dissolved by the government on July 10, 2017 through Government Regulations Number 2 of 2017 which replaced Law Number 17 of 2013. However, HTI tried to sue through the Jakarta State Administrative court (PTUN). Nevertheless, on May 7, 2018, the Court rejected the lawsuit filed by HTI.

Taking all of this into account, it is understandable why NU's response to the phenomenon of radicalism seems so hard. Radicalism which is driven by ideology of intolerance and violence is felt not only to pose a direct threat to society but also to the life of the state nation. For NU, keeping the values of Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila is a religious attitude it believes.

NU's responses to the phenomenon of radicalism can be seen in chronological as follow:

**TABLE 1** *NU's responses to The Phenomenon of Radicalism*

WAKTU	BENTUK RESPONS
21 December 1983	National Meeting of Alim Ulama NU in Situbondo: NU accepts Pancasila as the sole principle. In this national meeting, Pancasila Declaration was initiated, one of which emphasized that Pancasila was not contrary to Islam.
8–12 December 1984	The 27 <sup>th</sup> NU Congress in Situbondo: reaffirming NU's commitment to accept Pancasila as the sole basis or foundation of NU's organization.
25– 28 November 1989	The 28 <sup>th</sup> NU Congress in Krapyak, Yogyakarta: resulting "Guidelines for Political Citizens of NU" consisting of 9 points. The first point stated, "politics for NU means the involvement of citizens in national and state life as a whole in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 constitution."
1–5 December 1994	The 29 <sup>th</sup> NU Congress in Cipasung, Tasikmalaya, West Java: one of the decisions was that Islam provides guarantees and tolerance is maintaining joint relations by putting universal values such as justice, togetherness, and honesty in maintaining shared life, with not denying differences in certain matters.
21–27 November 1999	The 30 <sup>th</sup> NU Congress at Lirboyo, Kediri, East Java: one of the decisions was that democracy is an ideal choice and does not conflict with Islam.
28 November–2 December 2004	The 31 <sup>st</sup> NU Congress in Boyolali, Central Java: one of the decisions was to reaffirm the national commitment that was fading due to the crisis situation and excessive reformation spirit, loss of national integrity, and the emergence of federalism, and even separatist movements that threatened Indonesia's national unity.

22–28 March 2010	The 32 <sup>nd</sup> NU Congress in Makassar, South Sulawesi: NU firmed expressively its concern and rejection of the phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia.
15–17 September 2012	National Meeting of Alim Ulama NU in Kempek, Cirebon, West Java: one of the recommendations is to ask Islamic organizations to contribute ideas to save the life of the nation from transnational ideologies and movements, such as radicalism.
13–15 June 2014	National Meeting of Alim Ulama in Jakarta decided that the Republic of Indonesia was the result of a noble national agreement among the nation’s founding fathers. Therefore, every path and attempt to emerge movements that threaten the integrity of Republic of Indonesia must be prevented, including the idea of <i>Khilafah</i> .
1–5 August 2015	The 33 <sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Jombang, East Java: Nusantara Islam was created. The national commitment is confirmed through the absence of the mention of <i>kafir</i> for non-muslim citizens.
23–25 November 2017	NU National Meeting in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara: one important decision was about hate speech which is considered as a <i>munkar</i> and the importance of preventing terrorism.
27 Februari hingga 1 Maret 2019	NU National Meeting in Miftahul Huda al-Azhar Islamic boarding school ( <i>pesantren</i> ) in Citangkolo, Banjar, West Java: discussed several important issues regarding radicalism through social media. Some of the recommendations were including warding off hoax and promoting digital literacy, Papuan peace, and campaigning for an insight into the “Islam Nusantara”.

## 2.2.2. Nahdlatul Ulama's Efforts

NU's views and responses above eventually led to various efforts, both directly and indirectly, to counter radicalism. These efforts are as follows:

### "Islam Nusantara": Friendly, Tolerant and Moderate Islam

"Islam Nusantara" became the theme of the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Jombang, East Java, August 1-5, 2015. The theme was "Strengthening "Islam Nusantara" for Indonesian and World Civilizations." In a discussion in East Java on July 27, 2015, PBNU Chairperson, K.H. Said Agil Siradj explained, "Islam Nusantara" is not a new thought or sect in Islam. "Islam Nusantara" is a concept that explores and elevates the distinctiveness of Islam in Indonesia. He returned that "Islam Nusantara" to the practice of Walisongo teachings. "Islam Nusantara" is an Islam that is far from violence and fused with Indonesian culture.<sup>110</sup>

Azyumardi Azra understands that "Islam Nusantara" as distinctive Islam that results from the interaction, contextualization, indigenization, and vernacularisation of universal Islam with social, cultural, and religious realities in Indonesia. The orthodoxy of "Islam Nusantara" (Asy'ar, Shafi'ite fiqh, and sufism al-Ghazali) fostered the character of Islam *wasathiyah* (moderate and tolerant).<sup>111</sup>

"Islam Nusantara" is a way of understanding and practicing Islamic teachings carried out by the nation so that it becomes a system of values, traditions, and Islamic culture that is uniquely "Nusantara". In the expression of K.H. Afifuddin Muhajir from Ma'had Aly Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) Sukorejo, Situbondo whom also Rais Syuriyah PBNU,

<sup>110</sup> <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/15/08/02/nsfsf2318-ini-penjelasan-kiai-nu-bagi-penolak-islam-nusantara>, Accessed on 7 October 2019.

<sup>111</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Islam Nusantara" Jaringan Global dan Lokal Karya (Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 15; Lihat juga Azyumardi Azra, "Ortodoksi "Islam Nusantara" adalah Kalam (teologi) Asy'ariah, Fiqh Syafi'i, dan Tasawuf al-Ghazali" dalam Ahmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz (eds.), "Islam Nusantara": Dari Ushul Fiqh hingga Paham Kebangsaan (Bandung: Mizan 2015), 172.

“Islam Nusantara”, is a thought, practice, and Islam implementation in the *muamalah fiqh* segment as a result of dialectics between texts, sharia, and ‘*urf*, culture, and reality in Islam.<sup>112</sup> In other words, “Islam Nusantara” is the understanding and practice of Islam in Indonesia as a result of dialectics of shari’a texts with local realities and culture.<sup>113</sup>

In line with Afifudin Muhadjir, Zainul Milal Bizawie interpreted “Islam Nusantara” as a distinctive Indonesian perspective of Islam, a combination of theological Islamic values of local traditions, culture, and customs in Indonesia.<sup>114</sup> Isom Yusqi mentioned that “Islam Nusantara” is the term used to compose Islamic teachings and understandings with the local culture and wisdom of Indonesia which in principle does not conflict with the basic values of Islamic teachings.<sup>115</sup>

However, “Islam Nusantara” is not only Islamic practice and understanding, but also the methodology of *da’wah*. That is why, according to Faris Khoirul Anam, “Islam Nusantara” is a methodology of preaching to understand and apply the universality of Islamic teachings in accordance with the principles of *Ahlussunnah Wal Jamā’ah*, in a model that has undergone a process of contact with traditions in Indonesia. As a method of *da’wah* “Islam Nusantara” follows the teaching method that Walisongo has practiced, which is to integrate spiritual and secular aspects in broadcasting Islam, present peacefully, tolerate local traditions and then modify them to conform to Islamic teachings.<sup>117</sup>

The study of “Islam Nusantara” is not just a study of Islam in Indonesia, but also Islamic values that exist in this region which have grown and developed over the centuries. This civilization was built by saints

<sup>112</sup> <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/60458/maksud-istilah-islam-nusantara>, Accessed on 11 October 2019.

<sup>113</sup> Afifuddin Muhajir, “Meneguhkan “Islam Nusantara” untuk Peradaban Indonesia dan Dunia” dalam Akhmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz (eds.), *“Islam Nusantara” dari Ushul Fiqh hingga Paham Kebangsaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 2015), 67.

<sup>114</sup> Zainul Milal Bizawie, ““Islam Nusantara” sebagai Subjek dalam Islamic Studies: Lintas Diskursus dan Metodologis” dalam Ahmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz, *“Islam Nusantara”: Dari Ushul Fiqh Hingga Paham Kebangsaan*, (Bandung: Mizan 2015) hlm. 239. Lihat juga Zainul Milal Bizawie, *Masterpiece “Islam Nusantara”*, (Tangerang: Pustaka Compass, 2016).

<sup>115</sup> Yusqi, M Ishom. *“Islam Nusantara”: Mengarusutamakan Konsep dan Gerakan “Islam Nusantara”* (Jakarta: STAINU, 2015).

<sup>117</sup> Abdurrahman Mas’ud, *Dari Haramain ke Nusantara: Jejak Intelektual Arsitek Pesantren*, (Jakarta: Kencana, 2006), 54.

and scholars throughout history from the *Samudera Pasai* to Papua.<sup>118</sup>

“Islam Nusantara is NU’s ijtihad to introduce the uniqueness of Indonesian Islam while at the same time returning Islamic understanding and movement to Indonesian culture that is friendly, tolerant, and moderate. “Islam Nusantara” is also an attempt by NU to develop a more down-to-earth religious model as a “counterpoint” to the transnational Islamic tendency that ignores, even opposes, local culture and places more emphasis on Arabic culture.

### **Book Publishing**

One of NU’s efforts is publishing books that directly or indirectly provide an understanding of the religious importance to moderate and prevent radicalism in Indonesia. Some of these books are published by official NU institutions while others are published publicly.

Here are the following books::

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<sup>118</sup> Said Agil Siradj, *Islam sebagai Sumber Inspirasi Budaya Nusantara*, (Jakarta: LTN NU, 2015), 204.

**TABLE 2** *List of Books*

<b>NO.</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>WRITER/ EDITOR</b>	<b>PUBLISHER</b>	<b>YEAR</b>
1	"Islam Nusantara"	Nasaruddin Umar	Elex Media Komputindo Jakarta	2019
2	"Islam Nusantara" Inspirasi Peradaban Dunia	Juri Ardiantara dan Munawir Aziz	LTN NU Jakarta	2018
3	"Islam Nusantara", Manhaj Dakwah Islam Aswaja di Nusantara	Tim PW LBM NU East Java	PW LTN NU East Java- PW LBM NU East Java	2018
4	Gus Dur, "Islam Nusantara" dan Kewarganegaraan Bineka	Ahmad Suaedy	Gramedia Jakarta	2018
5	Wahabi Menuduh, NU Menjawab	Sholeh Qosim, dkk.	LTM-PBNU	2018
6	Nasionalisme Kaum Sarungan	A. Helmy Faishal Zaini	Penerbit Buku Kompas Jakarta	2018
7	"Islam Nusantara" Islam Indonesia: Ijtihad Kemaslahatan Bangsa	M. Imdadun Rahmat	LKiS Yogyakarta	2018
8	Meluruskan Pandangan Keagamaan Kaum Jihadis	Khamami Zada	Dirjen Pendis Kemenag RI	2018
9	Mendidik Kader Bangsa Nasionalis Religius "Buah Pemikiran Prof K.H. Saifuddin Zuhri:	W Eka Wahyudi	Pustaka Tebuireng Jombang	2018

	Tentang Islam, Pendidikan, dan Nasionalisme”			
10	Ideologi Kaum Fundamental: Menjawab Kegagalan Persoalan Agama & Negara	A. Dwi Hendro Sunarko Ginting dan Abdul Ghopur	LKSB	2018
11	Menjadi Islam, Menjadi Indonesia	M. Zidni Nafi’	Elex Media Komputindo	2018
12	NU Penjaga NKRI	Agus Sunyoto, dkk.	Kanisius Yogyakarta	2018
13	Fikih Kebangsaan, Merajut Kebersamaan di Tengah Kebinekaan	K.H. Athoillah Sholahuddin Anwar	Bahtsul Masail HIMASAL Lirboyo Kediri	2018
14	Membangun Nalar Islam Moderat: Kajian Metodologis	K.H. Afifuddin Muhajir	Tanwirul Afkar Situbondo	2018
15	Moderatisme Fatwa: Diskursus, Teori, dan Praktik	Syafiq Hasyim, dkk.	ICIP Jakarta	2018
16	Gus! Sketsa Seorang Guru Bangsa	Alamsyah M. Djafar dan Wiwit R. Fatkhurrahman	Elex Media Komputindo Jakarta	2017
17	Buku Pintar “Islam Nusantara”	Muhammad Sulton Fatoni	Ilman Bogor	2017
18	Fikih Toleransi	Syarif Yahya	Aswaja Pressindo	2016
19	Pedoman Muharrir dan Ta’mir Masjid NU	Abdul Manan Ghani	LTM-PBNU	2016

20	Masterpiece "Islam Nusantara"	Zainul Milal Bizawie	Pustaka Compass Tangerang	2016
21	Islam sebagai Sumber Inspirasi Budaya Nusantara	Said Agil Siradj	LTN NU Jakarta	2015
22	Berkah Islam Indonesia	Said Agil Siradj	Elex Media Komputindo Jakarta	2015
23	"Islam Nusantara": Mengarusutamakan Konsep dan Gerakan "Islam Nusantara"	M Ishom Yusq	STAINU Jakarta	2015
24	"Islam Nusantara": Dari Ushul Fiqh hingga Paham Kebangsaan	Akhmad Sahal	Mizan Bandung	2015
25	Ijtihad Politik "Islam Nusantara": Membumikan Fikih Siyasah Melalui Pendekatan Maqashid asy-Syari'ah	Yahya Cholil Staquf	Lirboyo Press	2015
26	Meneguhkan "Islam Nusantara"	Ahmad Musthofa Haroen	Khalista Jakarta	2015
27	Nasionalisme dan "Islam Nusantara"	Abdullah Ubaid dan Mohammad Bakir	PT Kompas Media Nusantara Jakarta	2015
28	Membumikan "Islam Nusantara": Respons Islam terhadap Isu-isu Aktual	Ali Masykur Musa	Mizan Bandung	2014

29	"Islam Nusantara": Ijtihad Jenius dan Ijma' Ulama Nusantara	Ahmad Baso	Pustaka Afid Tangerang	2014
30	Bekal Pembela Aswaja Menghadapi Radikalisme Wahabi	Muhammad Idrus Ramli,	Aswaja NU Center Surabaya	2013
31	"Islam Nusantara" Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam di Indonesia	Nor Huda	Arruzz Media Yogyakarta	2013

## Online Activism

One of the method in radical understanding is through online media. To counter the act NU requires a strong online movement. This initiative is a choice that is really carried out by NU, both through official media of NU and developed by individuals who are ideologically and organizationally affiliated to NU.

In terms of numbers, online media managed by NU activists are quite large. They are mostly networked with one another: sharing links, resources, or some content. In fact, they collaborate and strengthen each other. Savic Ali, Director of NU-online stated:

*“Through online world, we reproduce writings, articles, opinions that strengthen nationality spirit and diversity of our people. There are many online, websites created by NU young people. Islami.co, sharia talks, alid.id, laduni.id and others. There is a fiqh house. In Surabaya there is TV9. Many also spoke in offline forums and social media. There are so many I think, there are millions of NU young people on social media, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter who are never tired of voicing the nationality spirit to overcome ethnic and religious differences. We develop what we call NU media syndication where, for example, friends whose websites are still having difficulty content can take from NU online. Like that we developed. So, in terms of content, we exchange content to strengthen and enrich one another. The result was that NU youth voices who were pro-nationality and diversity were stronger. The nationalist view of Islam is prevalent among NU young people and NU young people are very confident when talking about it because their knowledge is well distributed.”<sup>119</sup>*

The following lists are media/ website address which are verified and maintained by NU pr members/ institutions which affiliated with NU.

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<sup>119</sup> In-depth interview with Savic Ali at PBNU Jakarta Thursday, 23 May 2019.

**TABLE 3** List of Website

<b>NO</b>	<b>WEBSITE</b>	<b>ADMINISTRATOR</b>
1	<a href="http://www.nu.or.id">http://www.nu.or.id</a>	NU Online
2	<a href="https://islami.co/">https://islami.co/</a>	Pribadi
3	<a href="https://alif.id/">https://alif.id/</a>	Pribadi
4	<a href="http://www.gusdurian.net/">http://www.gusdurian.net/</a>	Komunitas Gusdurian
5	<a href="http://banyuwangi.nu.or.id">http://banyuwangi.nu.or.id</a>	PCNU Banyuwangi
6	<a href="http://jombang.nu.or.id">http://jombang.nu.or.id</a>	PCNU Jombang
7	<a href="http://www.alfachriyah.org">http://www.alfachriyah.org</a>	Ponpes Al Fachriyah
8	<a href="http://www.alfikr.co">http://www.alfikr.co</a>	Ponpes Nurul Jadid
9	<a href="http://www.ansor.or.id">http://www.ansor.or.id</a>	PP GP Ansor
10	<a href="http://www.ansorjateng.net">http://www.ansorjateng.net</a>	Ansor Jateng
11	<a href="http://www.ansorjatim.or.id">http://www.ansorjatim.or.id</a>	Ansor Jatim
12	<a href="http://www.annahmah.co.id">http://www.annahmah.co.id</a>	Tim Arrahmah
13	<a href="http://www.aswajacenter.com">http://www.aswajacenter.com</a>	Tim Aswaja Center
14	<a href="http://www.aswajamuda.com">http://www.aswajamuda.com</a>	--
15	<a href="http://www.aswajanu.com">http://www.aswajanu.com</a>	PPM Aswaja
16	<a href="http://www.aswajanucenterjatim.com">http://www.aswajanucenterjatim.com</a>	Aswaja Center Jatim
17	<a href="http://www.aswajaonline.com">http://www.aswajaonline.com</a>	--
18	<a href="http://www.aswj-rg.com">http://www.aswj-rg.com</a>	Tim Aswaja Research
19	<a href="http://www.auleea.com">http://www.auleea.com</a>	PWNU Jatim
20	<a href="http://www.bersholawat.net">http://www.bersholawat.net</a>	--
21	<a href="http://www.cahayanabawiy.com">http://www.cahayanabawiy.com</a>	--
22	<a href="http://www.cyberdakwah.com">http://www.cyberdakwah.com</a>	Tim PP SS Sukorejo, Situbondo
23	<a href="http://www.dakwah.web.id">http://www.dakwah.web.id</a>	--
24	<a href="http://www.dakwahpbnu.id">http://www.dakwahpbnu.id</a>	PP LDNU
25	<a href="http://www.dinulqoyim.com">http://www.dinulqoyim.com</a>	--
26	<a href="http://www.dutaislam.com">http://www.dutaislam.com</a>	Tim Duta Islam
27	<a href="http://www.elhooda.net">http://www.elhooda.net</a>	--
28	<a href="http://www.fikihkontemporer.com">http://www.fikihkontemporer.com</a>	--
29	<a href="http://www.fiqhmenjawab.net">http://www.fiqhmenjawab.net</a>	--
30	<a href="http://www.gusdurfiles.com">http://www.gusdurfiles.com</a>	--

31	<a href="http://www.habiblutfi.net">http://www.habiblutfi.net</a>	Majelis Hb. Lutfi
32	<a href="http://www.halaqoh.net">http://www.halaqoh.net</a>	LTN Jatim
33	<a href="http://www.hikmahislam.com">http://www.hikmahislam.com</a>	PPM Aswaja
34	<a href="http://www.ipnu.or.id">http://www.ipnu.or.id</a>	PP IPNU
35	<a href="http://www.ippnu.or.id">http://www.ippnu.or.id</a>	PP IPPNU
36	<a href="http://www.islam-institute.com">http://www.islam-institute.com</a>	--
37	<a href="http://www.islami.co">http://www.islami.co</a>	--
38	<a href="http://www.islamnusantara.com">http://www.islamnusantara.com</a>	--
39	<a href="http://www.islamsantri.com">http://www.islamsantri.com</a>	--
40	<a href="http://www.islamuna.info">http://www.islamuna.info</a>	Tim Piss KTB
41	<a href="http://www.islamynews.com">http://www.islamynews.com</a>	--
42	<a href="http://www.jalansufi.com">http://www.jalansufi.com</a>	--
43	<a href="http://www.jazirahislam.com">http://www.jazirahislam.com</a>	--
44	<a href="http://www.kabarislamia.com">http://www.kabarislamia.com</a>	--
45	<a href="http://www.kalam-ulama.com">http://www.kalam-ulama.com</a>	--
46	<a href="http://www.kanzunqalam.com">http://www.kanzunqalam.com</a>	--
47	<a href="http://www.lakpesdam.or.id">http://www.lakpesdam.or.id</a>	PP Lakpesdam
48	<a href="http://www.ldnu.or.id">http://www.ldnu.or.id</a>	PP LDNU
49	<a href="http://www.liputanIslam.com">http://www.liputanIslam.com</a>	--
50	<a href="http://www.lirboyo.net">http://www.lirboyo.net</a>	Ponpes Lirboyo
51	<a href="http://www.liriksolawat.com">http://www.liriksolawat.com</a>	--
52	<a href="http://www.lpbi-nu.org">http://www.lpbi-nu.org</a>	PP LPBI NU
52	<a href="http://www.lptnu.org">http://www.lptnu.org</a>	PP LPT NU
53	<a href="http://www.ltnnu.org">http://www.ltnnu.org</a>	PP LTN NU
54	<a href="http://www.maarif-nu.or.id">http://www.maarif-nu.or.id</a>	PP Ma'arif NU
55	<a href="http://www.madinatuliman.com">http://www.madinatuliman.com</a>	Tim Madinatul Iman Kalimantan
56	<a href="http://www.majalahlangitan.com">http://www.majalahlangitan.com</a>	Ponpes Langitan
57	<a href="http://www.majelis.info">http://www.majelis.info</a>	--
58	<a href="http://www.majelisrasulullah.org">http://www.majelisrasulullah.org</a>	Majelis Rasulullah
59	<a href="http://www.matanciputat.com">http://www.matanciputat.com</a>	Matan Ciputat
60	<a href="http://www.matancirebon.com">http://www.matancirebon.com</a>	Matan Cirebon
61	<a href="http://www.media-islam.or.id">http://www.media-islam.or.id</a>	--
62	<a href="http://www.mediasantrinu.com">http://www.mediasantrinu.com</a>	--
63	<a href="http://www.metroislam.com">http://www.metroislam.com</a>	--

64	<a href="http://www.moslemforall.com">http://www.moslemforall.com</a>	PPM Aswaja
65	<a href="http://www.mosleminfo.com">http://www.mosleminfo.com</a>	--
66	<a href="http://www.moslemwiki.com">http://www.moslemwiki.com</a>	PPM Aswaja
67	<a href="http://www.mudimesra.com">http://www.mudimesra.com</a>	Mudi Mesra Aceh
68	<a href="http://www.muslimedianews.com">http://www.muslimedianews.com</a>	Tim MMN
69	<a href="http://www.muslimoderat.net">http://www.muslimoderat.net</a>	Tim MM
70	<a href="http://www.nahdlatul-ulama.org">http://www.nahdlatul-ulama.org</a>	LTN PBNU
71	<a href="http://www.neverblast.com">http://www.neverblast.com</a>	--
72	<a href="http://www.ngaji.web.id">http://www.ngaji.web.id</a>	--
73	<a href="http://www.nu-lampung.or.id">http://www.nu-lampung.or.id</a>	LTN Lampung
74	<a href="http://www.nucare.id">http://www.nucare.id</a>	PP Lazisnu
75	<a href="http://www.nujabar.or.id">http://www.nujabar.or.id</a>	PWNU Jabar
76	<a href="http://www.nujateng.com">http://www.nujateng.com</a>	PWNU Jateng
77	<a href="http://www.nujepara.or.id">http://www.nujepara.or.id</a>	PCNU Jepara
78	<a href="http://www.nukhatulistiwa.com">http://www.nukhatulistiwa.com</a>	PWNU Kalbar
79	<a href="http://www.nukita.id">http://www.nukita.id</a>	LTN Malang
80	<a href="http://www.nukudus.com">http://www.nukudus.com</a>	--
81	<a href="http://www.nutizen.com">http://www.nutizen.com</a>	Nutizen
82	<a href="http://www.nutv.nu">http://www.nutv.nu</a>	--
83	<a href="http://www.pesantrenvirtual.com">http://www.pesantrenvirtual.com</a>	--
84	<a href="http://www.piss-ktb.com">http://www.piss-ktb.com</a>	Tim Piss KTB
85	<a href="http://www.pondoktremas.com">http://www.pondoktremas.com</a>	PP Tremas
86	<a href="http://www.ppmaswaja.org">http://www.ppmaswaja.org</a>	PPM Aswaja
87	<a href="http://www.pppmmiftahulkhoir.com">http://www.pppmmiftahulkhoir.com</a>	--
88	<a href="http://www.pwansorjabar.org">http://www.pwansorjabar.org</a>	Ansor Jabar
89	<a href="http://www.pwnubali.or.id">http://www.pwnubali.or.id</a>	LTN Bali
90	<a href="http://www.pwnudiy.or.id">http://www.pwnudiy.or.id</a>	PWNU Yogja
91	<a href="http://www.pwnujatim.or.id">http://www.pwnujatim.or.id</a>	PWNU Jatim
92	<a href="http://www.riyadluljannah.org">http://www.riyadluljannah.org</a>	Ponpes Riyadlul Jannah
93	<a href="http://www.rumah-islam.com">http://www.rumah-islam.com</a>	--
94	<a href="http://www.salafynews.com">http://www.salafynews.com</a>	--
95	<a href="http://www.salamsantri.com">http://www.salamsantri.com</a>	--
96	<a href="http://www.santri.net">http://www.santri.net</a>	--
97	<a href="http://www.santrigusdur.com">http://www.santrigusdur.com</a>	--

98	<a href="http://www.santrimenara.com">http://www.santrimenara.com</a>	--
99	<a href="http://www.santrinews.net">http://www.santrinews.net</a>	--
100	<a href="http://www.santrionline.net">http://www.santrionline.net</a>	--
101	<a href="http://www.sarkub.com">http://www.sarkub.com</a>	--
102	<a href="http://www.satuislam.org">http://www.satuislam.org</a>	--
103	<a href="http://www.sekolahprogresif.sch.id">http://www.sekolahprogresif.sch.id</a>	--
104	<a href="http://www.seputarnu.com">http://www.seputarnu.com</a>	--
105	<a href="http://www.serambimata.com">http://www.serambimata.com</a>	--
106	<a href="http://www.soearamoeria.com">http://www.soearamoeria.com</a>	--
107	<a href="http://www.suara-muslim.com">http://www.suara-muslim.com</a>	--
108	<a href="http://www.suaradamai.com">http://www.suaradamai.com</a>	--
109	<a href="http://www.suarapesantren.net">http://www.suarapesantren.net</a>	--
110	<a href="http://www.sufinews.com">http://www.sufinews.com</a>	Tim Cahaya Sufi
111	<a href="http://www.sufitube.com">http://www.sufitube.com</a>	--
112	<a href="http://www.syekhermania.or.id">http://www.syekhermania.or.id</a>	--
113	<a href="http://www.tasamuh.id">http://www.tasamuh.id</a>	--
114	<a href="http://www.tebuireng.org">http://www.tebuireng.org</a>	Ponpes Tebuireng
115	<a href="http://www.unisnu.ac.id">http://www.unisnu.ac.id</a>	--
116	<a href="http://www.wahidinstitute.org">http://www.wahidinstitute.org</a>	Wahid Institute
117	<a href="http://www.wartaislami.com">http://www.wartaislami.com</a>	--

## Regeneration

The regeneration that is currently being carried out intensively by PBNU is the mandate of the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Makassar, March 22–28, 2010. In the Congress result issued by PBNU it was stated that the Congress was aware of the importance of regeneration. The poor recruitment system in the management of NU is inseparable from the underdeveloped system of NU's functional capabilities in the regeneration process and inaccurate ways and personal recruitment of management officials in the past.<sup>120</sup>

Care formation is one of the 16 strategic programs launched by the 30<sup>th</sup> NU Congress in Makassar and As'ad Said Ali, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of PBNU.<sup>121</sup> The regeneration team then compiled a module and formed a technical team for the regeneration this program was later given the name Nahdlatul Ulama Activist Education (PKP-NU).<sup>122</sup>

The event of Nahdlatul Ulama Activist Education (PKP-NU) has been held at Rengasdengklok, Education Center in Karawang 12 times since 2012 and has been joined by 270 NU cadres from various regions in Indonesia. PKP-NU from the 1<sup>st</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> batches in Rengasdengklok cover all regional administrators in Indonesia, even some branch managers. PKP-NU continues to roll throughout Indonesia. At the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Jombang August 1–5, 2015, the education has taken 12 places at the national level and 87 regional level forces with a total of 2.430 cadres participating.<sup>123</sup>

After the 33<sup>rd</sup> NU Congress in Jombang, the cadre training format changed to the NU School Cadre (MKNU/ *Madrasah Kader NU*). The 33<sup>rd</sup> Congress formulated a variety of cadres and their qualifications are as follows:

1. Structural cadres of NU, namely NU management at all levels (starting from PBNU level to the branch offices), institution management, committees and administrators of autonomous

<sup>120</sup> Abdul Mun'im DZ, *Hasil-hasil Mukhtamar 32 Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Letjen PBNU: Jakarta, 2011), 97.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 104 & 108-109.

<sup>122</sup> Setjend PBNU, *Laporan Tahunan, Annual Report, Nahdlatul Ulama 2010–2012*, 55.

<sup>123</sup> Rumadi dkk (ed.), *Hasil-hasil Mukhtamar NU ke-33 Nahdlatul Ulama*, (Jakarta: LTN-PBNU, 2016), 334.

bodies to increase their capacity to lead, mobilize citizens and manage NU organizations/ institutions.

2. Cadre of *Ulama* namely preparing NU syuriyah candidates at all levels of NU management, both from the Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) and externally. It is hoped that young scholars will be born who are ready to become NU syuriyahs.
3. NU Activist Cadres is NU cadres who have special task of strengthening, securing, maintaining, and transforming the values of NU's struggle and ideology as souls and adhesives in moving NU and its citizen to carry out religious, social, national, and state life for Islamic Aswaja implementation.
4. Functional cadres have roles to preparing next cadres who have functions, duties, and responsibilities as:
  - a) Trainer/ facilitator/ instructor, in training or education activities for regeneration;
  - b) Researchers, who are expected to be able to handle research conducted within NU;
  - c) Team leader for *bahtsul masail* activities
  - d) Team leader to organize and conduct *rukyyatul hilal*
  - e) Companion/ community organizer/ instructor/ community empowerment (various sectors).
5. Professional cadres are NU cadre who are prepared can have opportunity to be in the public institutions, i.e: executive, legislative, judicative, campus or national corporates, both at national and regional levels.<sup>124</sup>

One thing to note, all forms of cadre have a very strong anti-radicalism. It could be said that there was anti-radicalism mainstreaming in all cadre formation within NU.

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*, 346-347.

## Institutional Program Implementation and NU's Autonomous Institution

On one occasion, PBNU Secretary General Helmy Faishal Zaini ensured that the organization's official decisions related to radicalism were followed up in various programs. Autonomous bodies and various institutions of NU were also encouraged to develop de-radicalization program. In fact, PBNU specifically developed NCC (Nusantara Command Center), one of which is to conduct media data analysis, including social media. In this connection, PBNU developed NU Channel, which already has around five hundred thousand followers. To deal with the media war, PBNU also prepared buzzers. At present, PBNU is starting to target millennial groups through the preparation of resource persons who can preach and communicate with young people.<sup>125</sup>

Beyond the activities carried out by PBNU, there are number of other activities carried out by autonomous bodies and institutions under PBNU.<sup>126</sup> The following are some of the activities carried out by NU's institutions and autonomous bodies, particularly those related to radicalism.<sup>127</sup>

### 1. National Board Members of Ansor Youth Movement (Pengurus Pusat Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (PP GP Ansor))

GP Ansor organizes many national-themed activities. Activities that are regularly organized are youth and national summit which are usually carried out during national holidays. During 2017–2019, GP Ansor conducted eleven cadre activities in various forms of training in various places, from basic education and training (a total of 5.723 participants) to national leadership training. In every training, anti-radicalism and nationalism are very dominant material.

<sup>125</sup> In-depth interview with Helmy Faishal Zaini at PBNU, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

<sup>126</sup> Institutions or *lajnah* work as implementers of the policies issued by PBNU. Their management was formed and appointed by PBNU and the management period ended according to PBNU management period. The autonomous body is NU's social organization which is managed autonomously. They choose their own management. In contrast to institutions that are accountable to PBNU, the management of an autonomous body is responsible for its members.

<sup>127</sup> The following activities report based on: *Laporan Banom dan Lembaga PBNU 2019* (Jakarta: Setjend PBNU), 2019. The document was compiled from 42 institutions.

Another activity was the the Global Unity Forum (25–28 October 2018) which was participated by interfaith groups to find solutions of violence in the name of religion. This forum was intended to create a fair and harmonious relationship system that was upheld on the basis of respect of human rights and equality.

Ansor regularly organizes *Majlis Dzikir and Sholawat* (MDS) which initiated by Rijalul Ansor, a semi-autonomous body formed by GP Ansor as an implementation of the vision, values, traditions of *Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah An-Nahdliyah*. MDS is organizing a number of dhikr and *salawat* activities which have a moderate Islamic missionary mission/ *rahmatan lil alamin*. Beyond that, MDS also preached to campuses suspected of being infiltrated by radical groups. So far, five campuses have agreed to collaborate with MDS, namely: UI, STAN, ITB, and IPB.

## **2. Maarif Education Center (Lembaga Pendidikan Maarif Nahdlatul Ulama (LP Maarif))**

LP Maarif is an institution under the PBNU which deals with education issues. During 2017–2019, there were several programs that were directly or indirectly related to the issue of radicalism, including:

- FGD on strengthening Islamic wasathiyah in schools (5 July 2018). This activity seeks to design moderate Islamic content in schools that is expected to be carried out not only by NU but especially by the Ministry of Religion and Ministry of Education and Culture.
- Strengthening character education among secondary students in collaboration with the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. This activity was held in Bogor January 16–19 2019.
- Ramadhan Madrasa Mentor Education is intended to equip mentors who will provide Ramadhan madrassas in schools. The debriefing was carried out at PBNU on May 8, 2018.
- Smart school LP Maarif. This program is in the form of technology and information training for schools within Maarif NU in collaboration with the Ministry of Communication and Information. The event was held in

Jakarta, May 19, 2019, with a total of 500 participants divided into 20 terms.

- Writing national, NU and Aswaja textbooks that will be integrated in the curriculum of learning in schools.

### **3. NU's Teachers Association (Persatuan Guru Nahdlatul Ulama (Pergunu))**

Pergunu is an autonomous body which is an association of NU teachers. In the context of preventing radicalism, several activities have been carried out by Pergunu, including:

- Cadre Training. Cadre training is very massive. In these two years, Pergunu has successfully conducted cadre training with a total of 1,300 teachers in various regions, including: DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Lampung. In addition to strengthening Aswaja, the cadre training also presented the danger of radicalism.
- Aswaja book publishing for teachers written directly by the Chairperson of Pergunu, K.H. Asep Saifuddin Halim.
- Making a Private Online Koran Teacher Application. This application is designed to provide Koran teachers with online private methods. This application tries to compensate for the spread of similar applications managed by Wahabis.

### **4. NU's Committee of Research and Development of Human Resources (Lajnah Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nahdlatul Ulama (Lakpesdam NU))**

Lakpesdam is an institution under PBNU related to the development of human resources within NU. Some of the activities related to the prevention of radicalism include:

- Education and Development of Islamic Insights (PPWK). This program has been running regularly since the mid-1990s. As with other cadres in NU, the theme of nationalism and its threats - including radicalism - is one of the topics discussed in this PPWK.

- Strengthening the resilience of ASN (state civil apparatus) in facing the challenges of radicalism. In collaboration with Kemenpan, this activity has been carried out since 2018. One of the works is to create an instrument of Tolerance and Pluralism Awareness and Attitude Test (Exactly). With this instrument, ASN recruitment can be prevented from entering radical groups, including those who are potentially radical.
- Advocacy for the revision of the Adminduk Law, from 2017 to the present. This advocacy is intended to encourage justice in fulfilling the rights of legal identity for every citizen, including minority groups, whether ethnic, ethnic, religious or cultural.
- Advocate for the ratification of the Indigenous Peoples Protection Bill. This program was carried out from August 2018 to December 2019 by building partnerships with the Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN).
- Shia advocacy in Sampang. This was done from August 2018 to August 2019.
- The making of an inclusive film about Chinese and Chinese from January to July 2019. The aim was to disseminate inclusive and tolerant ideas with cinematographic media.

##### **5. Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyah Nahdlatul Ulama (RMI NU)**

RMI NU is an autonomous body that takes care of pesantren educational institutions within NU. The RMI management has organized a number of activities to counter radicalism, including:

- Supervise and be intensively involved in the discussion on the Pesantren Bill that has been passed by the DPR. In this law, prevention of radicalism is sought in such a way, one of which is by emphasizing the national aspect.
- Held a Wasathiyah Islamic Road Map seminar for Indonesia: Islamic Boarding School Contribution, in collaboration with the Ministry of Religion Balitbang (October 2019), which involved participants from 200 pesantren in the Banten, DKI Jakarta and West Java regions.

- Strengthening Aswaja among Islamic boarding schools involving 300 boarding schools. One topic is about the dangers of radicalism.
- Conducting Santri Apples to strengthen the national outlook among Islamic boarding schools conducted on October 20, 2018.
- In the previous period, 2010–2015, PP RMI NU was the executor of the PBNU collaboration with BNPT signed 11 August 2011 to prevent radicalism. Initially in the area of DKI Jakarta, West Java and Banten (2012–2013). In the following year it was expanded to other provinces, including: Central Java, East Java, DI Yogyakarta, South Sulawesi, Maluku, and NTB.

## **6. Muslimat NU**

Muslimat NU can be said to be a female version of NU. Lots of activities organized by the NU Muslimat Center Management related to the prevention of radicalism:

- Aswaja pocket book publishing, in it contains moderate Islam (in the process of printing).
- Creating a Muslimat NU cadre module, which contains the threat of radicalism (the printing process).
- Fostering and forming majelis taklim in the region in order to stem radicalism in the villages.
- To socialize the 4 Pillars for all NU Muslimat administrators on February 20, 2018.
- Increasing the capacity of da'iyah (women) to deliver moderate Islamic messages, carried out in Ternate, North Maluku (23–27 July 2018), Jakarta (3–5 September 2018), NTB (12–16 October 2018), Pekanbaru (19–23 February 2019), Palu (4–8 April 2019).
- Form a Team 9 for the Prevention and advocacy of the dangers of radicalism (May 2019).
- Serasehan to strengthen the role of Muslimat NU in improving the quality of the nation in Nganjuk (10 March 2019), Jakarta (13 March 2019), Bandung (6 March and 14 March 2019), Surabaya (16 March 2019), and Purwokerto (24 March).

## **7. NU Islamic Teachings Institution (Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama (LDNU))**

This is the institution that spearheaded the NU propaganda to balance the massive propaganda of radical groups. Some of the activities carried out include:

- Education of NU Activists (January – April 2019). This is intensive education which is carried out for 3 months (24 meetings).
- Dai Millennial education (21–22 May 2019 and 27 July 2019) capable of managing social media both in terms of content, design and management.
- Print a collection of Friday sermons (July 2019).
- Filling out the propaganda of Ramadan on TV9, NU's internal TV.
- The preacher training was held in October 2019.

## **8. NU Mosque Takmir Institute (Lembaga Takmir Masjid Nahdlatul Ulama (LTM NU))**

Similar with LDNU, LTM NU also has an important role in dealing with radical groups that move through mosques. By protecting the mosque from the influence of radical ideology, the people can be guarded. That is what this institution is doing. Some programs that are carried out related to radicalism are:

- Muharrik (movers) Training of Mosques and Da'wah. This has been done since the institute was active again after the 32nd NU Conference in Makassar 2010. Since 2015, this training has been intensified by being more structured, and has been conducted 36 times in various places in the Nusantara region.
- Training of Trainer (ToT) Madrasah NU Cadres in West Java 11–5 November 2016. This training is expected to be a trainer in their respective places.
- Mosque Pioneer Youth Training is carried out 6 times during 2017.
- Training of Takmir, Khatib, and Dai was conducted 2 times, namely in Purwakarta (2–4 August 2019) and in Sukabumi (23–25 August 2019).

- Assistance and guidance of mosques in the areas organized by the training.

### **9. NU Fatayat (Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama (Fatayat NU))**

Fatayat is an underbow of a young women's organization within NU. This institution includes having a strategic role in preventing radicalism because it deals directly with young women who are often the targets of radical group propaganda. Some of the programs that have been implemented are:

- Compilation of cadre curriculum and modules in 2016. This module was tested in a national level cadre training in Bogor in December 2016.
- Basic Cadre Training in Bogor and Bekasi (August 2019).
- National leadership training involves central, regional and branch management throughout Indonesia.
- Movement to protect children from violence in collaboration with KPAI.
- Formation of the NU Da'iyah Fatayat Forum at the regional and branch levels.
- Conducting anti-radicalism and terrorism workshops for NU Fatayat Da'iyah in Bandung April 20-22, 2017. This activity is in collaboration with BNPT.
- Make 30 minutes interactive shows on the channel @Kvision (Kompas TV) and Dakta TV.
- Creating the Aswaja Da'wah module, which began with a workshop on 3-4 December 2016.
- Mainstreaming gender in preventing violent extremism involving central and regional administrators in the Java zone, and at the Jabodetabek branch level. This activity is in collaboration with the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice in the Working Group of Women and C / PVE.

## Cultural Activism

The terms "structural NU" and "cultural NU" are known. Structural NU refers to the NU administrators who are responsible for carrying out the organization's official programs. Cultural NU refers to NU organizations or citizens who do not participate NU's management or organizational structure, but do activities or movements which are not official NU programs but share the vision and spirit of struggle with NU.

In the context of preventing radicalism, it is impossible to ignore the role played by cultural NU. The following are some of the cultural NU movements that are also engaged in the issue of preventing radicalism.

### 1. Gusdurian Network (Jaringan Gusdurian)

This network is chaired by Alissa Wahid, Gus Dur's first daughter (K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid). The aim was to nurture and carry on Gus Dur's thoughts, ideas and struggles. Gusdurian is a term for students, admirers, and successors to the ideas and struggles of Gus Dur.

This network is spread all over Indonesia, even in foreign countries. In some places, local communities are formed, but most are connected through forums and work dialogues. To establish joint work in the Gusdurian Network arena, the Gusdurian Network National Secretariat was formed. Among the various programs, a very strong and dominant issue is the spread of peace, democracy, and human rights.

### 2. The Wahid Foundation

The Wahid Foundation is an institution managed by NU young people who are engaged in a variety of issues, ranging from issues of democracy, human rights, pluralism, to public policy advocacy. The Wahid Foundation (formerly known as The Wahid Institute) was launched on September 7, 2004, at the Four Seasons Hotel in Jakarta, firmly establishing itself as one of the answers to various acts of terror and communal violence triggered by disputes in the name of religion or ethnic identity.

The Wahid Foundation was established to advance the humanitarian vision of K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) in terms of tolerance, diversity,

community empowerment, democracy, justice, and strengthening the values of peace, and non-violence in Indonesia and throughout the world. Some of The Wahid Foundation's activities in 2018 include:

- Establish 20 peace schools in Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya, each of 5 peace schools;
- Involving 1,171 women in the formation of the Cinta Damai Cooperative spread across Depok (477 cooperative members), Bogor Regency (99 members), Solo (78), Klaten (161), Batu City and Malang (77), and Sumenep (39) ; (2) online campaign of 670 peaceful narrative content including video and graphics with a reach of 2.8 million people;
- Peace campaign: has 24 media networks; 3,530 students; 1,309 students; 500 religious leaders; 400 pesantren;
- Advocating for freedom of religion and belief, advocating for policies on the National Strategy for Strengthening Values and Tolerance Practices, and advocating for the National Action Plan for Combating Extremism of Violence Leading to Terrorism.

### **3. The Islamic Boarding Schools and Community Development Association (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M))**

The Islamic Boarding Schools and Community Development Association (P3M) is an institution that pays attention to the issue of community empowerment and development, by placing pesantren as one of the driving forces. P3M was founded in 1983 by a number of NGO activists, religious leaders, and experts driven by K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). This institution emphasizes the importance of the existence of social instruments in mobilizing and building a life order that prioritizes public morality and benefit based on religious, social and cultural values. Pesantren as one of the social instruments that are concerned in building the nation's character through religious education, contributes greatly to creating a nationalism-oriented diversity.

Departing from the above values, P3M has made various efforts and initiatives to build a liberating religious understanding towards the quality of a just social order. For example, from 2002 to 2007, P3M developed an emancipatory Islamic discourse, namely the search for and enrichment of religious ideas that encourage liberation, change and defense of the weak.

From 2004 to 2016, P3M also strengthened democratic discourse within the santri and pesantren circles, such as the formation of santri leadership as a laboratory for the implementation of democratic values and practices in accordance with the concept of shura. For six years (2007-2013), P3M developed the *Tasamuh* Jurisprudence (theology of tolerance).

In the last few years, P3M has done a lot of research on radicalism. Some examples of research by P3M include: 1) Survey of 100 Ministries, State Institutions, and BUMN Enterprises in Jakarta; 2) Research of 20 BUMN Mosque, 5 Campus Mosques and 5 Housing Mosques; 3) SARA Politicization Research in Sawah Village; 4) Radicalism Research at IPB; 5) Research on Religious Moderation and the Potential of Radicalism in 10 Islamic Boarding Schools which were established after 2000.

#### **4. The Islamic and Social Studies Institute (*Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS)*)**

The Islamic and Social Studies Institute (LKIS) was born in Yogyakarta. This institution was founded by a group of activists from the State Islamic Religion Institute (IAIN) Sunan Kalijaga (now Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University) whose background is NU. Their commitment to moderate Islam and the involvement of their founders in the various activities of the pro-democracy movement pushed the institution towards the community education movement through the study and publication of critical Islamic books. In 1993 the first LKIS book was published: *Kiri Islam*, by Kazhuo Shiogaki. This book is a study of the intellectual thinking of progressive Muslim Muslims, Hassan Hanafi.

LKIS continues to publish critical books. Along with the awareness of the need to develop business diversification, other themes are felt to be

published by LKiS, namely NU and Islamic Boarding Schools, Education, Social, Culture, Politics, Literature, Women's Studies, Philosophy, Religious Dialogue Series, Communication, Political Education Series, Popular Literature, and the Women's Empowerment Series.

However, LKiS is more than just a book publisher. LKiS is more a community where intellectual struggles, social activism, and policy advocacy become distinctive characters. This is where LKiS also enters issues of preventing radicalism, through research programs or mentoring schools.

### **Recitation as an Education Space**

Recitation is the activity of the delivery and inculcation of Islamic teachings to increase the understanding, appreciation and practice of the congregation of Islamic teachings. This activity is usually delivered through lectures, which are sometimes accompanied by questions and answers. Study material is sometimes thematic, with predetermined themes. But sometimes the theme is general and is therefore called general recitation. Recitation is sometimes based on the yellow book; meaning lecture material is based on certain types of yellow books read by dai. But most recitals are usually general in nature, meaning that they do not use a particular type of yellow book.

The recitation is usually held colossally with a large number of worshipers. This type of recitation is usually referred to as 'grand recitation'. But there are times when the recitation is held in small numbers of worshipers, with limited participants, both in certain social spheres such as one RT, or within the scope of work or even family level.

In the NU environment, recitation is a tradition carried out for a long time. The tradition of recitation is not only carried out among NU. Many other groups carry out similar activities. However, in terms of the frequency of its implementation, the study in NU circles seemed to be far more frequent than other groups. In contrast to other Muslim groups, NU circles have a lot of momentum, all of which are almost always held in them.

Beyond routine recitals which are usually held regularly and with routine schedules, a number of NU assessments are usually also held in activities not specifically intended for recitation. Just to mention a few, the types of study in NU circles can be divided into several categories.

*First*, routine recitation. This study is usually held on a scheduled basis, both weekly, monthly (every 35 days according to the Javanese calendar), monthly, and so on.

*Second*, the study of commemorative holidays, such as the Birthday of the Prophet, Isra Mikraj, and others. Usually this study is carried out in accordance with the calendar of Islamic holidays.

*Third*, incidental recitation. Such studies are usually not scheduled, but are based on certain types of activities. For example, a wedding, circumcision, or thanksgiving, usually accompanied by recitation activities in it.

*Fourth*, the offline recitation, NU circles also held online recitation. This online study is sometimes based on the yellow book, but sometimes it is general.

In the NU environment, recitation becomes an educational medium not only in the inculcation of Islamic values, but also in strengthening nationalism, moderation, tolerance, and prevention of radicalism. Observations made in Situbondo, East Java; and Sragen, Central Java, showed that the studies conducted, both routine and incidental studies, always included material on tolerance, nationality, and the importance of being aware of the radicalism movement.

In Situbondo, salawat *nariyah* activities develop everywhere, and in them are always filled with recitation. "We tell the story of the struggle of the Prophet, the struggle of friends and scholars". The kiai here are most afraid of offending others, especially if they are different from us, not to offend others, do not want us to break with others. Lah principles like this

that finally when it is embedded, then we in the earth Situbondo finally peaceful," said K.H. Zaini Shonhaji, Chair of PCNU Situbondo.<sup>128</sup>

The same thing was acknowledged by H. Sahamo Efendi, Coordinator of the ISNU Situbondo PC Community Education. According to him, recitation has been deeply rooted in the Situbondo community. And the content of recitation always emphasizes the importance of living in harmony with each other, in addition to emphasizing Islamic values in general.<sup>129</sup>

The same thing also happened in the sermons held in Sragen, Central Java. Like the NU community in general, the Koran study was also lively. This study was partly carried out by the general public, but partly was initiated by NU itself.

One that strengthens the resilience of NU Sragen residents to face a radical ideology is the existence of 'field study' activities that are carried out simultaneously in all Sragen Regencies. Lapanan is a recitation activity for Sragen NU residents, coordinated by Fatayat and NU Muslimat together with NU management, NU autonomous body administrators and NU institutions. This activity is carried out every 35 days following the Javanese calendar.

"This activity began in the early 90s. But at that time only a few Branch Representative Councils (MWC) were holding. Only in the 2000s did the field activities begin to spread evenly throughout the Sragen Regency MWC. Only one or two do not conduct field activities. Now, for the past five years, all field activities have been carried out simultaneously by all MWCs," said Kyai Wafi, Nurwafi Hamdan's nickname.<sup>130</sup>

The benefits of this activity were recognized by Sutarti, Muslimat NU Sragen administrator; and Murtini, administrator of Fatayat NU Sragen. "Every field activity was attended by hundreds or even thousands of NU worshipers in all districts and it happened in every district," Sutarti said.

<sup>128</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Zaini Shonhaji, Situbondo, Thursday, 9 May 2019.

<sup>129</sup> In-depth interview with Sahamo Efendi, Kapongan Situbondo, 1 July 2019.

<sup>130</sup> In-depth interview with Nurwafi Hamdan, PCNU Sragen, Sunday 12 May 2019.

Murtini also confirmed. "In such activities the Aswaja values are conveyed, including the insight into nationalism and love for the country," said Murtini.<sup>131</sup>

The studies conducted by the NU community, both conducted by the management and NU residents in general, are a means of public education. Studies that in various momentum have a great impact, not only in the inculcation of Islamic values, but also in the inculcation of national values, tolerance, and the importance of preventing radicalism.

## 2.3. The Resiliencies of Nahdlatul Ulama

The big question that is important to answer is how strong is NU's endurance from influence of radical movements and ideologies that are increasing rapidly in Indonesia today? Is NU as a moderate organization representation still consistent or has it experienced a shift?

At the executive level, it could be said that NU's resistance to the influence of radical ideology was quite good. The resilience of the management of one of them is determined by a very strict recruitment and safeguarding mechanism. One of the rigors can be proven through the obligation of each board to attend cadre training, which is very dominant instilled anti-radicalism discourse.

The obligation to attend cadre training applies to all administrators from the central level to the level of branches in the villages. There was even an acknowledgment from one of the administrators at PCNU Situbondo that is there was an organizer who voiced another agenda and understanding, he would be immediately be given an organizational sanction.<sup>132</sup> The same recognition was also conveyed by Anggia Ermarini, Chairperson of Fatayat NU stated: NU would react violently if found there

<sup>131</sup> In-depth interview with Murtini, PCNU Sragen, Sunday 12 May 2019.

<sup>132</sup> In-depth interview with Fawaid, PC. GP Ansor Situbondo, Friday, 17 May 2019; Mamlu'atul Hasanah Ketua III PC Fatayat NU Situbondo Ahad, 13 May 2019.

are members who are radicals.<sup>133</sup>

Has there ever been a case for a member who was dismissed because he was indicated as being exposed to radical ideology? This case has occurred in the management of NU Gresik. When there was someone who was indicated to be radical, PWNU in East Java asked PCNU Gresik to replace the person.<sup>134</sup>

K.H Z. Arifin Junaedi, Chairperson of Ma'arif NU, an institution underbow of PBNU that responsible to manage formal educational institutions, when its found any students who were indicated exposed to HTI, he stated:

*"We have Ma'arif's scout camp program. When the camp for junior high school level in Kempek, Cirebon in 2015, when we started march the event, there were children who carried HTI flag. Then when the high school scout camp in Magelang (2017) was the same, someone carried HTI flag. Yes, of course we secure it and we asked. We interrogated them. Then one happened in Cibubur in 2019. They wore hats and knotted fabrics and we caught them."<sup>135</sup>*

Recognition of the firmness and screening of management through cadre training mechanisms was stated by all informants from various levels of NU management. Similar with Situbondo and Sragen, the same thing was found that cadreing at various levels was an important key in protecting NU officials from the influence of radical ideology.<sup>136</sup>

The screening of management recruitment within NU can be seen in the statement of the executive members of Fatayat NU, East Java, Yeni Lutfiana.<sup>137</sup>

*"Everytime we open a new recruitment/ management, there's a condition needed which a statement of willingness, second, a submitted CV then also observation from verified process. For*

<sup>133</sup> In-depth interview with Anggia Ermarini, at office of Ministry of Youth and Sport, Wednesday, 15 May 2019.

<sup>134</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Marzuki Mustamar, PWNU East Java, Thursday, 9 May 2019.

<sup>135</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Z. Arifin Junaedi, PBNU Jakarta Tuesday, 3 July 2019

<sup>136</sup> In-depth interview with Nurwafi Hamdan, PCNU Sragen 12 May 2019.

<sup>137</sup> In-depth interview with Yeni Lutfiana, PWNU East Java, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

*example, there's a member who never became IPPNU or PMII, but he was part of NU's family then we traced the personal history related to NU activities. Fatayat NU has a check and re-check mechanism."*

Nevertheless, the informants who were mostly NU officials admitted that there were NU members who supported intolerant and radical Islamic ideas. We need to consider the character of NU members who are highly dependent on the *kiai* or their Islamic teacher. It can be assumed that the resiliencies of NU, especially the pilgrims level, from the influence of radical ideology is highly dependent on the local *kiai* who are its leaders. If the *kiai* exposed to radical ideology, it is potential that the *kiai*'s congregation will have the same views and attitudes as his *kiai*'s followers.<sup>138</sup>

Radicalization among *kiai* itself occurs due to several factors, one of them is education. The simple scenario can be explained as follows: a *kiai* sent his son to a certain educational institution.<sup>139</sup> The son who had been exposed to radical ideology then returned home. It is only a matter of time for him to influence family members and surroundings because he will continue his father's legacy.<sup>140</sup> Radicalization among traditional *kiai* is no longer a strange thing. It was initiated by several NU *kiai* who even became FPI members.<sup>141</sup>

Because it was found that there was radicalization among the *Nahdliyin* that caused NU very keen to carry out regeneration and required all management to take part in cadre training. It is no longer possible for NU to merely base its moderation in terms of worship rituals because clearly there are groups that have the same worship procedures, but their religious ideologies are different. For example: NU and FPI, when viewed from the way of worship may be the same but clearly different perspective

<sup>138</sup> In-depth interview with Helmy Faishal Zaini, PBNU, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

<sup>139</sup> Some informants mentioned Saudi Arabia or Middle –Eastern countries at large as the area where intolerant thoughts and violence infiltrated to Indonesia young people who live there.

<sup>140</sup> In-depth interview with Helmy Faishal Zaini at PBNU, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.; In-depth interview with Nur Rofiah, Friday, 17 May 2019.

<sup>141</sup> Read: Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, *Radikalisasi Islam Tradisional: Studi Kasus Radikalisasi Kiai-kiai di Sampang*, Madura, paper is not published.

about the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, and national diversity.<sup>142</sup>

The next question is how many NU members are affected by radical ideology? There is no clear definitive answer about this. However, the number of Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) that remained firmly implements NU values, numbers of religious studies, NU educational institutions enabled NU to continue maintaining its people. Various activities and events conducted by NU and its autonomous bodies involving NU masses very large ones are also considered effective in protecting their citizens.<sup>144</sup>

## 2.4. Nahdlatul Ulama's Challenges

In implementing some efforts to strengthen moderateism and countering radicalism, NU has list of challenges. Some of them are:

### Lack of creativity in Islamic Teachings

Some informants stated that in dealing with radical groups, NU was less aggressive in preaching.<sup>145</sup> It was not clear why there's an assumption from some informants. However, from their perspective, it seems that what constrains NU's teachings is the lack of creativity in packaging and marketing moderate Islam to the public.

Anggia Ermarini, Chairperson of the PP Fatayat NU stated, when compared to the Salafi-Wahabi group, NU was not creative enough in gaining public support, especially among urban-educated muslim circles.<sup>146</sup> Salafi-Wahabis are very creative in carrying out *da'wah*. Even

<sup>142</sup> In-depth interview with Yahya Cholil Staqf, di office PBNU, Thursday, 23 May 2019; In-depth interview with Robikin Emhas, PBNU, Friday, 17 May 2019.

<sup>144</sup> In-depth interview with Nurwafi Hamdan di office PCNU Sragen 12 May 2019; Hj. Masruroh Wahid, Chairperosn of PW Muslimat NU East Java (Tuesday, 21 May 2019); K.H. Zaki Hadzik, Ketua PW RMI NU East Java (Saturday, 11 May 2019).

<sup>145</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Z. Arifin Junaidi di PBNU Jakarta Tuesday, 3 July 2019.

<sup>146</sup> In-depth interview with Anggia Ermarini, Wednesday, 15 May 2019.

worship can be packaged in such a way as to attract many people and become an effective social movement.

### Lack of Government Support

NU feels that government support for moderation works is inadequate. Government support are: direct support to NU and support in the form of policies that allow NU to freely conduct religious moderation work.

The first support was explicitly conveyed by PBNU Secretary General, Helmy Faishal Zaini.<sup>147</sup> According to him, NU could now be said to be the only organization that spoke out very loudly in combating radicalism. Therefore, almost all groups always demand NU to play a role countering radicalism. This is certainly encouraging for NU, but at the same it also placed NU as the party that seemed to be most responsible. Unfortunately, when the demands on NU were very large, this was not accompanied by support for NU.

Helmy Faishal Zaini stated:

*"Does this country only have NU? Who are the inhabitants of Indonesia? NU. We together. We also do not want to be called the only ones who guard this nation. This nation is too big to be managed by one NU organization. So, I would like to invite everyone that the task is to preserve diversity, to safeguard this nation, yes, the task of the nation's elements collectively. I am questioning SOE telecommunications, just asking for cooperation with NU. Then for what we have sophisticated communications technology is not used to spread counter-narratives of radicalism and terrorism. We have to build a good education ecosystem so that it teaches tolerant values ... so that acts of hate provocation that can endanger the lives of other groups or other beliefs can be prevented*

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<sup>147</sup> In-depth interview with Helmy Faishal Zaini at PBNU, Wednesday, 8 May 2019.

*as well as legally acted. So if we can create a good education and legal ecosystem, maybe we can hope for a tolerant society. "*

NU also felt that the lack of support for NU was to allow NU to confront radicalism but the government did not develop a firm policy to eradicate radicalism from government institutions.<sup>148</sup> For example, it was impossible for NU to moderate in state schools if the government did not make policies that can prevent radicalization in public schools.<sup>149</sup> It is also impossible for NU to moderate the public religious life if hate speech in mosques still happen.<sup>150</sup>

Therefore, it is not surprising that almost all informants stated what was wanted is a good partnership between NU and the government. For example, Bukhori Muslim, Secretary General of LDNU, stressed the importance of partnership between NU, ministries, and BUMN, especially in managing its mosque. Meanwhile, Mushonifin wanted NU to be given access to large media so that it would be more powerful in voicing moderate Islam.<sup>153</sup>

## Increased Radicalism Content on Social Media

Narrative dissemination of intolerance, violence, and hate speech on social media in one of the tough challenges for NU in conducting religious moderation.<sup>154</sup> Although NU's media are developing well enough, NU does not have an established cyber force that is able to compensate for the proliferation of radical content disseminated through social media.<sup>155</sup>

NU's preaching method which is still manual and does not utilize social media is one of the factors that led to the defeat of the NU from the Salafi-Wahabi group. It is clear that most of the NU *kiai* who are active in preaching do not understand the importance of social media in building

<sup>148</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Hudallah Ridwan, Lc, Sekretaris Syuriyah PWNU Central Java Wednesday, 15 May and Tuesday, 21 May 2019.

<sup>149</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Z. Arifin Junaidi, PBNU Jakarta Tuesday, 3 July 2019.

<sup>150</sup> In-depth interview with Savic Ali, PBNU Jakarta Thursday, 23 May 2019.

<sup>153</sup> In-depth interview with Mushonifin, Semarang, Saturday, 25 May 2019.

<sup>154</sup> In-depth interview with Ruchman Bashori, Chief of Leadership Division, Jakarta, Friday, 10 May 2019.

<sup>155</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Z. Arifin Junaidi, PBNU Jakarta Tuesday, 3 July 2019

public narratives today.<sup>156</sup> Savic Ali stated that many *kiai* preached offline. Even though many young people are learning Islam online.<sup>157</sup>

## 2.5 Conclusion

From the above explanation it can be concluded that NU responded to radicalism very strongly. This attitude of NU is directly proportional to the attitude of NU nationality, including: the final recognition of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila; reject the khilafah system and reject the formalization of Islamic law; must tolerance; and denial of violence in da'wah.

NU has explicitly made various efforts to counter religious radicalism. NU's most consolidated effort was to protect the organization from infiltrating radical movements through cadre programs. Various programs have also been developed by autonomous institutions and agencies underneath it, ranging from the development of the media to special programs aimed at dealing with radicalism. NU's efforts were well consolidated from the center to the lowest level. Also not to be ignored are the various efforts made by the NU cultural community, such as the Gusdurian Network, The Wahid Foundation, and others.

These various efforts made NU have a fairly good resistance from the influence of radical ideology. Nevertheless, almost all informants admitted that there were NU residents below who were influenced by radical ideology. Even though the number is relatively small, the occurrence of radicalization in NU residents is impossible to deny.

There are at least three major challenges facing NU in conducting religious moderation. These challenges include: a lack of creativity in

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<sup>156</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Ubaidillah Shodaqoh, PWNU Central Java, Tuesday, 21 May 2019; Mushonifin, Team Coordinator Cyber PW GP Ansor Central Java (Saturday, 25 May 2019); Rusmadi, Ketua Lakpesdam PWNU Jateng (Saturday, 25 May 2019).

<sup>157</sup> In-depth interview with Savic Ali, PBNU Jakarta Thursday, 23 May 2019.

da'wah; lack of government support; and the strong content of radicalism spread through social media. The accumulation of these three challenges makes NU's work less effective than NU's doing religious moderation work in Indonesia today.[]

**CHAPTER III**

**MUHAMMADIYAH**

## 3.1. Introduction

As an Islamic organization based on Islam moderate (*wasathiyah*), *Muhammadiyah* seriously reviewed the intolerance phenomenon and radicalism in religious lives. When radicalism is viewed as a religious act that legitimized acts of violence to reach their goals, intolerance is the gate to get that level. Religious radicalism in the highest level formed as terrorism acts that tore down humanity's values.

Beyond the current dynamic, *Muhammadiyah* activists generally rejected every form of violence in religious lives. For them, Islam is a peaceful religion that rejected every form of violence. And in the Indonesian context, *Muhammadiyah* viewed that the Republic of Indonesia is a final and Pancasila is the Islamic state ideology.

However, there were members of *Muhammadiyah* that felt unsatisfied with that moderate position of *Muhammadiyah*. The people that felt unsatisfied, in the end, preferred to leave the organization and joined the groups that know as intolerant or radical actors.

Therefore, it couldn't be denied that there is a phenomenon of infiltration of the radicalism ideology within the *Muhammadiyah*. The phenomenon of the Salafy's strengthening within *Muhammadiyah* is one of this phenomenon.

Those Islamic narrations that currently developed by the fundamentalist Islamic groups are also can be found within *Muhammadiyah*. *Muhammadiyah* as an Islamic organization that since the beginning declared as Islamic moderate is required to give the right response to this phenomenon.

## 3.2. The Role of Muhammadiyah in Countering Radicalism

### 3.2.1. Muhammadiyah's Responses

The symptoms of radicalism in Indonesia fully recognized by the elites of Muhammadiyah. Haedar Nashir, the General Leader of The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah, detected that Muhammadiyah in recent decades facing a dynamic religious and national that extraordinary complex. Since reform in 1998, there have been progressive development of the organization and the religious sectarian of Muslim with various ideology.<sup>158</sup>

As mentioned by Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary of The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah, there is a battle between the Islamic moderate-tolerant groups and Islamic radical groups. Currently, there is a competition between the *emerging Muslim groups*' dan *establishing Muslim groups*. While within the *establishing Muslim groups* there is an *established moderate character*, for example, Muhammadiyah, NU, Al-Washliyah, et cetera. These groups have developed matched with Indonesian characters.

Meanwhile, the *emerging Muslim groups* have currently emerged. This group is the one that coloring the religious and political situation in Indonesia at present. Furthermore, this group is growing as the interaction in the Islamic world also developed, particularly between Indonesian Muslim and Middle Eastern Muslims, especially the students. When the alumni from the Middle East are going back to Indonesia, they're not only brought back their knowledge but also their lives experiences while living in the Middle East.

The founders of the *establishing Muslim* were also alumni from the Middle East. However, the political situation in the Middle East was different

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<sup>158</sup> In-depth interview with Haedar Nashir, Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah (29 May 2019).

between then and now. At present, the Middle East is changing its political and ideologies. Because of that, their Islamic character is also different. The *emerging Muslim* groups are trying to position themselves as the representation of the Muslim as a whole and not differentiate into particular groups. They're carried Islam as a solution for every conflict between groups. However, this group, in the end, developed an exclusive community with Islamic identity and thoughts influenced by the Islamic movement in the Middle East.<sup>159</sup>

Those growing development have influenced the thoughts and movement of Muslim in Indonesia from the last two decades. There is almost no one that not influenced by this new wind, including the Islamic organization known as Indonesian Islamic mainstream such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.<sup>160</sup>

This situation is also influenced by almost every society. This trend is confrontative to everyone, including the people within the same religion, and strongly confronted with the other religion. The adherents could not differentiate between sacred and profane. For example, the shout "*Allahu Akbar*" in the forum the study Qur'an (*pengajian*) or to respond to a speech that agreed is one of the attributes of this trend. The sacred of the word *Allahu Akbar* are shouting and in a profane situation with a political agenda where never happened before within Muhammadiyah.<sup>161 162</sup>

This condition is solidifying after Action of Defending Islam (*Aksi Bela Islam* or ABI) 212 and Jakarta's Local Election 2017. These political electoral events have to solidify the political identity that also concreted the conflict between ideologies. Parallel to this situation, the Islamic discourse within public space can be defined as an unhealthy situation. Islam is narrated as an exclusive sector. The situation is getting complex with the nation and state situation. The political discourse is inherent with the religious discourse, which only has two choices; my side (*pihakku* as Islam) or their side (*pihak mereka* or non-Islam). How to handle this situation is not an

<sup>159</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary Muhammadiyah (13 June 2019)

<sup>160</sup> In-depth interview with Haedar Nashir, Chairperson PP Muhammadiyah (29 May 2019).

<sup>161</sup> Read: Tirto.id "Ketum PP Muhammadiyah Larang Pekik "Allahu Akbar" di Acara Internal", <https://tirto.id/ketum-pp-muhammadiyah-larang-pekik-allahu-akbar-di-acara-internal-cE8P>.

<sup>162</sup> In-depth interview with Haedar Nashir, Chairperson PP Muhammadiyah (29 May 2019).

easy task for Muhammadiyah, because they have to position themselves between the two.<sup>163</sup>

Related with moderate Islam (*wasathiyah*), Hamim Ilyas, Vice of Chief of Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah, said that Muhammadiyah is a moderate Islam that pro to progressive development.<sup>164</sup> As an Islamic moderate organization, Muhammadiyah might be intersecting with any other religious ideology, including salafy.<sup>165</sup> But there is a problem. The ideology of modernist adherent as Muhammadiyah tend to easily influenced. Because there is no particular holy book that schematic as the guideline of the religious ideology, Muhammadiyah adherent can be influenced easily by another islamic ideology guideline. Thus why there is a new emerging ideology within Muhammadiyah, for example, Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an (MTA) and Salafy.<sup>166</sup>

This phenomenon is as alarming as the possibilities of infiltration of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) into the youth generation of Muhammadiyah. Sudarno Shobron pointed, the member of Cadre Education Majelis of The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah, although as an organization HTI is already disbanded, HTI as a movement still lingers. The youth of Muhammadiyah can be influenced by HTI because they're still fragile.<sup>167</sup> Their age is still in a transition is also an internal challenge within Muhammadiyah Student's Group (*Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah* or IPM) how to defending their members from the radical group influence.<sup>168</sup> Besides that, another group that also eroding Muhammadiyah is Jamaah Tabligh. There is a member of Muhammadiyah that follows the activities of *khuruj* Jamaah Tabligh because of the think that Muhammadiyah has a similarity of the model of missionaries teaching (*dakwah*) with.<sup>169</sup>

Therefore, strengthening the Islamic ideology of Muhammadiyah is crucial. Muhammadiyah is not designing a program or forming a special

<sup>163</sup> Observation from Recitation during Ramadhan at PP Muhammadiyah (9 May 2019).

<sup>164</sup> Interview with Hamim Ilyas, Vice Leaders of Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid Central Leaders of Muhammadiyah (May 26, 2019)

<sup>165</sup> Interview with K.H. Tafsir, the Leaders of Regional Leaders of Muhammadiyah Central Java Province (May 18, 2019); Interview with Ahmad Norma Permata, the Chairperson of LPCR PP Muhammadiyah (May 26, 2019).

<sup>166</sup> In-depth interview with Tafsir, Chief of PWM Central Java (18 May 2019).

<sup>167</sup> In-depth interview with Sudarno Shobron (27 May 2019).

<sup>168</sup> In-depth interview with Hafizh Syafaaturrahman, Chief of DPP IPM, pada 13 June 2019.

<sup>169</sup> In-depth interview with Sudarno Shobron (27 May 2019).

team to countering radicalism or extremism. Muhammadiyah is trying to create religious moderating by revitalizing their ideology and understanding within their adherents.<sup>170</sup>

However, some events can be defined as Muhammadiyah's responses to encountering radicalism directly or indirectly. The responses are chronological as follows:

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<sup>170</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Tafsir, Chief of PW Muhammadiyah Central Java (Saturday, 18 May 2019).

**TABLE 4** Muhammadiyah's Responses to Encountering Radicalism

TIME	RESPONS
2000	In 2000, Majelis Tarjih and Development of Islamic Thought (MTPPI) published a book called <i>Tafsir Tematik Al-Qur'an</i> (Qur'an Thematic Interpretation) that explained about the social relationships between different religions. This interpretation is important to open the thinking of the Muhammadiyah adherent and Muslim for general about pluralism, interreligious dialogue, peace co-existent, inter-religion marriage, and infidel ( <i>murtad</i> ). This book is explicitly mentioned that social pluralism and religious pluralism is inevitable.
2002	The Session of Tanwir Muhammadiyah of the Year 2002 at Denpasar, Bali, started to introduce the concept of cultural missionaries called " <i>Dakwah Kultural</i> ". After several discussions, at Muhammadiyah's general meeting or <i>Muktamar</i> 2005 at Malang accepted the concept of " <i>Dakwah Kultural</i> " as an official agreement of the organization. This cultural missionary is basically an Islamic universal for the welfare of every human being without limitation of different religions, races, ethnic, skin color, language, and gender.
28 February 2003	The establishment of <i>The Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity</i> . The spirit of this establishment is a recognition of the importance of a cultural institution that fights for character and uniqueness of Indonesian Islam as the religion that brings mercy and grace or <i>rahmat-an li al-'alamin</i> that inclusive, and compatible with the modern ideas (democracy, human rights, etc).
October 2003	Established the Network of Youth Intellectual of Muhammadiyah ( <i>Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah</i> or JIMM). JIMM committed to developing the new Islamic thoughts and making innovation ( <i>tajdid</i> ) as the spirit in reinterpreted islam that more relevant to modernities.
2005	The 45 <sup>th</sup> Muhammadiyah's general meeting or <i>Muktamar</i> Muhammadiyah at Malang 2005, is also announced the Thoughts of Towards 100 years of Muhammadiyah or (" <i>Pernyataan Pikiran Jelang Seabad Muhammadiyah</i> " or <i>Zhawahir al-Afkar al-Muhammadiyah Abra Qarn min al-Zaman</i> ). This thought is

	including the statement that Muhammadiyah is an Enlightenment movement to encounter violence and terrorism.
2007	Din Syamsuddin has established the <i>Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilisations</i> (CDCC) in 2007. Until the end of his leadership within two periods of CDCC with The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah held five <i>World Peace Forum</i> (Forum Perdamaian Dunia) that attended by religious figures, government, intellectuals and peace activist.
2009	Tanwir Muhammadiyah at Bandar Lampung in 2009 published a document called <i>Revitalisation of Vision and Nation Character: Agenda of Indonesia Ahead</i> or <i>Revitalisasi Visi dan Karakter Bangsa: Agenda Indonesia ke Depan</i> . In which, Muhammadiyah offered four main characters of nations, one of them is moderate, which is an action that is not radical and can live and partner in pluralism.
2010	46 <sup>th</sup> Muktamar at Yogyakarta held on 3–8 July 2010, released "Islam Berkemajuan" or Progressive Islam that includes the Statement of Muhammadiyah's Thinking of 2 <sup>nd</sup> Centuries ( <i>Pernyataan Pikiran Muhammadiyah Abad Kedua</i> or <i>Zhawâhir al-Afkâr al-Muhammadiyah li al-Qarni al-Tsâni</i> ) <i>The Agreement of the One Century of Muhammadiyah of 46<sup>th</sup> Muktamar</i> or <i>Muktamar Keputusan Muktamar Saik Abad Muhammadiyah ke-46</i> at Yogyakarta: "Islam progressive sowing the seeds of truth, goodness, peace, justice, benefit, prosperity, and the primacy of living dynamically for all humanity. Islam advances to uphold the glory of men and women without discrimination ... anti-war, anti-terrorism, non-violence, anti-oppression, anti-backwardness ... "
2013	Meeting or Tanwir at Bandung in 2013 delivered a document of Indonesia Progressive: <i>Reconstruct the Meaning of Nation State</i> or <i>Indonesia Berkemajuan: Rekonstruksi Kehidupan Bernegara yang Bermakna</i> . Indonesia Progressive or Indonesia Berkemajuan is an actualization of the ideals of the Proclamation and the purpose of forming the Government of the State of Indonesia. Indonesia Progress can be interpreted as a major country ( <i>al-madinal al-fadhillah</i> ), prosperous and civilized country ( <i>umran</i> ), and a prosperous country.

	Developing Indonesia must ... guarantee freedom of thought, expression, and religion; and respecting human rights.
2015	The Muhammadiyah 47 <sup>th</sup> General Meeting or Mukthamar ke-47 at Makassar in 2015, delivered a concept of State of Pancasila as Darul Ahdi was syahadah or <i>Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdi was Syahadah</i> . Republic of Indonesia's basic principles is Pancasila as the state agreement because its fundamentals result from a national consensus. Indonesia is also considered a witnessing country where Muhammadiyah must actively do good as part of the nation's responsibility.
2015	The Muhammadiyah 47 <sup>th</sup> General Meeting or Mukthamar ke-47 at Makassar in 2015, The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah published a book called Strategic Issues of Religious, Nation, and Humanity or <i>Isu-isu Strategis Keumatan, Kebangsaan, dan Kemanusiaan</i> , that including the concern of extremist symptoms within Islamic that recommended moderate pluralism or "keberagaman yang moderat", and sunni-syiah dialogue or "dialog Sunni-Syiah".
2016	The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah organized the Fasting Month Qur'an Studies or Pengajian Ramadan with the theme The State of Pancasila as Darul Ahdi was syahadah: Theology and Ideology or "Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul 'Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah: Perspektif Teologis dan Ideologis" held from 9 to 11 of June 2016 at the campus of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY).
2017	The Cadre Education Majelis of The Central Leader of Muhammadiyah or Majelis Pendidikan Kader Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah published the book The State of Pancasila as Darul Ahdi was syahadah: Theology and Ideology or <i>Negara Pancasila, Darul 'Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah: Perspektif Teologis dan Ideologis</i> . Inside this book explained about Ahmad Syafii Maarif, the former Chief of Central Leader of Muhammadiyah, point of view about the State of Pancasila as Darul Ahdi was syahadah
2-4 November	The signed of a partnership between Muhammadiyah and the Ministry of Coordinator of Human Development and Cultural or Kementerian Koordinator Pembangunan Manusia dan Kebudayaan (Kemenko PMK) for

2017	socialization program of Pancasila values as dar al-ahdi wa al-syahadah.
2018	The result of the partnership program, the central of leader Muhammadiyah dan the Ministry of Coordinator of Human Development and Cultural (Kemenko PMK) published a book Faozan Amar et.al. (eds.), Darul-Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah: Konteks, Makna dan Aktualisasi untuk Indonesia Berkemajuan or Darul-Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah: Context, Meaning, and Actualization for Indonesia Progressive. In the book, Haedar Nashir gave a prologue that said Muhammadiyah Develop Islamic Integration and Nation Towards Indonesia Progressive or "Muhammadiyah Membangun Integrasi Keislaman dan Kebangsaan Menuju Indonesia Berkemajuan".

### 3.2.2 Muhammadiyah's Efforts

The various response has mentioned that established the efforts of Muhammadiyah to encountering religious radicalism. Although, Muhammadiyah is not designing a program or forming a special team to countering radicalism or extremism. Muhammadiyah is trying to create religious moderating by revitalize and producing thoughts and activities such as Qur'an studies, training, coaching, and others.<sup>171</sup> Some of Muhammadiyah's efforts can be seen below:

#### Islamic Progressive: Narration to Encounter Islamic Radical

The Muhammadiyah 46<sup>th</sup> General Meeting at Yogyakarta, 3–8 July 2010, Muhammadiyah delivered a concept of Progressive Islam or "Islam Berkemajuan", a narration of islam to strengthen the spirit of progressive (*tajdid* or *pembaruan/reform*) within Muhammadiyah. The concept mentioned as follows:

*The Progressive Islam plants the seeds of truth, goodness, peace, justice, benefit, prosperity and the virtue of living dynamically for all humanity. Islam upholds the glory of men and women without discrimination. Islam that encourages the missions against war, anti-terrorism, non-violence, anti-oppression, anti-backwardness, and anti-all forms of destruction on earth such as corruption, abuse of power, crimes against humanity, exploitation of nature, as well as various evil that destroy life. Islam positively delivers the primacy of the diversity of tribes, races, groups, and cultures of mankind on earth. (Tanfidz Mukhtamar Seabad 2010: 15).*

Within the paper of Islami Progressive of Islam Berkemajuan, Muhammadiyah imagined their social goals that referred to the message of Al-Quran (QS. Ali Imran Article 110; al-Baqarah Article 143). The Islamic communities that ideals by Muhammadiyah is the form of the best people

<sup>171</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Tafsir, Chief of PW Muhammadiyah Central Java (18 May 2019).

or *khaira ummah* (umat terbaik) that playing their position and the roles of the middle people or *ummatan wasathan* (umat tengahan), and the histories actor or *syuhada 'ala al-nas* (pelaku sejarah) amongst humans life.

The uniqueness of Islamic moderate Muhammadiyah shows within their views that position the faith (*akidah*), worship (*ibadah*), moral (*akhlak*) and practical profane (*muamalah duniawiyah*) as proportional. This position showed within this quote as follows:

*With the Islamic view that is progressing and spreading the enlightenment, Muhammadiyah has not only succeeded in affirming and enriching the meaning of the teachings of the Muslim faith (akidah), worship (ibadah), and morals (akhlak) but at the same time renewing the mu'amalat duniawiyah which brings life development throughout the progress of Islamic teachings. The progressive Islamic understanding increasingly confirms the perspective of tajdid which implies purification and development (dynamization) in the Muhammadiyah movement, which all originate from the movement back to the Qur'an and as-Sunnah (al-ruju 'ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah) to deal with the times. (Tanfidz Muktamar Seabad 2010: 15).*

Islam Progressive or Islam Berkemajuan also explained by oleh Muhammadiyah with the concept of Islam Cosmopolitan or "Islam Kosmopolitan":

*"In dealing with the development of universal humanity, Muhammadiyah developed a cosmopolitan Islamic perspective. Cosmopolitanism is an awareness of the unity of people throughout the world and humanity that transcends ethnic, class, national, and religious barriers. Cosmopolitanism morally implies a sense of universal human solidarity and a sense of universal responsibility to fellow human beings regardless of primordial and conventional differences and separation." (Tanfidz Muktamar Seabad 2010: 18).*

*“Islamic cosmopolitanism developed by Muhammadiyah can be a bridge for the interests of the development of Islamic and Western dialogue and inter-civilizational dialogue..... Concerning relations between civilizations and the development of universal humanity, it is truly necessary that global ethics (global ethics) and global wisdom (global wisdom) can guide, direct, and lead the world towards a more enlightened civilization.” (Tanfidz Mukhtamar Seabad 2010: 19).*

To simplify the meaning of Islamic Progressive s appears in some recommendations of the 47th Muhammadiyah Congress, which is fully contained in the book of Strategic Issues for Humanity, Nationality and Humanity (2015) of *Isu-isu Strategis Keumatan, Kebangsaan, dan Kemanusiaan* (2015). Several recommendations place Muhammadiyah in a firm position in dealing with religious radicalism, including:

*First, Moderate Diversity, “The latest development shows symptoms of increasing extreme religious behavior, including the tendency to call parties or other people infidels (takfiri). Among Muslims, there are a group of people who like to judge, instill hatred, and commit acts of violence against other groups on charges of heresy, infidelity, and liberalism. Takfiri tendency is contrary to the Islamic character which emphasizes compassion, politeness, morality, and tolerance. The attitude that easy to accuse other parties of infidelity is caused by many factors including a narrow religious perspective, poor insight, lack of religious interaction, exclusive religious education, religious politicization, and the influence of political and religious conflicts from abroad, especially those that occur in the Middle East.*

*Second, a Tolerant Religious, “The efforts to strengthening the tolerance is insufficient if only producing rigid formal rules, but also have to sow and planting the values of tolerance, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and religiously based on family, social organizations, and formal education accompanied by examples from religious leaders and national elites.”*

Based on literature research, the ideas of the Enlightenment movement in Muhammadiyah have emerged since the 45<sup>th</sup> General Meetings, Mukhtamar ke-45 at Malang in 2005. The formulation of Statement of Thought Towards One Century of Muhammadiyah or “Pernyataan Pikiran Jelang Seabad Muhammadiyah” (*Zhawahir al-Afkar al-Muhammadiyah Abra Qarn min al-Zaman*) with a lot of statement of Enlightenment or ‘pencerahan’. Only at the 46<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2010, Muhammadiyah declared itself as the “Enlightenment Movement” together with “Progressing Islam” as its Islamic outlook.

In their Statement of Thought of Muhammadiyah Second Century “Pernyataan Pikiran Muhammadiyah Abad Kedua” (*Zhawâhir al-Afkâr al-Muhammadiyah li al-Qarni al-Tsâni*) firmly stated:

*“Muhammadiyah in the second century, strongly committed to enlightenment movement. The Enlightenment movement (tanwir) is a praxis of progressive islam to free, empower, and advance in life. The enlightenment movement is presented to answer the humanities problems, such as poverty, ignorance, backwardness, and other problem, structural and cultural issues. The enlightenment movement Gerakan pencerahan presenting islam to answer the problems of spiritual drought, moral crisis, violence, terrorism, conflict corruption, ecological damage, and other forms of crimes against humanities. The enlightenment movement committed to develop the social relation with justice without discrimination glorifying human dignity, men and women, uphold the high tolerant and diversity, and building the main social institution.”*

Tanwir at Bengkulu, 15–17 February 2019, with a theme of the Religious that Enlightening or “Beragama yang Mencerahkan”, at least because of two things. *First*, Muhammadiyah or muslim hopefully can share the messages and practice of islam that bring enlightenment in life; brighten heart, thoughts, acts, and noble acts. *Second*, in daily life there are still can be found Islamic understanding and practice which causes problems such

as violence, takfiri, hoax spread, intolerance, expressions of hatred, and hostility.<sup>172</sup>

The meeting (*tanwir*) also formulated the Enlightenment Treatise or “Risalah Pencerahan”. The Enlightenment Treatise mentioned thought as follows:

*“The Enlightenment religion develops religious views, attitudes, and practices that are of the middle nature (wasathiyah), builds peace, respects diversity, respects the dignity of humanity of men or women, upholds noble civilization, and advances the lives of humankind embodied in the attitude of trustful life, fair, good (ihsan), tolerant, compassion towards humanity without discrimination, respect for diversity, and the main social institutions as the actualization of the values and mission bring goodness (rahmatan lil-’alamin).”*

Based on this enlightenment movement, Muhammadiyah firmly committed in missionaries (*dakwah*) and *tajdid* to presenting islam as the middle thoughts (*wasathiyah*), building peace, respect the diversity, respects the dignity of the humanity of men or women, upholds noble civilization, and advances the lives of humankind.

This formal action of Muhammadiyah rejected the violence is reflected by the actions of their leaders to respond to the violent actions by some Islamic groups with legitimized as enforce right and forbid wrong (*amar ma’ruf nahi munkar*). For Abdul Mu’ti, the General Secretary of Muhammadiyah, the meaning of against the crimes (*nahi munkar*) is to prevent the crime, however, there is a *misleading*, because they interpreted as violent acts. If *nahi* is means prevent, it should be done before. So, *nahi munkar* is not meant to vandalised the night clubs when it's already built. But it needs to prevent before it's done, in regulation level, how the local regulation about the entertainment area.<sup>173</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Haedar Nashir, “Beragama yang Mencerahkan dan Memajukan Muhammadiyah ke Depan” *Pidato Iftitah Tanwir Muhammadiyah Bengkulu* Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 215-17 February 2019.

<sup>173</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Mu’ti, General Secretary Muhammadiyah (13 June 2019).

Saad Ibrahim, the Chief of Regional Leader of Muhammadiyah East Java Province (PWM East Java) said that to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) cannot be a force, especially religious.<sup>174</sup> While Najib Hamid also said that to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) should not use violence.<sup>175</sup> The people could not try to be law enforcement in the name of enforcing the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*).

In conclusion, most of the informants said that to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) cannot using violence. Furthermore, some of the informants firmly said to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) ala Muhammadiyah through real works, such as build hospitals, schools, universities, orphanages, and others. For example, the leaders from Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (NA), Yenik Kholifatul and Aini Sukriah, also mentioned that their organization form of enforcing the right (*amar ma'ruf*) are through caring to women's groups, and protecting women through the right (*ma'ruf*) education. Similar to other informants, they also said that to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) can not use violence.<sup>176</sup>

Religious Leader (Kiayi) Tafsir, the Chief of Regional Leader of Muhammadiyah Centra Java Province, explained that there are three characters of Muhammadiyah's missionaries. *First*, because of its middle nature, the propaganda of Muhammadiyah is slowly but surely. *Second*, Muhammadiyah's preaching character is gentle or non-confrontational, both with the government and with various groups. Muhammadiyah can embrace and cooperate with any party. *Third*, pragmatic, in the sense of talking less and do more.<sup>177</sup>

Muhammadiyah's leaders in the branch level in general almost have the same view. Arif Zuhri, for example, stated that the activities to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) must have done

<sup>174</sup> Saad Ibrahim, Chief of PW Muhammadiyah East Java (10 May 2019).

<sup>175</sup> Najib Hamid, Vice Chief of PW Muhammadiyah East Java (13 May 2019).

<sup>176</sup> Yenik Kholifatul, Ketua Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (NA) Kabupaten Malang (6 May 2019) dan Aini Sukriah, Chairperson PW Nasyiatul Aisyiyah East Java, (6 May 2019).

<sup>177</sup> In-depth interview with Tafsir, Chief of PWM Central Java (18 May 2019).

in a good way, wisely and politely with good words. These rules apply to Muslim or non-muslim. If ever really need to use violence, it's only can be used for defense. For him, Islam forbids violence. In this context, he also disagrees if there are civilian people that acted as the law enforcement in the name to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) because it's only will create greater chaos.<sup>178</sup>

Nevertheless, there are also leaders of Muhammadiyah that viewed that to enforce the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*) with violence that been done by Islamic Defenders Indonesia (Front Pembela Islam or FPI) can be justified and needed in some context. Khozin, for example, agreed that civilian can be law enforcement in the name of enforcing the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*).

*For example in a Pancasila state whose base is the God Almighty... where law enforcement must be done by the law enforcement apparatus. And if then the legal apparatus does not act following their duties and authority, in my opinion, muslims can use violence, if the government legal apparatus does not take any action. And this cannot be tolerated, how we will allow tyranny. Therefore, in certain cases FPI's existence is important, do not think it is not important. Because Muhammadiyah did not act and NU did not act, then the existence of FPI was important, to enforce the lawbreakers, for example, the liquors and so on. But what FPI's done also not always right, in the context of violence, and it must be selective.<sup>179</sup>*

If you read the views of Muhammadiyah activists, in general, they have a similar view, that enforces the right and forbid the wrong (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*), must be carried out peacefully and within the framework of the applicable law.

<sup>178</sup> Arif Zuhri, Chief of PCM Dau Malang (8 May 2019).

<sup>179</sup> K.H. Khozin, brother of Amrozi (7 May 2019).

## Darul Ahdī wa al-Syahadah: Affirmation of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila

One of the most important contextualizations of the fundamental ideas of Islam progressive according to Muhammadiyah is pursuing is the concept of *Dar al-'Ahd wa al-Shahādah*. That is means that Indonesia is based on Pancasila is seen as a state of agreement (*dār al-'ahd*) and testimony (*al-shahādah*). It aims to provide guidelines for the members of Muhammadiyah regarding the state relations and partnership (*persyarikatan*), as a foundation for ideological defense, as a means of politic harmonization, and intellectual manifest, and the politics that emphasize the importance of nationalism.

According to official documents of Muhammadiyah, the Pancasila state is called *dār al-'ahd* (state treaties or state agreement),<sup>180</sup> because when it was founded in 1945, its fundamentals resulted from a national consensus.<sup>181</sup> The addition, *dār al-shahādah* (witness state) means that the implementation of the Pancasila (noble values) requires the active role of Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah saw itself as a part of Indonesia and became Indonesia itself (Muhammadiyah is Indonesia).<sup>182</sup>

Pancasila was formulated through the consensus of the national figures, including Muhammadiyah's figures, that carried the muslim aspirations. They understand that Pancasila is in harmony and goes hand in hand with Islamic thought.<sup>183</sup> When Indonesia ideally desires to be a safe, harmony and peaceful country (which in Arabic is commonly understood as *dār al-salām*), developed, just, prosperous, dignified and sovereign, this is actually in harmony with the aims of Islam. This is known as "*baldatun*

<sup>180</sup> Read: Halil İnalçık, "Dār al-'Ahd," dalam P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds.), *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, (Accesed on 6 July 2019).

<sup>181</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Negara Pancasila sebagai Darul Ahdī wa Syahadah*, (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2015), 12.

<sup>182</sup> Din Syamsuddin, "Tafsir Islam atas Negara Pancasila," dalam Muamaroh dan Benni Setiawan (eds.), *Negara Pancasila, Darul 'Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah: Perspektif Teologis dan Ideologis*, (Yogyakarta: Majelis Pendidikan Kader Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2017), 161-162.

<sup>183</sup> Haedar Nashir, "Muhammadiyah Membangun Integrasi Keislaman dan Kebangsaan Menuju Indonesia Berkemajuan," dalam Faozan Amar dkk. (eds.), *Darul-Ahdī Wasy-Syahadah: Konteks, Makna dan Aktualisasi untuk Indonesia Berkemajuan* (Jakarta: Al-Wasat Publishing House, 2018), 23; Din Syamsuddin, "NKRI: Negara Perjanjian dan Kesaksian," dalam Akhmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz (eds.), "*Islam Nusantara*": *Dari Ushul Fiqh Hingga Konsep Historis* (Bandung: Mizan, 2015), 282; Lukman Hakiem (ed.), *Dari Muhammadiyah untuk Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Kiprah Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Mr Kasman Singodimedjo, dan K.H. Abdul Kahar Mudzakkir* (Yogyakarta: Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 2013).

*.tayyibatun wa rabbun ghafūr*" (a just, prosperous and prosperous country, which is under the auspices of God's mercy and forgiveness).<sup>184</sup>

into *Dar al-Islām* (Islamic state) and *Dar al-ḥarb* (war state) that is no longer relevant in the context of modern globalization.<sup>185</sup> The reason is that because Indonesia is also part of the international system of the nation-state, hence morally and politically must respect the reality of global diversity. As a consequence, he also said that Indonesia is bound by various agreements or international agreements at a higher level. This is in line with Muhammadiyah's position which is also bound by national agreements that have higher authority.<sup>186</sup>

In the 1980s, Pancasila was raised as a Single Principle, Muhammadiyah currently affirmed its national outlook as in the One Century Conference Tanfidz as the following quote:

*Muhammadiyah and Muslims are an integral part of the nation and have been active in developing Indonesia from the national movement to the era of independence. Muhammadiyah is actively involved in creating and determining the foundations of a nation-state based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Muhammadiyah contributes to the efforts to educate the life of the nation and maintain Islamic politics with a national perspective during battles with various world ideologies. Since the beginning, Muhammadiyah has a clear national outlook that the Republic of Indonesia is a Unitarian country which was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, was a final national consensus and bound to all components of the nation by making Muhammadiyah as an adhesive and unifying nation, following the verses of the Qur'an Surat al-Hujurat verse 13. (Tanfidz Conference of the Century 2010: 17).*

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<sup>184</sup> Haedar Nashir, "Muhammadiyah Membangun Integrasi Keislaman dan Kebangsaan Menuju Indonesia Berkemajuan," 20-21.

<sup>185</sup> Syamsuddin, "Tafsir Islam Atas Negara Pancasila," 161.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

*Nationalism is not a final doctrine that only limited to like the slogan of loving the motherland but must be interpreted and functioned as positive energy to develop a dynamic Indonesia and transformatively in realizing national ideals amid the problems and challenges of the times. (Tanfidz Conference of the Century 2010: 18).*

Tanwir in Bandar Lampung in 2009 formulated the concept of Revitalizing the Vision and Character of the Nation: Indonesia's Agenda for the Future (*"Revitalisasi Visi dan Karakter Bangsa: Agenda Indonesia ke Depan"*).<sup>33</sup> Muhammadiyah views that the formulation of the concept of vision and character of the nation is an important and strategic agenda to see and predict the future of Indonesia. Muhammadiyah believes that Indonesia has the potential and opportunity to become a nation, a state that is developed, just, prosperous, sovereign, and dignified before other nations.

In this concept, Muhammadiyah also highlights the reality of nationality in the political, economic and socio-cultural fields. Muhammadiyah offers four national characters, one of which is moderate. Moderate character is characterized by a non-radical attitude to life and is reflected in the middle personality between the individual and social, materially and spiritually oriented, and able to live and work together in diversity<sup>188</sup>

The 2009 Tanwir document was later revitalized at Tanwir Muhammadiyah in Bandung (2013), then Muhammadiyah formulated the concept of "Indonesia Progressive: Reconstruction the Meaningful of State Life" (*"Indonesia Berkemajuan: Rekonstruksi Kehidupan Bernegara yang Bermakna"*). Muhammadiyah asserted that the jihad field (the area of struggle) of the movement was in three domains: political, cultural and economic which were united in a concept of "Indonesia Progressive".

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<sup>33</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Revitalisasi Visi dan Karakter Bangsa: Agenda Indonesia ke Depan*, Fifth Edition Mukhtamar Ke-47 (Yogyakarta: PPM, 2015).

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, 42.

*"Indonesia Progressive can be interpreted as the major country (al-madinal al-fadhillah), a prosperous and civilized country (umran), and a welfare country. A developing country is the country that encourages the creation of the functions of missionaries and mercy which are supported by intelligent, have a good personality, and noble human resources. Therefore, developing countries must be able to uphold sovereignty (territorial, political, legal, economic, and cultural); bring prosperity (fulfill the needs of clothing, food, and shelter); bring happiness in materially and spiritually; guarantee the freedom of thinking, expression, and religion; respect the human rights, and create security and guarantees of the future."*<sup>189</sup>

At the 47th Congress in Makassar in 2015, Muhammadiyah officially asserted the position of the Pancasila State as *Darul Ahdi wasy-Syahadah* (State of Agreement and Testimony). The official document states as follows:

*"The Pancasila State is the result of a national consensus (dar al-'ahdi) and a place of proof or testimony (dar al-shahadah) to be a safe and peaceful country (dar al-salam) towards a life that is advanced, just, prosperous, dignified, and sovereign in the shade of Allah's blessing. This nationalist view is in line with the Islamic ideals of the ideal state "Baladatun Thayyibun Wa Rabbun Ghafur", which is a good country and is in God's forgiveness. ... Pancasila as the basis of the Republic of Indonesia is a state ideology that binds all the people and components of the nation. Pancasila is not a religion, but its substance contains and is in line with the values of Islamic ideology, which become ideological references in a national diversity life. Thus it can be stated that Pancasila is Islamic because the substance in each principle is in line with the Islamic values .... All Muslims including Muhammadiyah must commit to the Pancasila State as Dar al-Syahadah or a country of witness and prove*

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<sup>189</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Indonesia Berkemajuan: Rekonstruksi Kehidupan Bernegara yang Bermakna*, Cetakan Ketiga Edisi Muktamar Ke-47 (Yogyakarta: PPM, 2015), 11.

*themselves in filling and building a meaningful nation towards progress in every aspect o of their life."*

Is Muhammadiyah's official policy internalized by its cadres? This question is important to answer because the answer to this will show how far Muhammadiyah's policies function as a guideline for its members. To answer this question, we explore two important issues: Pancasila and the implementation of Islamic law.

In general, Muhammadiyah activists viewed that Pancasila was a joint agreement between the founders of the country of which there were representatives of the Islamic group at that time. Muhammadiyah activists assumed that Pancasila is sufficient to accommodate the Islamic values fundamentally, not contradict with the Islamic law, and Pancasila is final as the state ideology. The formalization of Islamic law by replacing Pancasila as the basis of the state is seen as unjustified.

Muhammadiyah, through its general chairman, Haedar Nashir, confirmed his thought about the State of Pancasila. In an official media of Muhammadiyah, Suara Muhammadiyah, Haedar stated:

*"Muhammadiyah, including its members, disagrees and does not give any space for ideologies, thoughts, attitudes, and views that want to create other forms and ideologies that are contrary to the views of the Pancasila State Darul Ahdi Wa Syahadah. Ideologies or views on the state of the Khilafah as well as for the communist state, secular state, and others that are contrary to the principle of the Pancasila State Darul Ahdi Was-Syahadah and rejected in Muhammadiyah."*<sup>190</sup>

In viewing the relationship between Islam and the state, Muhammadiyah takes a moderate position. Based on an interview with Kiai Tafsir, the Chief of Regional Leaders of Muhammadiyah Central Java Province, there are at least three understandings about the relationship

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<sup>190</sup> <http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2019/04/02/muhammadiyah-berpaham-negara-pancasila-darul-ahdi-was-syahadah/>

between Islam and the state, and that becomes a neverending discourse. Some people said to uphold Islam is by establishing an Islamic state. On the other side, some people said that upholding Islam through implementing Islamic law in the country, and some said that Islam must be separated from the state. As part of the effort to put Muhammadiyah in the middle position, the Pancasila according to Muhammadiyah is the most moderate ideology."<sup>191</sup>

Referring to Abdul Mu'ti's statement, General Secretary of Central Leaders of Muhammadiyah, for Muhammadiyah the formal application of Islamic law to replace the existing law, was considered unnecessary. The application of Islamic law currently tends to be interpreted by the radical group is only related to *jinayat*, or criminal aspects. This interpretation is denied other aspects of the *Shari'a* or Islamic law. The substance of the *Shari'a* is safety, benefit, and welfare. When Islamic law is only interpreted as a *jinayat*, it will become a problem for the diversity of Indonesian as a nation.

*"We're in Indonesia have agreed. Because our society is diverse, what is fighting for is the substance of the Islamic law (Shari'a) that values in Islam are institutionalized in the products of applicable laws and are institutionalized in social behavior. So, don't interpret that obeying traffic signs is not part of the Shari'a, it is part of the relationship between human (hablum min an-nash). Likewise concerning hajj, then there is the law about hajj. So, don't interpret that during the time of the Prophet there were no laws and there was no need for Hajj laws, so there was no need (any laws). This is related to the interests of many people, relations between countries. Therefore, a law was made that was taken from religious provisions related to hajj."*<sup>192</sup>

At the regional leadership level of Muhammadiyah, the majority of opinions tend to be similar to the organization's policies. Khozin firmly

<sup>191</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Tafsir, Chief of PW Muhammadiyah Central Java (Saturday, 18 May 2019).

<sup>192</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Mu'ti, General Secretary Muhammadiyah (13 June 2019).

stated that it is possible to align Islam with the state, but must be relevant and within the Pancasila frame. The efforts to legalize the Islamic law (*Shari'a*) as the basis of the state, according to him, it would only tear Indonesia apart. According to Khozin, what is the meaning of Islamic state if it does not guarantee peace in life. What is needed is moderation, as the concept of Muhammadiyah.<sup>193</sup>

Sukmajaya argued that Indonesia today is like the Medina of the time of the Prophet. According to him, Pancasila is fully in harmony with the universal values of Islam.

*"Because those who are making the concept are Muslims and they were not kidding. Furthermore, if we look into each item of Pancasila. The first precept is divinity, meaning we are a country that recognizes God Almighty. The second precepts are humanity, the third precepts are ukhuwah, unity, the fourth precepts are wisdom and the fifth precepts are justice. That's almost the same as the universal values in Qu'ran. If we explore the universal values of the Qur'an, namely justice, humanity, togetherness, and equality, it is the same. This means that Pancasila does not conflict with Islam. It's just a pity, our new brother sometimes doesn't know history, they consider Pancasila to be a denial from islam (thaghut) and so on."*

<sup>194</sup>

On the branch level of Muhammadiyah, a firm opinion comes from Arif Zuhri. According to him, Pancasila is not contradicted with Islamic values and otherwise, it helps to strengthen Islamic values in Indonesia. Likewise with Islamic law, it does not clash with the state law because of the existence of a theory of "structuralization of the norm" which prioritizes the substantial of Islamic law. Although, the formalization implemented through the Regional Regulation (Perda) of Islamic Sharia, for example, he

<sup>193</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Khozin, brother of Amrozi (7 May 2019).

<sup>194</sup> In-depth interview with Sukmajaya, Muhammadiyah Malang Raya (10 May 2019).

believes that the regional regulation must look at the diversity of the community.<sup>195</sup>

Mukayat, from the Regional Leaders of Youth of Muhammadiyah (*Pengurus Wilayah Pemuda Muhammadiyah*) East Java Province, firmly stated that there is a harmony between Islam dan Indonesia. Likewise with Pancasila, which according to him, is also very similar to the formulation of Islam. According to Mukayat:

*“First, God Almighty. It is monotheism. Second, fair and civilized humanity. It is also in line with Qur’an that we must respect, cherish, and not allow to kill. Justice and consultation are the same. In my opinion, Pancasila is excavated from many faiths. Not only Islam but also Hinduism, Buddhism. The concept of Pancasila existed long before Islam was here. In Hinduism and Buddhism are also not allowed to kill, drink liquor, rape and cheating. Pancasila and Islam are final.”<sup>196</sup>*

The formalization of Islamic law (*Shari’a*) that intends to change the foundation of the state according to Mukayat is dangerous because it can trigger a civil war. He is agreed with the formalization of Islamic law (*Shari’a*) at the national law level as long as it was synergistic with other religions and groups, without hurting any feelings and stunted other groups.

Abdul Musawir, from the Central Board of Muhammadiyah Student Association (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah* or DPP IMM), noted that Pancasila as the nation's ideology is an agreement of Muslims that must be followed, and obedience to state law is obedience to Islamic law. Furthermore, he expressed his disagreement with efforts to change the country's foundation. Islamic law (*Shari’a*) implementation, according to Abdul Musawir, must take place in the form of values and spirit, while the form can be flexible.<sup>197</sup>

<sup>195</sup> In-depth interview with Arif Zuhri, Chief of PCM Dau Malang (8 May 2019).

<sup>196</sup> In-depth interview with Mukayat, Chief of PW Pemuda Muhammadiyah East Java (14 May 2019)

<sup>197</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Musawir, DPP IMM (6 May 2019).

In line with Abdul Musawir, Irsyad Majid from PC IMM Malang is also firmly said that Pancasila was concentrated with Islamic values. Implementing Pancasila, according to him, means practicing Islam in basic values. In implementing Shari'a, Ershad Majid referred to a number of early Islamic governments that were proportional in implementing Islamic law, so there were also laws that were not enforced according to the circumstances. Therefore, according to Ershad, there is no contradiction between Islamic law and national legislation.<sup>198</sup>

. Yenik Kholifatul, an activist of Nasyyatul Aisyiyah, pointed out that there is a compatibility between Islam and Pancasila from point of view of both humanist visions. She refused to change the country's foundation. But she is optimistic that Islam can improve state law which she considers is still sharp downward and blunt upward. She refused the establishment of an Islamic state but agreed if Islamic law was adopted as a national law that had been adapted to Indonesian thinking.<sup>199</sup> Aini Sukriah also expressed her full agreement with Muhammadiyah who saw Indonesia as *Dar al-Ahd wa al-Syahadah*. She looked Pancasila is in harmony with Islam. She considered the legal instrument is only a technical instrument that did not need to be a debate to be labeled sharia if it would eventually lead to a dispute.<sup>200</sup>

Overall, the entire argumentation taken from various representations of the communities in Muhammadiyah shows that there is a common view of the finality of Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state. There is a general tendency to see the implementation of Islamic law (*Shari'a*) in legislation as long as the mechanism is constitutional, implemented without stunting the minority, and does not consider it as a mandatory struggle.

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<sup>198</sup> In-depth interview with Irsyad Madjid, PC IMM Malang Raya (7 May 2019).

<sup>199</sup> In-depth interview with Yenik Kholifatul, Chairwoman Nasyyatul Aisyiyah (NA) Malang (6 May 2019).

<sup>200</sup> In-depth interview with Aini Sukriah, Chairwoman Nasyyatul Aisyiyah (NA) East Java (6 May 2019).

## Pancasila as Dar al-Ahdi wa al-Syahadah

To consolidate its ideology, Muhammadiyah is very aggressively conducting socialization to their grassroots. To strengthen this step, Muhammadiyah and the Ministry of Coordinator for Human Development and Culture (PMK), established partnership in the form of the Socialization of Pancasila as Darul 'Ahdi Wasy Syahadah. This partnership signed by the General Chairperson of Muhammadiyah Central Executive, Haedar Nashir, and the Ministry of Coordinator for PMK Puan Maharani. This cooperation is a form of cooperation with Islamic organizations in Indonesia to succeed in the mental revolution (November 24, 2017).<sup>201</sup>

The results of this collaboration produced two important books. *First, Darul-Ahdi Wasy-Syahadah: Context, Meaning, and Actualization for Progressive Indonesia*. In the book, Haedar Nashir gave a prologue: "Muhammadiyah Building Islamic and National Integration Towards Progressing Indonesia". *Second, the Friday Prayer Sermon book about Darul Ahdi wasy-Shahadah*. This book is distributed during the socialization and consolidation activities in the form of seminars, workshops, training, and other activities.<sup>202</sup>

At the period of this research, the researcher had made observations in several places. On Saturday, May 3, at the Front One Hotel Solo Airport, there was an event called "Socialization of Pancasila as *Darul' Ahdi Wasy Syahadah* for Muhammadiyah Women's Activists". At the event attended by several speakers such as Shoimah Kastolani (Chairperson of PP Aisyiyah), Abu Nasir (from Ministry of Coordinator for Human Development and Culture or Kemenko PMK), Wakhidatul Muflikha and Zuhriyatun Nurohmah (Nasyiatul Aisyiyah).

In her presentation, Shoimah said that within the institution of Aisyiyah and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state was practiced in everyday life. The practice of Pancasila's life is carried out among others by establishing educational and health

<sup>201</sup> <https://damailahindonesiaku.com/menko-pmk-dan-muhammadiyah-implementasikan-revolusi-mental.html>

<sup>202</sup> <https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/433113/lifestyle/daws-agar-jadi-rujukan-dai-muhammadiyah-berdakwah>

institutions for all people regardless of ethnicity, religion, race, and class.<sup>203</sup>

Based on the statement of Faozan Amar (the program coordinator), Beside Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, the similar socialization activities were also carried out with autonomous organizations, assemblies, and other Muhammadiyah institutions in different regions in Indonesia such as the Basic and Secondary Education Assembly (Dikdasmen), Special Da'wah Institutions (LDK), Tabligh Council, Social Services Council (MPS), Information Library Council (MPI), Cultural and Sports Arts Institute (LSBO), Aisyiyah, Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM) and Pondok Hajjah Nuriyah Shabran Muhammadiyah University, Surakarta.

### Reciting and Studied of Qur'an (*Pengajian*)

Regular recitation of Qur'an becomes a part of Muhammadiyah's effort to strengthening the moderate Islamic ideology. For example, when this research was conducted, the fasting month (*Ramadan*) studies were being carried out intensively. At the national level, these studies was conducted by the Central Leaders (PP) of Muhammadiyah with specific themes. This study is often referred to as "*tanwir*", a national level Muhammadiyah consultative meeting under a conference. Not infrequently this study produces ideas that are then institutionalized into an official decision of the organization.

In this research, researchers conducted observations at two "recitation of Ramadan". First, the fasting month (*Ramadan*) studies PP Muhammadiyah at Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta. While observation is held, the recitation was held in the seminar hall of Ahmad Dahlan Mosque, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, starting Thursday through Saturday, 9-11 May 2019. The recitation raised the theme "Enlightenment Minutes in National and Homeland Life: Theological, Ideological, and Praxis". The studies participants consisted of PP Muhammadiyah members, PPM assemblies/institutions / bureaus,

<sup>203</sup> Observasion "Sosialisasi Pancasila sebagai *Darul 'Ahd*i Wasy Syahadah bagi Aktivistis Perempuan Muhammadiyah", Saturday, 3 May, at Hotel Front One Bandara Solo.

members of the Aisyiyah Central Leadership, chairpersons and secretaries of central level autonomous organizations, chairpersons and secretaries of Muhammadiyah regional leaders throughout Indonesia, chairpersons of regional leaders in Aisyiyah throughout Indonesia, heads of regional leaders Muhammadiyah throughout DIY – Central Java and surrounding areas. The activity was also attended by the rector of Muhammadiyah / Aisyiyah tertiary institutions, the director of Muhammadiyah / Aisyiyah hospitals, and the Education Board of PWM Cadres all over Indonesia.<sup>204</sup>

*Second*, the fasting month (*Ramadan*) recitation of the Regional Committee of Muhammadiyah. This study is carried out every year. This research observes the study at the Regional Committee of Muhammadiyah of Central Java Province, which took place at the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta on Saturday, May 18, 2019. The studies raised the theme of "Enlightening Religious Da'wah", continuing the theme of Tanwir Muhammadiyah in Bengkulu, which had just been carried out in 2019. The event started from 07.30-18.00 WIB and divided into two study panel sessions. The first panel covered two discussion themes, namely (1) Understanding Religion and Its Implementation in Muhammadiyah's Religious Culture by Dr. H. Wawan Gunawan Abdul Wahid, M.Ag. from the Tarjih Assembly and Tajdid PP Muhammadiyah; (2) Implementation of the Ideology of Muhammadiyah Movement in the Middle of the Heterogeneity of People and National Life by Prof. Dr. K.H. Yusuf Suyono as Deputy Chairman of the Regional Leadership of Muhammadiyah Central Java Province. In the second panel, there is one theme of discussion but delivered by two speakers. The theme is "Enlightening Da'wah and Religion" by Drs. Marpuji Ali from PP Muhammadiyah and Drs. Tafsir, M.Ag. as Chairman of the Regional Leadership Council of Muhammadiyah in Central Java.<sup>205</sup>

In addition to the routine the fasting month (*Ramadan*) recitation every year, Sunday morning recitation has also become a tradition in Muhammadiyah. This event is a forum for Muhammadiyah people to

<sup>204</sup> Observation during recitation on Ramadan PP Muhammadiyah (Thursday-Saturday, 9-11 May 2019).

<sup>205</sup> Observation during recitation on Ramadan Pimpinan Wilayah Central Java (Saturday, 18 May 2019).

gather and as a vehicle for strengthening the ideology and socialization of organizational policies. This study is open for the public with a general theme. The researcher observed the routine Sunday morning studies which were the flagship program of the Blimbing Muhammadiyah Branch of the Blimbing Branch, Sukoharjo Regency.<sup>206</sup> According to one of the speakers, this recitation is the most active and the largest congregation. This recitation was conducted because of the insistence and input from the branches.

The activities were carried out in collaboration with all Muhammadiyah autonomous organizations, from Aisyiyah, Muhammadiyah Youth Force Preparedness Command (Kokam), and Muhammadiyah Youth. The audience consisted of a delegation of Muhammadiyah and Aisyiyah branch leaders from the Blimbing Branch as well as the general public and Muhammadiyah sympathizers in Polokarto District and surrounding areas. The number of audiences who attended reached 2,000–3,000 people. Even in certain events, this recitation attended by 8,000–10,000 people. This Sunday morning study was required for branch leaders / twigs and Muhammadiyah school / madrasah teachers in the Blimbing branch area. Leaders and teachers must fill in the attendance list provided by the committee.

According to Yenik Kholifatul, at the regional level, Nasyyatul Aisyiah (NA) has a program to encountering radicalism, although it is not structured. During this time, the program carried out to insert values through various studies of propaganda in the branch although not comprehensive and in-depth.<sup>207</sup>

### **Ideology Coaching: Leaders, Autonomous, and Foundation**

Some training must be attended by Muhammadiyah cadres, one of which is *Baitul Arqam* (BA) of Muhammadiyah. This is one of the training to foster Muhammadiyah leaders, because there is an ideology of

<sup>206</sup> Observation with Andika, (Secretary of Majlis Tabligh PCM Blimbing in Polokarto, Sukoharjo, 19 May 2019)

<sup>207</sup> In-depth interview with Yenik Kholifatul, Malang (6 May 2019).

Muhammadiyah. *Baitul Arqam* is a form of coaching in Muhammadiyah that is oriented to fostering Islamic ideology and leadership. Every Muhammadiyah member who takes part in the Foundation of Muhammadiyah or Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah (AUM) must follow *Baitul Arqam* first.

Besides BA, there is also *Dar al-Arqom* (DA). DA has a higher level. DA is a full week of training for the cadre. The importance of training for cadre within the Muhammadiyah bodies as an effort to encounter the radicalism was revealed by Deputy Chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Java PW, Fatah Santoso. He stated that there were many Muhammadiyah members that less tolerant of other groups, even fellow citizens themselves. This is due to a lack of insight and limited knowledge. One thing that can be overcome is through Baitul Arqam.

He stated:

*"BA (Baitul Arqam), in my opinion, must have a broad perspective and broad knowledge. And the breadth of that view does not occur if our knowledge is limited. So there must also be additional knowledge. If the study is too general, right, so it can be through discussion forums in Baitul Arqam ... the most effective way is through Baitul Arqam."*<sup>208</sup>

Baitul Arqam was carried out to defend the Foundation of Muhammadiyah (AUM/ *Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah*) from the infiltration of the radical groups. This issue openly stated by the Chairman of the East Java PWM, Saad Ibrahim. According to him, all of the Foundation of Muhammadiyah (AUM) must be managed by Muhammadiyah so that AUM does not become a nest that spread the radical ideology. AUM must be well guarded, especially from the infiltration of various outside parties, including radical Islam. That is one way to safeguard Muhammadiyah and at the same time block the pace of religious radicalism. For Saad,

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<sup>208</sup> In-depth interview with M. Abdul Fatah Santoso, (22 May 2019).

Muhammadiyah is an Islamic movement that has its ideology and has a clear khittah (moderate, inclusive, and tolerant).<sup>209</sup>

The efforts to maintain AUM, especially within the Muhammadiyah tertiary institution (PTM), can be seen in how the University of Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM) moderates lecturers and education staff. As stated by Syamsul Arifin as the person in charge of academics at UMM, in countering religious radicalism, Muhammadiyah sought various preventive measures from the infiltration of ideologies from outside, especially radical Islam. In the UMM environment, for example, the policy applies that all UMM lecturers (especially AIK lecturers) must have the Muhammadiyah ideology.

Furthermore, Syamsul explained the preventive action made by UMM. According to him:

*"Of course the preventive efforts are multi-layered. In recruitment, if it's a lecturer, the most important area is academic ability. But because this is Muhammadiyah, they must have Muhammadiyah militancy. Then there is needs intensive coaching, for example, pre-service, in office, recitation, consolidation, which is done continuously. So that no lecturers and educators are using other frames ..."*<sup>210</sup>

In Surakarta, the implementation of Baitul Arqam went well. The researcher observed how BA was held that carried out the theme Refreshing Ideology which was attended by Prof. Yunahar Ilyas, Lc., M.Ag. (Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah). According to Suyanto (Secretary of the Regional Leader of Muhammadiyah Solo or PDM Solo), concerning the Muhammadiyah ideology in Solo was considered done, due to the centrality and religious authority of Kiai Subari who was qualified as Chairman of the PDM. At AUM there is also no problem because the

<sup>209</sup> In-depth interview with Saad Ibrahim, (10 May 2019).

<sup>210</sup> Syamsul Arifin, University of Muhammadiyah Malang (7 May 2019).

strengthening of its ideology is effective through the activities of *Baitul Arqam*.<sup>211</sup>

The autonomous organization of Muhammadiyah also often organizes activities for their cadre. IPM activists, according to Maharina Novia, encountering radicalism through training for cadre programs. The most important material in the program is to strengthen of ideology. She pointed out that this was implemented in cadre cadet Melati 1-4. She explained that from the central to the grassroots level, the HDI emphasized the importance of critical and transformative scientific awareness. In this way, they hope to encounter the radical ideology that is destructive and remains strong in upholding moderate Islam (*wasathiyah*).<sup>212</sup>

In the NA's circles, Aini Sukriah stated that there was no specific program to encounter radical Islam, but the regeneration program (*Dar al-Arqom*) used to strengthen the moderate understanding of the Islamic Muhammadiyah to the cadres. Such thing, according to him, is a preventive action to protect the ideology of Muhammadiyah cadres.<sup>213</sup>

The same thing has also been done by the Muhammadiyah student social circles. Irsyad Majjid explained that countering radical Islam was carried out through the IMM regeneration programs. The most important material in regeneration is moderate Islam (*wasathiyah*) that emphasizes the importance of tolerance and religious freedom. The regeneration which includes various important materials was also carried out at the level of the commissariats (faculties), so that the distribution was so massive.<sup>214</sup>

In the Muhammadiyah youth under bow organization, Mukayat explained that their cadre militancy was able to encounter all ideological challenges that came from outside. What allows cadre militancy is a multi-layered cadre process from the first level namely *Bait al-Arqom* to the plenary level. He ensured that thus no core Muhammadiyah cadres were exposed to radical ideology let alone terrorism.<sup>215</sup>

<sup>211</sup> In-depth interview with Suyanto, Chief of Pemuda Muhammadiyah Surakarta (15 May 2015)

<sup>212</sup> In-depth interview with Maharina Novia, Chief of PP Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (IPM) (6 May 2019).

<sup>213</sup> In-depth interview with Aini Sukriah, (6 May 2019).

<sup>214</sup> In-depth interview with Irsyad Majjid, (7 May 2019).

<sup>215</sup> In-depth interview with Mukayat al-Amin, *Ketua Pimpinan Wilayah Pemuda Muhammadiyah* (14 May 2019)

## Culture of Muhammadiyah: Intellectual Movement

To support and continue to plant the ideas of pluralism and multiculturalism, Muhammadiyah in 2002 at Bali, began to introduce the concept of "Cultural Da'wah". After going through various discussions, finally, the 2005 Congress in Malang unanimously accepted "Cultural Da'wah" as the official decision of the organization. Cultural Da'wah is essentially a call for the universality of Islam for the welfare of all mankind without being limited by differences in religion, race, ethnicity, ethnicity, color, language, and gender. Cultural Da'wah pretended to spread Islam *rahmatan li al-`alamin* through wise approaches and methods following human intellectual and psychological capacities and without coercion. In this way, it is hoped that universal Islam can touch and greet the particularities of time and space. The locality is part of the modality to embody Islam in the archipelago and anywhere in the world.<sup>216</sup>

During the period of Ahmad Syafii Maarif's leadership, there were at least two Muhammadiyah intellectual communities that emerged to accommodate the progressive young thinkers of the Muhammadiyah, the Maarif Institute, and the Muhammadiyah Youth Intellectual Network (JIMM). His critical thoughts can attract the attention of the public, especially Muhammadiyah members. In addition to Syafii Maarif, several progressive senior Muhammadiyah figures were involved in seeding critical thinking among these Muhammadiyah youths, including M. Dawam Rahardjo, Moeslim Abdurrahman, M. Amin Abdullah, and Abdul Munir Mulkhan. They were the figures who inspire Muhammadiyah's progressive young thinkers who are committed to the ideas of pluralism, democracy, tolerance, human rights, and religious freedom.

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<sup>216</sup> Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, *Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2004).

## 1. The Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity

The spirit of the formation of The Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity (or commonly abbreviated as Maarif Institute) is a recognition of the importance of cultural institutions that fight for Indonesian Islam that is *rahmatan li al-'alamin*, inclusive, and compatible with modern ideas, such as democracy and human rights. The presence of this institution was considered relevant at the time of the strong distortion of the Islamic message by anti-progress, anti-democracy, and pro-violence.<sup>217</sup>

This institution was established on February 28, 2003, in Jakarta at the initiative of Ahmad Syafii Maarif. The main mission of the Maarif Institute is to socialize the idea of Islamic progressive, to engage in dialogue and partnership between religions, between cultures and between civilizations to realize civilization, peace, mutual understanding, and constructive cooperation for humanity. The development of the Maarif Institute is an effort to manifest the great ideas of Syafii Maarif which are summarized in the concepts of Islam, Indonesian-ness and humanity.

Syafii Maarif wants Islam that developed in Indonesia is Islam that is friendly, open, inclusive, and able to provide solutions to various problems of the nation and state. To develop Islam as such, Muslims must be open, passionate to go forward, optimistic, and not hopeless, and not mentally minority. Syafii Maarif himself has been known as an Islamic figure who has never been awkward in associating and establishing good relations with Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Chinese, religious leaders, nationalists, NU, and also world leaders. According to him, this is a great investment to build tolerance and dialogue with other groups.

There are some of the concerns that Syafii Maarif's continuously think about, *first*, the culture of Arabism in society; *second*, the anomaly of democratic life; *third*, the low quality of human resources (HR) in Indonesia.

<sup>217</sup> Fajar Riza Ul Haq, "Gugus Wacana Maarif Institute: Keislaman, Keindonesiaan, dan Kemanusiaan". Workshop paper "Pengembangan Islam dan Pluralisme di Indonesia", Paramdina University, 7-8 June 2007.

Syafii Maarif disagrees with the institutionalization of rules or Islamic law to be a national state law.<sup>34</sup> These thoughts from Syafii proved to be very important in the development of pluralism and democracy in Indonesia. He sees the substance of religion as ethics in a democracy. If this country wants to be based on Islam, according to Syafii, what should be developed is the ideals of substantive Islam, not the formalization of sharia as in Islamic history. Honestly, Syafii claimed to be happy when Islam was not the basis of the state in Indonesia.<sup>219</sup>

To strengthening and spreading the discourse that he developed, Maarif Institute created a website with the address: [www.maarifinstitute.org](http://www.maarifinstitute.org). In addition to making the Maarif Institute website also publishes the Maarif journal, which is published every month. Since it's founded in 2003, the Maarif Institute has successfully produced the Muhammadiyah Youth Intellectual Network (JIMM) – at that time the Maarif Institute was led by Moeslim Abdurrahman, a progressive Islamic intellectual who was very concerned with the transformation of the Islamic community in Indonesia. At that time, the Maarif Institute played the role of an umbrella and a platform for the progressive young intellectuals of Muhammadiyah who were nervous about the reality of intellectualism that was running less dynamically within the Muhammadiyah.<sup>220</sup>

## **2. Muhammadiyah's Young Intellectual Network (*Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah (JIMM)*)**

According to one of its founders, Zuly Qodir, JIMM is a community of young Muhammadiyah youths, who are mostly no longer administrators of Muhammadiyah, or are still members but have different thinking styles and methods of interpreting the Qur'an from the leader at the regional, regional or central level.<sup>221</sup> JIMM lahir sekitar September 2003. JIMM was founded around September 2003. The presence of JIMM was actually as a space

<sup>34</sup> M. Amin Abdullah, "Intelektual Sekaligus Aktivistis", dalam Abd Rahim Ghazali, Refleksi 70 Tahun Ahmad Syafii Maarif Cermin Untuk Semua (Jakarta: Maarif Institute, 2005), 18.

<sup>219</sup> Zuly Qodir, *Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam: Wacana dan Aksi Islam Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006), 158.

<sup>220</sup> Mohamad Ali, *Islam Muda Liberal, Post-Puritan, Post-Tradisional*, (Jakarta: Apeiron Philotes, 2006), 102.

<sup>221</sup> Zuly Qodir, *Islam Syariah vis a vis Negara Ideologi Gerakan Politik di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2007), 198.

given by Ahmad Syafii Maarif - who was then the Chairperson of Muhammadiyah. But JIMM did not get widely recognized among other Muhammadiyah administrators, because JIMM was outside the Muhammadiyah structure.<sup>222</sup>

JIMM has carried out many activities regarding the dissemination of Islam and pluralism in Indonesia. The discourse of pluralism itself is one of the important issues of JIMM. According to the curriculum created and launched by JIMM activists, the three main discourses that are studied and become the spirit of JIMM are contemporary Islamic thought, critical social science, and new social movements.<sup>223</sup>

Moeslim Abdurrahman asserted that JIMM tried to develop new thinking and create *tajdid* (renewal) as a step for JIMM to reinterpret the more relevant meaning of Islam.<sup>224</sup> The discourse on Islam, democracy, pluralism, and hermeneutics that was discussed by JIMM then led them to have to reckon with the fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and organizations in line with them – conservatism groups which the Shafi'is called Mafia in a Cloak "*preman berjubah*".<sup>225</sup>

JIMM has been holding various workshops and studies of Islamic thought since the beginning. The activity resulted in a Return to the Qur'an, Interpreting the Meanings of the Age (*Kembali ke Al-Qur'an, Menafsir Makna Zaman*) that compiled the papers of the speakers at the event; Muhammadiyah Progressive Manifesto Young People's Thought. They also carried out the "Dissemination of Pluralism Philosophy Discourse for Muhammadiyah High School/Vocational School Teachers in Yogyakarta". This activity produced a book that was published by JIMM Yogyakarta with

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "Jihad Membumikan Pluralisme, Bersatu Menghadang Fundamentalisme" Paper *Workshop* "Pengembangan Islam dan Pluralisme di Indonesia", diselenggarakan oleh Pusat Studi Islam dan Kenegaraan (PSIK) Universitas Paramadina, Puncak, 7-8 June 2007.

<sup>224</sup> Moeslim Abdurrahman, "Menggagas Islam yang Memihak, Sebuah Pengantar", dalam Ahmad Fuad Fanani, *Islam Mazhab Kritis Menggagas Keberagamaan Liberatif* (Kompas: Jakarta, 2004), xxi.

<sup>225</sup> Lukman Hakim, "Toleransi dan Kemanusiaan: Pengalaman Maarif Institute" dalam *Pluralisme dan Kebebasan Beragama—Laporan Penelitian Profil Lembaga*, 98-119.

the title *Learning Wisdom from the Story of Friends (Belajar Kearifan dari Kisah Sahabat)*.<sup>226</sup>

Initially, JIMM had received resistance from the Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta (UMS). At UMS itself, there is a study center called the Center for Cultural Studies and Social Change (PSBPS). According to the founder of PSBPS, Yayah Khisbiyah, the center of the study spreads the thoughts of progressives and supports the ideas of JIMM. For this reason, Yayah admitted, her party was in opposition by conservatives.

However, an interesting development occurred in 2014. For the first time, the University of Muhammadiyah Surakarta provided a place for JIMM to hold their event on the campus. On another campus, namely at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), JIMM received a "protection" from Prof. Dr. Muhadjir Effendy, who paid great attention to the development of the intellectual world among the young generation of Muhammadiyah. Meanwhile, the shift in the attitude of the UMS to JIMM cannot be separated from the figure of Marpuji Ali who with his persuasive approach that can convince the UMS public that JIMM is not a danger to Muhammadiyah.<sup>227</sup>

In its journey, JIMM's last activity, 2018, has carried out "Tadarus National of Islamic Thought" (Tadarus Pemikiran Islam Nasional) at the Muhammadiyah University of Malang on May 23-24 by discussing the theme "Rebranding Muhammadiyah: Dialectics of Authenticity and Change in the Thought and Movement of Muhammadiyah" (*Rebranding Muhammadiyah: Dialektika Otentisitas dan Perubahan dalam Pemikiran dan Gerakan Muhammadiyah*). The tadarus was also attended by young Muhammadiyah cadres from all over Indonesia, especially the cadres of autonomous organizations, both IPM and IMM on campus. All forms of JIMM activities in the form of Islamic thought, workshops, colloquia, and seminars that discuss current issues in Muhammadiyah are the initial steps of the progressive Muhammadiyah group to exchange ideas. They even reproduce ideas that once existed by the expectations of early

<sup>226</sup> Ahmad Fuad Fanani, "Jihad Membumikan Pluralisme".

<sup>227</sup> Pradana Boy ZTF, *Membela Islam Murni* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2016), 189.

Muhammadiyah figures as a form of reform organization movement.

### **3. Islamic School for Progressive Women (*Madrasah Perempuan Berkemajuan*)**

Islamic School for Progressive Women or *Madrasah Perempuan Berkemajuan* (MPB) is a program initiated by the Central Leadership Research and Development Institute (LPPA) Aisyiyah, chaired by Alimatul Qibtiyah. Initiated for about two years, MPB aims to share Aisyiyah's experiences and views. Aisyiyah's progressive thoughts should not only be enjoyed by Aisyiyah residents but can also be known by the general public. Aisyiyah pioneered Islamic School for Progressive Women or *Madrasah Perempuan Berkemajuan* (MPB) for studies on contemporary issues related to Islamic perspectives, how politics with Islam, and so on. This is still being discussed and will be distributed throughout the Aisyiyah region. This Islamic School for Progressive Women has only begun in 2014.

The Islamic School for Progressive Women is held for a week for four months. The participants were open to the public, not only for the cadres and members of Aisyiyah, but also for young people. According to Head of NA Sukoharjo Ninin Karlina, the Islamic School for Progressive Women intended to make the participants understand the concept of conservative then later they become progressive. In other word, interpret Muhammadiyah's ideology then adjusted it into the present context. According to Ninin Karlina in this activity, the participants were given insights about Muhammadiyah's ideological map among contemporary Islamic movements ranging from radicalism, conservatism, and contemporary Islam.<sup>228</sup>

### **4. Red Beret: IMM Experiences**

Red Berets is an intellectual activity of the Leaders of Muhammadiyah Student Association of Sukoharjo Regency (PC IMM Sukoharjo) to carry out the training for the cadre of young people who

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<sup>228</sup> In-depth interview with Ninin Karlina, Sukoharjo (15 May 2019).

think moderate and progressive Islam. Red Berets has been a tradition for the generations since 2006. This is a kind of philosophy school that attended by IMM cadres at the Indonesian commissariat level. Red Berets are held once per semester with a duration of time of two weeks (14 days) and usually coincide during semester breaks.

The main activity of the Red Berets is to study philosophy. The learning method that applied to the Red Berets is in the form of alternating presentations by participants of the Red Berets that divided into two groups. The themes presented are (1) Introduction (philosophical understanding, object of philosophical study, philosophical thinking characteristics, ontology, epistemology, and axiology); (2) Pre-Socratic philosophers / Anthropocentric philosophers (Tales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Pythagoras, etc.); (3) Post-Socratic philosophers / Anthropocentric philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle); (4) Philosophy of Hellenism; (5) Scholastic Philosophy, Philosophy of thought and its figures (Idealism, empiricism, rationalism, positivism, etc.), Islamic philosophers, and contemporary philosophers.

This activity becomes an arena of criticism, training to build arguments, habits of differing opinions, habits of hearing the opinions of others who have different points of view, are trained and forged. So, many Red Beret graduates who used to be old-fashioned in thinking who believed in the absolute truth about what they had learned about religion and other sciences, would be melting and more tolerant with those who disagree with it. Red Beret graduates are not people who are anti-dialogue, but people who like dialogue. So in the future, Red Beret graduates will be able to solve all their problems simply by constructive dialogue and not need to go through physical violence. This has implications for the religious understanding of participants participating in the Red Berets. They are more open to new discourses, understandings and ideas about Islam.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> In-depth interview Yahya Fathur Rozy, Friday, 24 May 2019 Time 09.00-09.40 WIB.

## Academic Studies

From the central, regional, regional, to the branch level, Muhammadiyah activists try to counter the radical Islamic ideology. Not only through regeneration, but also studies, seminars, workshops, and so on. It is expected to become a preventive effort from all forms of infiltration of radical ideologies that are dehumanization and destructive.

In the IMM social circles, for example, Abdul Musawir explained that IMM held various seminars among students, in the context of countering radicalism. In addition, in its various programs, IMM always includes material on the importance of strengthening Pancasila as the ideology of the nation that must be maintained.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>230</sup> Abdul Musawir, Ketua DPD IMM East Java (6 May 2019).

### 3.3. The Resiliencies of Muhammadiyah

Another important thing that is interesting to be discussed is about the resilience of Muhammadiyah in dealing with radicalism. This topic may seem sensitive, but we must dare to discuss ourselves openly. The courage to talk about ourselves will open up the possibility to take the right step forward.

Based on the observation of the Deputy Chairperson of Muhammadiyah Central Java PW, Achmad Jainuri, through all this time the Muhammadiyah leadership was sterile from all forms of destructive ideological infiltration, because the ideological protection process that Muhammadiyah had been pursuing had gone through a long process. There is a very strict screening mechanism for Muhammadiyah leaders. At the central leadership level, after going through the elections, the candidates for the elite Muhammadiyah leaders are filtered through the next selection process, which is determined by members of the Tanwir (deliberation). Through this process, people who are not in accordance with Muhammadiyah's vision and mission will be eliminated.<sup>231</sup>

Regarding the durability of Muhammadiyah, especially at the executive level, was also conveyed by Syamsuddin, Deputy Chairperson of Regional Leader of Muhammadiyah Central Java's Province. According to him, in general, there are no Muhammadiyah administrators who are influenced by radical ideology, especially those who deal with structural-organizational affairs every day. From the branches, branches, regions, regions to the center, Muhammadiyah activists have been selected by organizational mechanisms.<sup>232</sup>

At the regional level it also shows that. The Chairperson of the Malang PDM Disdasmen Council, Khozin, stated that there were no core officials who were indicated to be influenced by radical ideology. But if

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<sup>231</sup> In-depth interview with Achmad Jainuri, Vice Chair of PW Muhammadiyah Central Java (8 May 2019).

<sup>232</sup> In-depth interview with Syamsuddin, Vice Chair of PW Muhammadiyah East Java (8 May 2019)

those who initially had a fundamentalist Islamic background then joined the Muhammadiyah, they were indeed not easy to completely change the ideology they had in the beginning. All core management are well-selected people, especially on the basis of their ideology. In addition, anyone who will become a potential leader, must still follow further selection which is more stringent. Those who truly have a strong Muhammadiyah spirit will be elected as leaders.<sup>233</sup>

In the under bow organization of student organizations, the Head of Scientific DPP of the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) Abdul Musawir claims that is none of its members are affected by radical Islam. IMM is believed to be safe from these destructive ideas because the ideological protection at IMM is very strong. Every cadre who joins must participate in a series of cadre activities, to have strong Muhammadiyah militancy.<sup>234</sup> In fact, according to the Chairman of the PC IMM Malang City, Irsyad Majid, more IMM cadres who have progressive thinking rather than radical.<sup>235</sup>

As for the under bow organization of the student movement, Maharina explained that no cadre of the Muhammadiyah Student Association (IPM) was exposed to radicalism let alone terrorism. If there are Muhammadiyah school students who take radical actions, certainly, the person concerned does not follow the HDI regeneration process strictly.<sup>236</sup> However, the explanation of Hafizh Syafaaturrahman, Chairman of the IPP DPP, gave slightly different information. Because IPM members are teenagers who are in transition, they are vulnerable to being influenced by other groups. Those who are prone to be affected are mainly those who are not administrators.<sup>237</sup>

Meanwhile, in the under bow of the Muhammadiyah young women's movement, Aini Sukriah explained the differences between the original

<sup>233</sup> In-depth interview with Khozin, Chair of Majelis Dikdasmen, PDM Kota Malang (11 May 2019).

<sup>234</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Musawir Yahya, Kabid Keilmuan DPP IMM (6 May 2019).

<sup>235</sup> In-depth interview with Irsyad Majid, Ketua PC IMM Malang Raya (7 May 2019).

<sup>236</sup> In-depth interview with Maharina Novia Zahro Kabid PIP PP IPM (6 May 2019).

<sup>237</sup> In-depth interview with Hafizh Syafaaturrahman, Ketua DPP IPM, pada 13 June 2019

cadres and the migrants.<sup>238</sup> The process of radicalization is impossible to penetrate the ideological defenses of the original cadres. According to Yenik Kholifatul, the original cadres had followed a selective cadre process (DANA 1, DANA 2, DANA 3) and some had even participated in cadres in previous organizations such as HDI and IMM.<sup>239</sup>

Nevertheless, Jainuri acknowledged that at the grassroots level, several Muhammadiyah people were found who were influenced by radical ideology. "(Some) Muhammadiyah people are easily fascinated by neighboring grass. Because they are probably fluent in delivering material and books that they rarely hear in Muhammadiyah."<sup>240</sup>

However, in Haeri Fadly's view, what happened to the Muhammadiyah people in the grassroots actually did not reach the radical stage, but was conservative-intolerant. Even if this is dangerous, there is clearly a difference between intolerance and radicalism. According to him, as far as what happened to Muhammadiyah activists at the grassroots was religious conservatism, but they were not radical. Usually, this is actualized in the form of behavior that is not easy to accept differences, especially concerning the issue of belief (faith). According to Haeri, this can happen because of their religious insight already believes in certain religious doctrines that are very closed (exclusive).<sup>241</sup>

On the other hand, Nurbani Yusuf revealed a different case. In the area where he lived, there were Muhammadiyah people who were indicated to have a radical ideology. People like this will usually drag Muhammadiyah to follow the ideology of violence they embrace. If people like this has become an administrator then it would create problems inside.<sup>242</sup>

There are other cases, as revealed by Idaul Hasanah, that is concerning the seizure of mosque management by Muhammadiyah residents and those affiliated with the right stream. According to her, like

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<sup>238</sup> In-depth interview with Aini Sukriah, (6 May 2019).

<sup>239</sup> In-depth interview with Yenik Kholifatul Laila, (6 May 2019).

<sup>240</sup> In-depth interview with Achmad Jainuri, (8 May 2019)

<sup>241</sup> In-depth interview with Haeri Fadly (7 May 2019).

<sup>242</sup> In-depth interview with Nurbani Yusuf, M. Sos, (9 May 2019).

one of the mosques in Malang, the Muhajirin Mosque, it was neglected and was eventually controlled by those who tended to be conservative. Although in the end, the management of the mosque can be taken over by the people of Persyarikatan.<sup>243</sup>

One of the important strengths of Muhammadiyah's citizens and leaders is adherence to the organization's official products. Muhammadiyah has an official media that is read by its leaders and citizens, the Voice of Muhammadiyah (*Suara Muhammadiyah*), which is published every two weeks. This magazine is the main reference for members and leaders in their actions and thinking. The magazine is managed by Buya Syafii Maarif as the general leader, who directed every week at the editorial meeting. Aside from Buya, General Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah, Haedar Nashir, also helped oversee the magazine's thinking.

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<sup>243</sup> In-depth interview with Idaul Hasanah, SHI, MHI, (6 May 2019).

### 3.4. Muhammadiyah's Challenges in Moderating Islam

Several challenges faced by Muhammadiyah in moderating Islam in Indonesia. The challenge can come from inside or outside. Following are some of the challenges facing Muhammadiyah:

#### The Absence of "Pure Islam" Guidelines

One of Muhammadiyah's challenges in dealing with the fundamentalist Islamic groups is the similarity of puritanical theology, *ar-ruju 'ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah* (Return to Al-Qur'an and al-Sunnah / Hadith). Salafi groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamic groups that have been known to be intolerant and radical also use the slogan.

Even though Muhammadiyah has a different perspective on its puritanism theology, this similarity makes many Muhammadiyah members vulnerable to being influenced by other puritans groups. For example, in some areas, the Majelis Tafsir Al-Qur'an (MTA) succeeded in eroding Muhammadiyah adherents, partly because of the theological similarities between MTA and Muhammadiyah.

As stated by Sudarno Shobron, a member of the Muhammadiyah PP Cadre Education Board, "I have been asked," May I, as the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Branch, also build the MTA, because the missionaries preaching model is the same? " When Musywil was in Pati, there were also reports that their adherents there were active in MTA recitation."<sup>244</sup>

Syamsuddin argues that there is a kind of psychological barrier in Muhammadiyah in terms of the war against the discourse of radicalism. That is because the radical figures are mostly Middle Eastern graduates

<sup>244</sup> In-depth interview with Sudarno Shobron, Member of Education Community PP Muhammadiyah (29 May 2019)

and have an incision with Muhammadiyah, which is the purification movement.<sup>245</sup>

This situation is getting worse because of the absence of the guidelines that can be used to the grassroots. Maslahul Falah said, the main obstacle of Muhammadiyah in dealing with radical groups, one of which is related to the lack of guidance to the grassroots.<sup>246</sup> No wonder Muhammadiyah people often feel confused if other groups present their ideology to Muhammadiyah mosques or institutions because they also have the same slogan.

### The Crisis of Preachers (*Mubalig*) and Scholars (*Ulama*)

There is a fundamental weakness in the bodies of Muhammadiyah if it wants to be an important actor in the movement of moderation of thought and religious attitudes in Indonesia, it is the crisis of ulama or preachers or *dai* or *mubalig* or *ustaz*. The complaints about the lack of scholars or preachers were found in almost all informants in this study.

Sobrun Jamil, Muhammadiyah Youth, stated that Muhammadiyah lacked preachers who were ready to preach at the grassroots.<sup>247</sup> Dyah Puspitarini, Chairwoman of Nasyiatul Aistiyah state that she was find it difficult to have da'l or ustadz from Muhammadiyah to be questioned about religion.<sup>248</sup>

The crisis of the preacher at Muhammadiyah was also experienced in various regions. Because of this situation, it is not uncommon for Muhammadiyah Qur'an recitation and studies to be filled by non-Muhammadiyah preachers with a very strict Islamic ideology, while progressive and moderate Muhammadiyah-style Islamic progress is not conveyed to Muhammadiyah members.<sup>249</sup>

A similar complaint is also stated by Muhammad Bardan, Chairperson of the Sukoharjo PDM Cadre Assembly might be able to illustrate this clearly. According to him, Muhammadiyah succeeded in

<sup>245</sup> In-depth interview with Syamsudin, Vice Chairperson PW Muhammadiyah East Java (8 May 2019).

<sup>246</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Maslahul Falah, Chief of Ranting Laren, Lamongan (8 May 2019).

<sup>247</sup> In-depth interview with Sobrun Jamil, Ketua PDPM Malang Raya; Anggota PWPM Jatim (12 May 2019)

<sup>248</sup> In-depth interview with Dyah Puspitarini (Chairperson PP Nasyiatul Aisyiyah (4 June 2019).

<sup>249</sup> In-depth interview with Ninin Karlina, (15 May 2019)

building thousands of mosques, unfortunately, the large number of mosques was not followed by the availability of preachers who routinely revived these mosques. "Muhammadiyah often builds mosques, it just can't take care of the mosque. Muhammadiyah is lacking preachers who routinely serve mosques. Because it was taken by other groups, " he said...<sup>250</sup>

Kiai Tafsir, Chairperson of the Regional Leadership Council of Muhammadiyah in Central Java, very clearly explained this situation.

*One of Muhammadiyah's weaknesses is that it is filled with the spirit of progress. The result is very minimal that pursue the Islamic world. Muhammadiyah members want to study medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and so on. Once Muhammadiyah children go to school, they are always asked, "What do you want to work for? Tomorrow, what will it be? "When we want to enter (faculty) usululuddin, for example, the ablest to lecture ... If the ushuluddin school is as ameh dadi opo (tomorrow what do you want to be, ed.), As if forgetting that God exists ... Finally when the moment of searching preacher (mubalig) [Muhammadiyah has difficulty] .... So the mistake is, not only in the structure, the culture is also wrong. Now, Muhammadiyah has provided infrastructure to produce preachers, such as Pondok Shabran and PUTM, but how many are there? [Researcher and Trustee of Pondok Shabran gave information that there were one hundred registered at Pondok Shabran, but only thirty people were accepted]. The problem after that, who registered there? Those who entered there were not the elite children of Muhammadiyah. Those who entered were Muhammadiyah members who were poor and underprivileged, who were elite entering medical school. So they are only "KW 2"(second quality) PUTM classes. Shabran is "KW2". Try searching for PUTM and Shabran children, how many of them are elite children ... Then there must be a center for religious education so that the needs of the huts for caregivers can be fulfilled .... So,*

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<sup>250</sup> In-depth interview with Muh. Bardan, (24 May 2019).

*understanding the religion in accordance with the outlines of Muhammadiyah. His ulama's education is like that of Shabran, but don't be limited. Anyone who wants to stay must be accepted, do not need to be limited and do not have to be given a full scholarship if it is not able. The important thing is the regeneration of the ulama is awakened. Lha NU, in fasting month (Ramadan) like this, the nggowo mattress is being aired, how come (to bring your own mattress, ed.) To stay on vacation.”<sup>251</sup>*

The preacher or *dai* or *mubalig* crisis was further aggravated by the inability of the preacher of Muhammadiyah in conveying their messages. Why Muhammadiyah Sukoharjo, for example, more often invites non-Muhammadiyah preachers, one of them is because the study of Muhammadiyah preacher is less interesting. They are also not capable of packaging material so that it is easy for the audience to understand.<sup>252</sup>

As a da'wah organization, Muhammadiyah has always endeavored to expand and develop its progressive wing of Islamic da'wah in society. But in its implementation, the preaching of Muhammadiyah was less attractive to other groups because the preacher of Muhammadiyah was less flexible, tended to be boring, and the language was heavy. Because of this, there is almost no Muhammadiyah mission that appeals to young people.<sup>253</sup>

The existence of the preacher at Muhammadiyah is really needed to defend the Muhammadiyah community from the influence of radical groups. The existence of the Muhammadiyah is very important in maintaining the religious understanding of the Muhammadiyah people so that they are in line with the Muhammadiyah's *fatwa* and ideology. No less important is the packaging in the study. Unattractive studies make many Muhammadiyah people migrate to other groups.<sup>254</sup>

<sup>251</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Tafsir, (18 May 2019)

<sup>252</sup> In-depth interview with Ninin Karlina, (15 May 2019)

<sup>253</sup> In-depth interview with Muhammad Taufik Hassan, (Tuesday, 7 May 2019); In-depth interview with Isnaeni Shofianah, General Secretary PD IPM Sukoharjo (12 May 2019).

<sup>254</sup> In Surakarta, most of Muhammadiyah migrated to Qur'an Recitation, this information based on the in-depth interview with Sudarno Shobron Surakarta (27 May 2019).

## Media Missionaries Speech (*Dakwah*)

As a modern organization, Muhammadiyah now faces a new reality of millennial society which makes the media as one of very decisive factors. Unfortunately, Muhammadiyah is actually weak in this field. The media developed by Muhammadiyah are inferior to those of the hardline Islamic groups, call it *eramuslim.com*. In fact, among Muhammadiyah young people who are familiar with journalistic issues, the media is not well developed.

Muhammadiyah's weaknesses in the media sector are also indirectly echoed by Mu'arif, one of the senior editors of *Suara Muhammadiyah (SM)*, Muhammadiyah's official media. He gave an example of why SM was less influential than other Islamic media, one of which was because SM readers were only from internal Muhammadiyah. That is not all the management read it. Muhammadiyah should have the courage to market its thoughts openly through various alternative media channels.<sup>255</sup>

Actually Muhammadiyah has expanded into the digital world. SM Magazine has *suaramuhammadiyah.id*, there is *muhammadiyah.or.id* as the official website. The regional Leaders of Muhammadiyah at East Java Province has *pwmu.co*, while The regional of Leaders Muhammadiyah Central Java has *tabloidcermin.com*, while Solo Raya has *mentarinews.com*. However, the majority or in general the Muhammadiyah sites are still dominated by news of the organization's activities and are too internally oriented. Thus it is not powerful enough to propagate Muhammadiyah's ideology and religious understanding both to its worshipers and to the public sphere.

Muhammadiyah's weaknesses in the field of media ultimately hampered the formation of public discourse which is now almost all channeled through the media. According to Syahrul, one of the obstacles of IPM, in the battle of discourse with radical groups is that media owned by IPM are not as attractive as those managed by radical groups.<sup>256</sup>

<sup>255</sup> In-depth interview with Mu'arif, Senior editor *Suara Muhammadiyah* (24 June 2019).

<sup>256</sup> In-depth interview with Syahrul Ramadhan, Chair of PW IPM East Java (5 May 2019).

Not to mention this weakness is compounded by the poor creativity of the Islamic content produced by Muhammadiyah. If compared with the Salafi group, for example, Muhammadiyah can be said to be lagging far behind in developing the media as a channel of moderate Islamic da'wah.<sup>257</sup> In fact, on social media too, the voice of Muhammadiyah is less echoed than radical Islamic groups. This is one of Muhammadiyah's homework assignments at the moment.<sup>258</sup>

The infiltration of radical Islamic discourse that entered the official media of the institution, according to Najib Hamid, did not yet exist. He continued if there was definitely resistance. If there are different attitudes, that's normal. However, according to him, about the media, Muhammadiyah is still losing. Muhammadiyah East Java has an online PWMU, Matan is offline. There is Walida offline. PWMU TV is online, but it doesn't survive because it's an extraordinary capitalist industry. When TV has to be developed with propaganda material, dealing with advertisements.

## Political Identity

In carrying out the mission of Islamic moderation, one of the challenges facing Muhammadiyah is the internal dynamics of the organization. Within the Muhammadiyah bodies, there are various variants of views, including political views. This diversity of political views is not infrequently brought into the organization and to be direct. These variants usually experience crystallization when certain political events occur, both internal and external. Internal events for example, leadership succession, and externally, for example, are related to electoral political momentum. Because Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization, it is not uncommon for political interests to be wrapped in Islamic narratives, resulting in tampering the idea.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> In-depth interview with K.H. Tafsir, Chair of PW Muhammadiyah Central Java (18 May 2019).

<sup>258</sup> In-depth interview with Syahrul Ramadhan, (5 May 2019).

<sup>259</sup> In-depth interview with Abdul Mut'i, General Secretary PP Muhammadiyah (13 June 2019).

A very strong political momentum that carries religious sentiments as a strategy to build identity politics that has an impact on hardening religious attitudes in Muhammadiyah was the 2019 Presidential Election some time ago. Religion is dragged into the realm of practical politics and becomes a tool to draw the line between 'us' and 'them'. Religion that should spread universal human values is impoverished into a mere political tool. As a result of the strengthening of religion-based identity politics is the hardening of religious discourse and religious action.<sup>260</sup>

Actually this situation had occurred before the 2019 Presidential Election, it is in the 2016 DKI Governor Election. The feud between supporters of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and Anies Baswedan was loaded with various Islamic narratives that were very exclusive and intolerant. Political differences are used to draw a line between Muslims and non-Muslims. Supporting one candidate is considered a jihad. The strength of identity politics by playing religious sentiments continues in the 2019 Presidential Election.<sup>261</sup>

In the bodies of Muhammadiyah, this situation had a noticeable impact. At least, this is what Jainuri acknowledged. He argues that the strengthening of exclusivism and intolerance in the body of Muhammadiyah can be felt as a result of the strengthening of identity politics in electoral political events. He stated plainly, "In general, yes [there was radicalization]. If we read on Whatsapp there is a tendency, encouraging us to be radical. Especially if we look at the daily life of friends, high-ranking officials who are vulgar about political choices. What can we do?."<sup>262</sup>

From the point of view the young people, Yahya Fathur Rozy said that puritan Muslims (for example FPI, Tarbiyah, ex-HTI, and puritan Muslims from moderate organizations), that this democratic party is one of a series

<sup>260</sup> In-depth interview with Mukayat al-Amin, Chairperson PW Pemuda Muhammadiyah East Java (14 May 2019).

<sup>261</sup> In-depth interview with Syamsul Arifin, ahli sosiologi agama (7 May 2019).

<sup>262</sup> In-depth interview with Achmad Jainuri, Vice Chair of PW Muhammadiyah East Java (8 May 2019)

of activities that nuanced religion. If different choices, will be considered infidels, hypocrites, accursed, and so on.<sup>263</sup>

The same confession was also obtained from Nurbani Yusuf, Chairperson of Batu City PDM. As a result of electoral politics, the changes to the hardening of religious attitudes among Muhammadiyah members is actually happen.<sup>264</sup> Syamsul Arifin's reflection could be evidence of how hard the real thing happened.

"I have never encountered in electoral politics that there is a religious wave of this magnitude. There is a potential danger because Muslims are divided and become an uncomfortable relationship. It became the judgment that certain parties were better in Islam, while others were not. And also, there are Muslim groups that carry radicalism and even terrorism."<sup>265</sup>

From this point, it can be said that there has been a hardening of religious attitudes among Muhammadiyah adherents as a result of electoral politics, especially in the 2019 Presidential Election. This is not only a symptom of Muhammadiyah exclusively. Almost all Muslims in Indonesia were affected. However, this phenomenon cannot be denied has occurred within the Muhammadiyah community.

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<sup>263</sup> In-depth interview with Yahya Fathur Rozy, Ketua Bidang Tabligh PC IMM Sukoharjo (25 May 2019).

<sup>264</sup> In-depth interview with Nurbani Yusuf, Chair of PDM Kota Batu (9 May 2019).

<sup>265</sup> In-depth interview with Syamsul Arifin, Sociologist of Religion (7 May 2019).

### 3.5. Conclusion

In responding to the phenomenon of strengthening religious radicalism in Indonesia since the 1998 after-reforms, Muhammadiyah has a great sensitivity and attention. As a *wasathiyah* (moderate) Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah has given a firm response to all forms of intolerance, radicalism and extremism in religion.

Through the concept of progressive Islam, Muhammadiyah reinforces its moderate in religion and state. A progressive Islam is an Islam that fully fights for peace and recognizes and respects diversity. In this progressive Islamic framework, Muhammadiyah also affirmed its recognition that the NKRI with Pancasila as a state of agreement (*dar al-ahd*), where Muhammadiyah was required to make it as a land of witness (*dar al-shahadah*) for all its struggles in building a prosperous fair state in under God's forgiveness (*baladun thayyibatun a rabbun ghafur*).

In dealing with radicalism, extremism and terrorism, Muhammadiyah chose the Islamic moderation approach. There is no special program developed by Muhammadiyah to fight radicalism. However, some things can be considered as Muhammadiyah's efforts in developing a moderate religious life, which is assumed to have an impact on deradicalization. These steps can take the form of structural policies (published the concept of progressive Islam; *Ahl al-Ahd wa al-Syahadah*; recitation, regeneration, study, etc.) or various Muhammadiyah cultural movements (moderation movements developed by Muhammadiyah youth, like Maarif Institute, JIMM, and et cetera).

However, Muhammadiyah faces various challenges that are not easy. Some data in the field shows that the influence of radical ideologies (to varying degrees) influence Muhammadiyah members. There was a migration of Muhammadiyah residents to other groups.

This phenomenon is partly due to the absence of a "guide-differentiator" between the slogan of *al-ruju 'ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah*

"which is owned by Muhammadiyah with other puritanical Islamic groups which are currently many supporters and actors of actions intolerant and radical. This situation is compounded by the crisis in Muhammadiyah. This situation also supplemented by the preacher crisis that caused not a few Muhammadiyah recitations which were actually filled by non-Muhammadiyah preachers who had Islamic ideologies that conflicted with Muhammadiyah.

The lack of media development has also become a challenge for Muhammadiyah in building the moderat (*wasathiyah*) Islamic discourse in public spaces. What also cannot be ignored is the impact of electoral politics that plays on religious issues. Religious issues that are used as instruments to build identity politics in the electoral political agenda contribute to the hardening of religious life. This is no exception within Muhammadiyah.[]

**CHAPTER IV**

**CONCLUSION**

## 4.1. Conclusion

This research is trying to look at the role of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as the main pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia to encounter religious radicalism that is uprising in Indonesia after reform. This study started from the reality of religious life in Indonesia at present, with the high level of religious intolerance and violence. Hence, these two Islamic organizations that become the objects of the study, are NU and Muhammadiyah. The total number of their members, if compiled, is more than a half of the Muslim population in Indonesia.

Either NU or Muhammadiyah claimed that they are the front line of moderate Islam (*wasathiyah*). NU based on moderation is the concept of *ahlus sunnah wal-jama'ah* manifested into the principle of *tawazun* (balance), *tawassuth* (moderate), and *tasammuh* (tolerant), these concepts have been implemented since the history of Walisongo in Nusantara. These ideas were institutionalized within the concept of "Islam Nusantara" that reflected in Islamic doctrine that developed by the Islamic teachers of the Islamic boarding schools. "Islam Nusantara" is applied together with the local tradition that caused NU to easily appreciate the diversity (*kebhinekaan*) of Indonesia and absolutely claimed the legitimacy of the Republic of Indonesia that is based on Pancasila.

On the other hand, Muhammadiyah based their moderation on the concept and spirit of modernity of Muhammadiyah that reflected with the balance between puritanism and dynamism. The puritanism of Muhammadiyah is not a destructive puritanism, but established over the spirit of purification of Islam without rejecting the modernity and social-cultural reality. The spirit of modernity and enlightenment of Muhammadiyah were institutionalized within their concept of Islam Progressive in context of the desire for progressive Indonesia. The ideas of Indonesian Muhammadiyah reflected with the concept of *darul ahdi was syahadah*. This concept is an official institutionalization of Muhammadiyah's view of the legitimacy of Indonesia with all the diversity. Indonesia is a country that

agreed together as a witness field for all the values of kindness and field of *ijtihad* towards the realization of *baladun thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur* (welfare state under the blessing of Allah).

Moderatism of NU and Muhammadiyah broght the two organozations to have a firm action to encounter religious radicalism. Both organization firmly rejected any form of intolerant and violence in the name of religion. Their views embodied through several efforts for religious moderation, either through structural programatic efforts or cultural movements that initiated by the adherents of both organizations.

The respons from NU to the phenomenon of radicalism explicitly written in the decision of the highest forum of organization, that is the 33rd Muktamar NU in Makassar at 2010. Then, NU continue to be expressively. NU also taking concrets steps to encounter radicalism, such as ideoly consolidation and massive regeneration movement within internal commitee and adherents; strengthen moderatism nof islam in Indonesia through the concept of "Islam Nusantara"; published books; empowering the media; mainstreaming anti-raficalism within all programs; an various recitation forum.

Those efforts have making NU, at least at the level of the comittee relatively have a good durability to radical ideologu. Nevertheless, the powerful of radicalism have also a little part of NU adherent (member or the preacher) influenced by the radicalism ideology. To encountering the current radicalism, there are several challenges that NU face, one of challenge is the robust of intolerant and radical contents that spread through social media. This fact is worsen by the lack of creativity of NU preaching in balancing the *dakwah* from intolerant- radical groups, and the lack of support from the government, directly or a rigid regulation to encounter the intolerant-radical groups.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah's responses to phenomenon of religious radicalism in Indonesia is softer. For Muhammadiyah, strengthening the moderstismbof islam is the best way to encounter religious

radicalism. Therefore, there is no special program that initiated by Muhammadiyah to counter the radicalism.

The official response from Muhammadiyah at 45th Muktamar ini Malang 2005. Then, at the event, Muhammadiyah established himself as a movement of enlightenment against violence and terrorism. This idea later implemented with the concept of Islam Progressive which was launched at the 46th Muhammadiyah Muktamar in Yogyakarta 2010. The wheel continued to roll until the legitimacy of the NKRI and Pancasila was strong. Muhammadiyah in his 46th Muktamar asserted that the Permanent Occupation of the IRB was from *al-ahdi wa al-syahadah* (state of consensus and testimony).

Indeed, there are no special programs or teams formed by Muhammadiyah to deal with radicalism. However, various activities carried out by Muhammadiyah can be seen as Muhammadiyah's efforts to counter radicalism. These efforts include: 1). consolidating ideology through training and dissemination of organizational decisions to leaders and adherents; 2). certain programs, especially those run by autonomous organizations; 3) religious studies and academic studies. In this context it is also necessary to look at various enlightenment and peace activities carried out by organizations or communities that are ideologically affiliated with Muhammadiyah, for example the Maarif Institute, JIMM, and so on. This affirmation of commitment to moderate Islam makes Muhammadiyah in general relatively immune from the influence of radical ideology. At least this applies to the core cadres or leaders. However, among some adherents and officials there was religious violence that could lead to intolerant attitudes. This changes occurred for at least two reasons: the electoral politics that using religious jargon and infiltration of Salafi-Wahabi groups into Muhammadiyah because it has the same theological jargon (*al-aim ila ila al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah*). Related to this also, found in several places there were dual membership, the member of Muhammadiyah and at the same time active in the Salafi-Wahabi group,

which is not uncommon to find Islamic doctrines that are diametrically opposed to Muhammadiyah's Islamic moderateism.

There are some of the challenges facing Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah have a crisis of preachers who can guide their adherents at the grassroots level to be able to distinguish between the puritanism of Muhammadiyah and other groups. There is no surprise, that is not uncommon to find Muhammadiyah recitations filled by Salafi-Wahabi preachers. This crisis is also aggravated by the development of the media that not yet maximum. In fact, radical-intolerant groups are actually very active in spreading their preaching through the media.

Whatever the story of these two organizations, both recognize that they cannot face radicalism alone. They need support from other groups, both from the government and other moderate organizations. Both also claimed to be weak in the media sector. Another fundamental need of these two moderate Islamic organizations in dealing with the emerging of radicalism is the access to the media. HR indeed always emerges as one of the important needs in dealing with radical intolerant groups. But their human resources shows the lack of individuals who have the skills to produce, packaging, and marketing the moderate Islamic narratives at present, where religious narratives are almost all produced and disseminated through the media.

## 4.2. Support Needs and/or Recommendations

Some recommendations to strengthen NU and Muhammadiyah in mainstreaming Islam wasathiyah in Indonesia as follows:

**TABLE 5** *Internal*

<b>Muhammadiyah</b>	<b>Nahdlatul Ulama</b>
Build and strengthen networks between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah (and other moderate mass organizations) to get together (both through cooperation schemes and synergies) in countering radical-intolerance, especially in the fields of education, media, and human resource development.	
Strengthening the ideology of moderate Islam (Islam Progressive) among Muhammadiyah cadres in a more massive, systematic and structured manner.	Expanding the consolidation of ideology and movement through various training / regeneration, not only to the management, but also to the citizens.
Strengthen the cadre of Muhammadiyah scholars who firmly hold the Islamic moderation of Muhammadiyah.	Strengthen da'wah through media with more creative packaging so to reach millennial generations and urban Muslim groups.
Strengthening the media (including social media) as a vehicle for the spread of moderate Islam.	
Improving the quality of the preachers in order to convey Islamic propaganda and messages according to Muhammadiyah's understanding to the public is more interesting.	

**TABLE 6** *External*

<b>External</b>
To support the efforts of NU and Muhammadiyah to moderate religious life, the government should make strict regulations to protect state assets, facilities, and infrastructure (including state schools, state campuses, SOEs, and various other state institutions), so as not to turn into the area of incubating intolerant and radical ideologies.
Government should ensure that strategic positions within ministries, state institutions, including BUMN are clean from radical groups. One of them is through the development of intolerance and radicalism detection tools in the recruitment process.
Government should provide grants that can be accessed by NU and Muhammadiyah to make various religious moderation activities, for example, training in journalism, research, festivals, including support to islamic boarding schools (pesantren) or educational institutions that need special support.
Government should facilitate NU and Muhammadiyah preachers to be able to access mainstream media, especially in the religious study segment.
Through the Press Council and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, the government should ensure moderate religious content in various shows in the media.
Government should involve NU and Muhammadiyah in developing and taking policies related to issues of intolerance, radicalism, and terrorism.
Government should take firm actions against the state civil apparatus (ASN) which is proven to have a radical ideology.

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