


# Narrative Report 2005



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I. Foreword</b> .....	1
<b>II. Introduction</b> .....	2
2.1.External Analysis .....	2
2.2.Internal Analysis .....	8
<b>III. Civilian Supremacy and the control of the military Budget</b> .....	10
3.1.Purpose.....	10
3.2.Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievements in 2005 .....	10
3.3.Strategies.....	10
3.4.Activities and Outputs .....	10
3.5.Outcomes .....	13
3.6.Networking.....	14
<b>IV. Reduction of Indonesia’s Debt Burden</b> .....	15
4.1.Purpose .....	15
4.2.Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievements in 2005.....	15
4.3.Strategies .....	16
4.4.Activities and Outputs .....	16
4.5.Outcomes .....	19
4.6.Networking.....	21
<b>V. Halving Indonesian Poverty by 2015</b> .....	22
5.1.Purpose .....	22
5.2.Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievements in 2005 .....	22
5.3.Strategies.....	22
5.4.Activities and Outputs .....	23
5.5.Outcomes .....	27
5.6.Networking.....	30
<b>VI. Advocacy Effectiveness, INFID Network Efficiency, and INFID Sustainability</b> .....	30
6.1.Purpose .....	30
6.2.Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievements in 2005 .....	30
6.3.Strategies .....	30
6.4.Activities and Outputs .....	31
6.5.Outcomes .....	33
<b>VII. Media Record</b> .....	34

## I. Foreword

Over the past twelve months, INFID has implemented an advocacy program on public policy in its three priority issues: civilian supremacy and military budget transparency, debt burden reduction and halving the poverty by 2015. During this period, INFID has had to deal with various amounts of progress resulting from advocacy, opportunities and challenges.

The Annual Report of 2005 serves as a progress report of the advocacy work on public policy, which has been delivered by a different method compared to the previous reports. This report was organized based on the Result Base Management (RMB) style, which highlights the analysis resulting from the output and outcome of the entire activities', rather than giving detailed descriptions of each individual activity. The change is meant to give more information, and focus on the results of 2005, and the advocacy direction to be implemented by INFID in the following year. Moreover, the report's compacted substance is also based on the demand of various people who prefer a more comprehensive and clearer format for these reports.

### **Structure of the Report**

The report consists of two parts. The first section contains an external and internal analysis. The external analysis provides a general political, economical, and social context in order to explain the situation at the time when INFID implemented its advocacy work. The internal analysis describes the positive organizational impact, such as the occurrence of changes in work mechanism and culture, individual behavior and organizational management of the INFID's secretariat. Further, the increasing involvement of INFID's participants and network in various activities, as well as the feeling of ownership of issues being advocated as "common interest", is resulting in the working synergy between the secretariat-participant and the network. The second section contains the report of the implementation of each project's program (civilian supremacy and military budget transparency, debt burden reduction campaign, halving poverty by 2015 and increased international advocacy effectiveness through the institutional sustainability of INFID).

We expect this Report will provide a clear projection of the political, economical, and social situations, as well as the advocacy work ongoing at INFID.

Jakarta, 28 February 2006  
On behalf of INFID

**Dian Kartika Sari**  
Acting Director

## II. Introduction

### 2.1 External Analysis

#### **2.1.1. Political Situation in Indonesia**

The advocacy work accomplished by INFID in public policy, including areas of achievement, cannot be separated from the political, economical, and social context in Indonesia over the past twelve months.

An improved political and democratic process has been underway in Indonesia. The democratic General Election of 2004, increased freedom of the press, and the implimentation of a direct election of Regional Chief Executives in various areas of Indonesia highlight these improvements. These improvements, achieved with minimal conflict, sugges that the process of democratization is heading in the right direction. In traditional political logic and theory, improved political systems and processes tend to advance stronger leaderds, and leadership. Under this scenario, the leader, which has been legitimated by the people, thus creating a leader with a strong commitment to fulfill the needs and rights of the people. However, the reality in Indonesia has been that the political process has resulted in governmental changes, along with political formation and configuration changes, which have not always been beneficial to the people.

One critical outcome of the General Election of 2004 was the elimination of majority power within the Indonesian political map. Currently, a major dominant political power does not exist in the Indonesian House of Representative or the legislative body DPR RI. The lack of a majority power has resulted in a strong tug of war of political interests, which in return slows down the legislative process, and ensures long discussions prior to any decisions. Numerous actual problems of the people tend to be used as political commodity to ensure the political position of the parties, or of individuals in the parties within the legislative body.

The role of the House of Representatives, which serves as the legislature, the decision-maker in the State budget, and the executive controlling body, generally has not been productive in responding the problems of the people and the state. In the area of legislation, throughtout all of 2005 the House of Representatives produced only 14 laws out of 55 draft laws planned in the National Legislation Program 2005. Meanwhile in terms of budgeting right usage in formulating the State Budget, the House of Representatives could not represent the people's interests, and the constitutional mandate, to allocate an educational budget at least 20% of the State Budget. Further, the House of Representatives also gave approval to subsidy revocation in various public service sectors, such as medical health, education and BBM (refined oil), which has caused an increase in the impoverishment of Indonesian people. Perhaps most importantly, the role of controlling the executive body is the most powerful function played by the House of Representatives. Yet in taking this role, it would be difficult not to state that the political interests of the political parties influenced parliamentary control. The end result was this important role for the House of Representatives created no positive impact on the improvement of people's lives. For example, the use of the parliamentary right in discussing the governmental decision of raising the price of BBM (refined oil) and

implementing rice imports, both subjects ended up with the approval given to the governmental decisions.

It is important to recognize that the President, as the head of the executive body, was elected by 63% votes in the direct General Election in 2004 and came from a newly formed political party, which was a minority party<sup>1</sup> in the legislative body. The logical consequence of the president's fragile political position was that he had to implement power sharing by accommodating the representatives of political parties in the *Indonesia Bersatu* cabinet he formed, in an effort to ensure his position and to make his political work less difficult. The failure of the government in the area of economic development during the twelve months of the governance of Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and Jusuf Kalla (SBY-Kalla) as the state chiefs executive ended up in the reshuffling of the cabinet—specifically of the ministers for the economic sectors in November 2005. However, these were nothing more than positional shifts of ministers from political parties, and the addition of ministers from political parties that had been threatening the political position, or at least hindering the political work of the president.

During 2005, there were numerous political events, which took place at the local and national level, which garnered international attention, and participation from the civilians of Indonesia.

Throughout the month of January, numerous international events occurred, such as; the Tsunami summit (6-8 January 2005), the Paris Club Meeting (12 January 2005), and the CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) meeting (19-20 January 2005). These meetings provided INFID with the opportunity to lobby and campaign for Debt Cancellation to the Indonesian government and parliament. INFID also delivered its statement to the people of Indonesia, participants at the Tsunami and CGI summits, and the international community through the mass media. The Infrastructure Summit (17-18 January) was also being held in January. During this period, INFID together with WGPSR, KruHA and Walhi, organized discussions and a press conference to promote a pro-poor infrastructure Summit. This activity was intended to provide a balance to the government's concept on infrastructure development to increase investment.

INFID also worked together with HRWG facilitated participants, such as Kontras, Imparsial, PBHI, Elsam, Forum LSM Aceh, among others, in preparing their written statements to be discussed in the meeting of Commission on Human Right 61st session, in March to April in Geneva. Further, INFID facilitated the attendance of participants at international meeting in Geneva.

A number of events occurred in 2005 related to the issue of democracy and the respect of political civil rights. There were also discussions on the defense sector reformation relating to the effort of defense modernization, the military equipment purchase scandal, the transfer of military businesses, a territorial dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Ambalat, the resurgence of Regional Intelligence Coordination Body/Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Daerah (Bakorinda), the revitalization of military relationship

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<sup>1</sup> Parliament members from Partai Demokrat are only 57 people, Golkar 127 people, PDI-P 109 people, PPP 57 people, PAN 53 people, PKB 52 people, PKS 45 people, PBR 13 people, PDS 13 people and 20 people from small parties.

between Indonesia and USA, and military cooperation between Indonesia and Australia in the context of war on terrorism. To these events, INFID and its participants positioned themselves as a civilian power in order to continually remind the government, parliament, and the military through lobbying and campaigning. INFID ensured that it did not diverge from its stated position of defense reformation to create provisional defense and military systems, to respect democracy and human rights, as well as to comply with the transparency and accountability principles.

Civilian groups also became aware of the progress of advocacy in the attempt to attain proper law enforcement in the murder conspiracy of Minur. Polycarpus was sentenced, along with the court's verdict and the president's mandate to completely disclose of the case.

Another significant event in 2005 was the commencement of the regional chief executive direct election, which was held with the full participation of the people. More than 80% of the general election, which took place throughout Indonesia was carried out peacefully, without any violence and legal dispute over the winning candidate. However, the remaining 20% was filled with violence and legal disputes over the winning candidate. It is apparent that there has been an increase in awareness from the public of the political process, and their ability to realize democracy. The population also voiced their criticism of the military, and the old style of involving the military in civil governance, by the fact that most of the candidates for regional chief executives from the military did not win the election. In this situation, INFID (i.e. secretariat) did not play any significant roles, however, its regional partners and network took up a significant role.

During 2005 various forms of religion-based violence occurred. This violence took many forms, including group violence within a religion, such as the attack against a group doing bilingual prayer, or the Ahmadiyah group being attacked by other Islamic groups. To such events INFID's participants expressed criticisms toward the police, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and parliament members for siding with the perpetrators of the violence, and for not taking immediate action to prevent the continuation of violence.

Another important issue in 2005 occurred when the local government prepared provincial regulation based on "Syariah Islam" (Islamic Law) regulating curfew for women, *dress code (jilbab)*. Meanwhile the government and the House of Representatives discussed the draft bill for Pornography and Porno-action. INFID's participants and network, mainly from women's groups, reacted strongly and rejected the politicization of religion and discrimination against women. Meanwhile, INFID became a major reference for the mass media to criticize the issue based on the international Convention of Economy and Socio-Cultural Rights.

Other events that were relatively significant included the signing of Reconciliation MOU between the Government of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement/Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh post the tsunami disaster, and the one year commemoration of the tsunami in Aceh. These social and political situations influenced most of the agenda of civilian advocacy in Aceh, including for those concerned citizens outside of Aceh. In order to divide the focus between monitoring the reconstruction and rehabilitation, monitoring the process of reconciliation and human rights prevention, and advocacy against past human rights violation crimes, INFID's participants in Aceh and

Jakarta carried out various projects related to the Aceh issue. INFID itself actively supported participants concerned with the Aceh issue to inform and communicate the development of Aceh to the international community. Supported by INFID's Liaison Office in Brussels, INFID presented some members of the civil society of Aceh to explain the situation in Aceh, and to deliver the reconstruction needs required from the international community support. In terms of the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Aceh, INFID campaigned to the Indonesian government, creditors, and donors to ensure that national and international civil community groups implemented the principles of transparency and accountability.

Leaving aside the terrible tsunami disaster, it is important to acknowledge that most of Indonesia had been suffering from humanitarian disasters. In addition to the widely spreading dengue disease, malaria, polio and TBC, which had been reported since January in the mass media. Malnutrition (marasmus kwashiorkor) began to emerge in May in some poverty ridden areas and cities. It is undeniable that the malnutrition disaster is an extended impact of the refined oil price increase put into effect in March. This policy has proven effective in "killing" people. In three months from the introduction of the policy increasing the price of refined oil, 1.67 million babies under the age of five were diagnosed with sickness related to malnutrition. Hundreds of babies and adults died because of malnutrition. In addition to killing many people, the policy also eliminated people's livilyhoods by causing the closing down of numerous small industries and the laying off of workers/laborers.

Responding to this event, INFID carried out lobbying and campaigning against poverty. The action was initiated by the Poor People seminar held in April 2005, prior to the Poverty Summit. The results of the seminar were delivered to the Coordinating Minister for Welfare as material for consideration in the discussion of poverty issues at the Poverty Summit. Participants and organizers of the seminar later advanced the anti-poverty movement by forming The Joint Coalition on Anti Impoverishment/ Koalisi Bersama Anti Pemiskinan (KBAP) on 13 May 2005. The group consisted of INFID's participants and network from women's, children, urban poor, labor, migrant workers, farmers, youth and students groups, as well as the disabled groups. These groups worked nationally and locally campaigning and, through budget advocacy. In addition to acting locally and nationally, the group responded to international events such as Global Campaign Against Poverty held on 1 July 2005 at the same time as the G8 meeting, and UNESCAP meeting in August in Jakarta, as well as UN Millennium Summit 2005 in September, and campaigned for the decline in the Refined Oil (BBM) price in October.

Additionally, since May, INFID had been involved in the Solidarity Action for Malnutrition (Marasmus Kwashiorkor) Network/Jaringan Aksi Solidaritas Busung lapar, in an effort to defeat the malnutrition issue.

INFID was also involved in the global social solidarity movement to campaign for global justice and equality. It was also involved in events such as the five decades commemoration of Asia Africa Conference, the UN Reformation, the World Bank Meeting, and the continuity of Asia-Africa solidarity discussed in Hongkong, and coinciding with the WTO meeting.

To build solidarity among civilians in Europe, INFID relied upon its representative office in Brussels. This office was actively involved in various NGO meetings, facilitated INFID participants from Indonesia in building relationships with European NGOs, and assisted with the lobbying process. Regionally, solidarity is build through active participation in Asia forum, Social Watch, GCAP Asia, ADB Forum, among others.

### **2.1.2. Economic Situation**

**In the context of the Indonesian economy there were six significant items; 1) the state financial situation, 2) natural disasters occurring in various areas of Indonesia, 3) impoverishing state policies that worsened the public social and economic condition (these were caused by the government's insensitiveness and recommendations from developed countries and international financial institutions on Indonesian economic policy), 4) non-existence of a strategy on the funding of Indonesian economic development and improvement, 5) the paradox of global poverty eradication within the MDGs frame contrasted against the strengthening of economic globalization, 6) the fight against global economic injustice and UN reformation efforts.**

**The government of Republic of Indonesia's Financial Report showed that the government's total financial obligation amounted to Rp. 1,346 trillion, while its asset values were only Rp. 831 trillion. Thus, there was Rp. 515 trillion difference between the country's assets and its obligations as of 31 December 2004.**

The Rp.831 trillion in assets held by Indonesia is necessary to take care of the population of more than 241 million citizens. Moreover, when observed from the point of the total assets available, liquid funds were less than 10% of total assets, equalling to approximately Rp. 83.6 trillion. The rest of the assets were in the form of goods, such as medicine, seeds, defense equipments, and state debt. The government's financial obligation, which amounts to as much as Rp. 1,346 trillion, came from domestic debt capital and interest (amounting to more than Rp. 630 trillion) and external debt capital and interest (more than Rp. 590 trillion). Further, the government has not included a calculation of its obligation towards civil servants, whose retirement fund could amount to hundreds of trillions. Neither has the government calculated its obligation to fund human development and poverty eradication. The situation of the state financial report does not accurately reflect the actual financial issues facing the government, these issues are closer to reality than those of the report's finance problems.

**Indonesian External Debt Outstanding by December 2005 amounted to US\$ 135,735.91 million, out of the total amount, as much as US\$ 78,470.3 was External Debt Outstanding –sub Government Debt consisting of multilateral and bilateral debts.<sup>2</sup>**

**The Altered State Budget/ APBN-P (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara – Perubahan) Law No. 1/2005 showed that the allocation of debt payment held the highest position in the State Budget. As much as Rp. 58.3 trillion was allocated for debt interest payments, which consisted of domestic debt interests amounting to Rp. 41.8 trillion and Rp. 16.5 trillion. While the payment for debt capital installment amounted to as much as Rp. 35.5 trillion. Thus as much as Rp. 93.8 trillion was**

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<sup>2</sup> Source Bank Indonesia

allocated for domestic and external debt payments which consisted of Rp. 52 trillion for external debt and Rp. 41.8 trillion for domestic debt.

As for the country's development, which was carried out by 83 ministries/institutions, only as much as Rp. 61 trillion was allocated, goods purchase amounted to as much as Rp. 35,14 trillion and capital purchase as much as Rp. 49 trillion. Thus, each institutional function was allocated with a very limited amount of funds. For example, the health budget was allocated not more than Rp. 11 trillion, whereas education budget only received Rp. 26 trillion.

The economic growth rate in 2005 was only 5 percent, while the state budget deficit amounted to as much as Rp. 20.3 trillion (0.5 percent of the state income). That deficit was relatively smaller compared to the previous year due to the existence of the debt payment moratorium. To cover the deficit, the government withdrew external debt of as much as Rp. 28 trillion, including the debt agreed upon in the CGI meeting, which amounted to as much as US\$ 3.4 million. Yet until the end of 2005, the debt absorbance power only reached to 55 percent (Statement from Sri Mulyani, Kompas).

While Indonesia dealt with the state financial problems, some cities and regencies were hit by natural disasters such as flood, landslides and storms. These occurred in Java, Kalimantan, and Sumatra. Besides the natural disasters, diseases such as dengue, malaria, chikunguya, Avian Flu, Polio, Dysentery and malnutrition also emerged and spread throughout much of Indonesia, from Sabang to Papua.

The social situation was at it worst, yet the government issued impoverishing policies such as raising the price of Refined Oil twice within one year, once in March and again in October. Further, the increase in October, which reached the average of 126%<sup>3</sup>, caused uncontrolled inflation and 17-18% real sector's bankruptcy. The policy caused approximately 20.5 million families or more than 100 million people, to live in an extreme poverty.

In an effort to overcome the high level of oil prices and the low level of purchasing power of the people, the government issued a policy to grant Direct Cash Aid/Bantuan Langsung Tunai amounting to Rp. 100,000 each month for each family or Rp. 3,300 daily for each family, which would be received once every three months. The granting of aid without a sufficient and effective management system caused serious social conflict. Some of the poor people, which did not get the aid protested to the village officials, even destructed public facilities and, in an extreme case, caused the death to of a village official. Yet at the moment people were upset due to the raising refined oil price, the government and the legislatives increased their own budget by increasing the extra allowance for the President and Vice President, as well as the allowance for the House of Representatives members amounting to as much as Rp. 10 million monthly.

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<sup>3</sup> The policy is a result of the recommendation from international financial institution for Indonesian government to increase the price of refined oil/ BBM (Andrew Steer's statement)

**In the international social interaction stage, the government had stated a commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to formulate the Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP)/Strategi Nasional Penghapusan Kemiskinan (SNPK) and to integrate the two policies into the Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP)/Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah (RPJM) and Long Term Development Plan/Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang. However, these entire documents advanced only as far as the rhetoric level and had no comprehensive funding strategy. There were no economic and funding calculations to achieve MDGs, PRSP or even the MTDP implementation, nor was there any method to get funding in order to finance the development. This reality showed that the government of Indonesia has no development funding strategy (Financing for Development Strategy). Further, it provides proof that without any financing strategy, any planning will be meaningless, just a concept written on a piece of paper.**

**Indonesia's classic issue of corruption remains a serious problem. Appreciation should be given to the effort of the government to enforce the law and in forming an institution to eradicate corruption, the Corruption Eradication Commission/ Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK). However, the effort of law enforcement seemed sluggish, and was full of discriminative issues toward particular political targets, including the fact that some suspects even ended up being free of any verdict.**

Another serious case concerning the Indonesian economic problem is the attitudes and recommendations of the developed countries and international financial institutions. These developed countries and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank in CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia); continue to push the government, in both their formal and public statements, to lift subsidies which assist the people of Indonesia. Further, they put pressure on Indonesia to implement various policy changes, such as, to prioritize infrastructure development, labor and defense law reformation, and taxation policy alterations to draw foreign investment interests. Yet these developed countries carried out, and maintain various forms of restrictions, in the form of product quota and standardization, which hindered the importation of Indonesian products to their countries.

These injustices, such as the differential treatment of subsidies by developed countries, were not applied solely to Indonesia, but to all developing and poor countries, particularly to those who were heavily dependent upon loans. This can be clearly seen in various international documents, one of which is the outcome document of the World Summit 2005, and the rejection of developing countries' proposals in the WTO discussions by developed countries. Such situations increased the international community's awareness that it will be impossible to eradicate poverty as long as these injustices and inequality still exist globally. In response to that issue, the Global Campaign Against Poverty and UN Reformation keep being demanded by the international civilian communities and the poor countries. As part of the movement to realize global social justice, INFID is actively involved in each of these movements.

## **2.2 Internal Analysis**

**The complexity of the external situation demands speedy, accurate and coordinated effort between units in the secretariat of INFID. Moreover, the clarity of guidance and direction in the management of issues and human resources from the management side is badly needed. Thus, INFID established a coordination**

mechanism through various institutional meetings. Yet the fact highlight that management at the secretariat level was not sufficient to respond to the various complex external situations considering the limited number of staff working in the substance field.

To resolve the problem, the secretariat of INFID went back to its function as an organization with the format of a Forum, by making the roles of participants and networks more effective. INFID's year end reflection showed that such work plan seemed to lessen the burden of secretariat works and enrich the analysis from a gender, child rights and poverty perspective. Thus, in the following year's program planning INFID will delegate the role to participants and networks in more definite way.

By the end of 2005, INFID organized an organizational meeting, i.e. INFID's General Assembly, as the highest decision making body. The outcome of the General Assembly was the new Board members election for the period of 2005 –2008, and the formulation of the next three years' programs as the organization's mandate. Yet at the same time, the executive director, INFID secretariat executive, position has been vacant since November 2005. While the Board members organized recruitment, the day-to-day executive for the secretariat was hold by the Deputy executive Director acting as the Acting Director, until a new director is recruited.

### III. Civilian Supremacy and the control of the military Budget

#### **3.1 Purpose**

Statement of purpose for the 2004-2009 period:

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) publishes a comprehensive yearly budget of the military expenditure and its sources (including off-budgetary sources) and the Consultative Group of Indonesia (CGI) member countries are urged to stipulate that lending agreements are subject to the transparency of the military budget.

#### **3.2 Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievements in 2005**

1. Accurate information on the various aspects of the military budget, for example, off-budget revenues.

##### **Indicator**

- Availability of information about, and the socialisation of the mechanism for the transfer of military businesses by the government.

2. Existence of an active national and international network advocating for the transparency of the military budget and the necessity of military reform.

##### **Indicator**

- Equal dissemination of information to the INFID secretariat and participants, and to all national and international networks, on the importance of ratifying the 1997 OECD convention to support regulation of the accountable and transparent purchase of essential arms.

3. Establishment of the military budget issue as a regular item on the CGI agenda.

##### **Indicator**

- Discussion within the CGI Working Group on security and development regarding transparency in the military budget.

#### **3.3 Strategies**

This project adopts a two-pronged strategy:

1. Making the network effective:

- A. ensuring efficiency in the division of work for the collection of accurate and credible data and information
- B. strengthening its position as a pressure group

2. Using the power of the media to voice thoughts and opinions:

- A. utilizing press conferences
- B. briefing journalists and the mass media

#### **3.4. Activities and Outputs**

Article 76 clause (1) the 2004 law on the Indonesian military (UU TNI), establishes that: *Within 5 (five) years of the coming into effect of this law, the Government must take over the activities of all businesses directly or indirectly owned and managed by the TNI.*



In related with this Law the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Endriartono Sutarto, has said that as a logical consequence of the transfer of military businesses, the government would increase the defence budget. In this regard, General Endraiantono instructed his ranks to transfer these businesses, both foundations and cooperatives, within the next two years. This is seen as a *'fait accompli'* by the military, and is used to strengthen its bargaining position in increasing the defence budget.

The increased bargaining position of the military can be seen through the pressure they put on Parliament to approve the budget proposed by the government. The budget was seen as a way to ensure that the welfare of soldiers could be dealt with immediately without the excess that would be produced if the military continued to operate businesses. (*Kompas*, 13 April 2005).

The Coordinating Minister for the Economy has said that military businesses can be taken over directly without prior auditing (*Kompas*, Mei 14, 2005) . This sparked debate among the public, because transfer of military businesses without audit is contrary to the principles of transparency and accountability. Furthermore, this statement comes from Minister who has a history as a bad manager and of being unable to differentiate between public and private enterprises.

The immediate response of INFID and civil society networks to the second statement made by the Minister was to hold a press conference to emphasize that based on the principles of transparency and accountability, military businesses must be audited before they are transferred.

INFID is also organizing a **seminar on the transfer of military businesses** to encourage public debate, and to gauge public opinion on the mechanism used for transfer of military businesses by the government.

In response to the strong civil society reaction, the Department of Defence stated that it had formed a team of four to discuss the mechanism for transfer of military businesses. This team consisted of the Department of Defence, Department of Finance, Department of Law, Legislation and Human Rights, and the Minister for State Enterprises, The results of the team's discussion of alternatives and mechanisms for the transfer of military businesses were expected be made public by September 2005.

There have been several recent incidents, such as the tsunami and earthquake in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and parts of North Sumatra, and the tension with Malaysia over Ambalat, that have highlighted the weakness of Indonesia's defence against the military power of other countries. Indonesia's development and procurement of defence equipment lags far behind Malaysia's.

The limited defence budget allocated by the government is merely a justification for the limited capacity of the defence sector. The department of defence is currently sounding out the possibility of borrowing money from overseas to finance the development of Indonesia's defence system. These loan funds will be extended in the form of export credit. Currently, the department of defence opts to purchase essential arms through an export credit mechanism, owing to state budget constraints. According to Department of Defence Data, export credit in 2004 amounted to USD 419.81 million, and the department's projected figure for all armed forces between 2005 and 2009 is Rp 64 trillion.

The above data highlight how little information on military expenditure was made public in 2004. In fact, it simply shows only how much of the defence budget came from export credit facilities. In other words, export credit facilities have been identified as one of the likely sources of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of defence budget management.

**Changes in the country's political policy made INFID decide to shift the target and objectives of its research to focus more on export credit facilities in procurement of essential arms. This research was conducted by INFID in collaboration with Pacivis.**

INFID invited Parliament members, Civil Society, staff of Defence Ministry, experts from universities to discuss the findings of research in an expert meeting forum. This forum helped to educate the participants in understanding the problems of utilizing export credit facilities in the procurement of essential arms. As the result of the findings and discussion: the Parliament members committed to control and monitor the credit export process, staff of the Defence Ministry realize that the procurement of military equipment and weaponry is no longer a hidden from scrutiny, and they also invited civil society and experts to become involved in the process and to give input. Furthermore, Parliament members actively discussed the problem of credit export in Parliament and through the media. Lobbying of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), the Department of Finance and Bank Indonesia, took place to discuss issues related to export credit.

INFID also sent network members to take part in the CGI meeting on 20 January 2005, and the continuing discussion in the Security and Development CGI working group before CGI midterm meeting. This discussion aimed to strengthen the knowledge of the CGI working group members on transparency and accountability.

INFID also organized a number of road shows to several embassies, such as the United States (US) and British embassies and the European Union, to discuss export credit and the role of the military in the tsunami in March 2005.

Together with participants and networks, INFID sent a letter to the US embassy to obtain information about the revitalisation of defence sector ties between the US and Indonesia. INFID also issued a statement and recommendations on this issue and asked a network in US (Human Rights First) to pass that letter to the US Congress

As part of a network and as secretariat of an NGO Forum, INFID supports participants and networks in issues of security sector reform, civilian supremacy, and civil and political rights advocacy with mutual benefit partnership principles. Therefore INFID works with/supports participants:

1. Against a plan by the Government of Indonesia to establish regional coordination intelligence Agents (Bakorinda).
2. In urging the Government of Indonesia to audit military businesses.
3. In issuing statements and recommendations to the US Government to ensure that US policy on revitalisation will not destroy the Indonesia Security Sector Reform Agenda.
4. For solidarity in law enforcement of the Munir Case and advocating the Human Rights Defender issue.
5. In sending written statements and in attending the 61<sup>st</sup> session Commission of Human Right (CHR) in Geneva as an INFID delegate. (Joint with Human Right Working Group /HRWG).
6. In facilitating participants and networks to lobby and establish networks in Europe, with Liaison Office (LO) Brussels assistant.
7. In celebrating of International Human Right Day.

### **3.5. Outcomes:**

#### **Lobbying & Campaigning**

The outcomes of all activities in lobbying and campaigning on issues and policies on Civilian Supremacy and the control of the military budget project include:

#### **Raised the profile of issues:**

- The transparency and accountability of the Military Budget;
- The mechanism for the transfer of military businesses by the government;
- The credit export facilities for military spending and increasing the debt burden.

#### **Increased dialogue with Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- The transparency and accountability of the Military Budget;
- The mechanism for the transfer of military businesses by the government ;
- The credit export facilities for military spending and increasing the debt burden;
- The Munir case;
- The Indonesian Security Sector Reform Agenda.

#### **Changing the opinion of Government (Defence Ministry) and Parliament on issues:**

- The use of credit export facilities for military spending;
- The transparency and accountability of the Military Budget;
- The mechanism for the transfer of military businesses by the government;
- The Munir Case;
- Policy makers (in the Department of Defence and Department of Home Affairs) have given serious consideration to civil society statements. This is evident from the feedback on the statements of INFID and its network, and from revisions to policy recommendations and more intensive discussion of policy recommendations from the political, defence and economic aspects.

## **Changing the rhetoric (in the media) on the Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- The use of credit export facilities for military spending;
- The transparency and accountability of the Military Budget;
- The mechanism for the transfer of military businesses by the government;
- The Munir Case.



### **3.6 Networking:**

#### **Strengthening Civil Society by working with Participants and Network:**

- The greater acceptance of Participant and Networks for INFID contribution on Security Sector Reform Advocacy;
- The greater synergy of aims/activities in networks/movements;
- The change in collaboration, trust or unity of civil society groups.

#### **Enlarging democratic space:**

- The greater acceptance/recognition of civil groups by Government of Indonesia and Parliament, UN Geneva and the media;
- The ability of civil groups to input into a wider range of decisions.

## IV. REDUCTION OF INDONESIA'S DEBT BURDEN

### **4.1 Purpose**

The purpose of this project for the six year period is to provide creditor support for the re-negotiation of Indonesia's debt burden, along gaining a commitment to do so from the GoI. The key indicator for the first three years (2004-2006) is to influence the GoI and three creditors to jointly commission an international independent team to study the impact of debt burden on human development

### **4.2 Output in 2004-2006 and indicators of the achievements in 2005:**

1. Commitment by the GoI to tackle the debt problem in way that does not adversely impact the rights of the poor and the sustainable management of the environment.

#### **Indicators:**

- The presence of an argument for the reduction of debts (to deepen the INFID-IMDR 2004 joint research), along with a participative research project on the impact of debt on day-to-day lives.
- Condition the GoI (creating awareness/conditioning) to support the holding of a Debt Conference.

2. Establishment of effective support groups in the three creditor countries that assist with INFID's advocacy work.

#### **Indicator:**

- Research conducted that examines the impact of the debt on human development, and which results in a national and international debt meeting on alternative debt solutions.

3. Articulating the problem of Indonesia's debt burden on poverty eradication and sustainable development in order to education the public at international and national levels.

#### **Indicator:**

- Pressure from national and international NGOs working on debt arbitration, poverty and deforestation for Indonesia in the way:
  - a. One CSO and one think tank raising the issue of debt burden on poverty in Indonesia.

4. A coherent macro-economic policy and the solution of Indonesia's debt problem, especially the domestic debt caused by indebted forest-based companies.

#### **Indicator:**

- Influence World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to urge GoI to adopt the 'Equator principle' for sustainable development.

### **4.3. Strategies:**

Strategies in debt advocacy included:

1. Strengthening the basis of arguments, through research, to convince the GoI, world leaders and international financial institutions, that in view of Indonesia's financial situation and its development and poverty reduction needs, debt reduction is crucial.
2. Building international solidarity for the reduction of Indonesia's debt.
3. Conducting national and international debt reduction campaigns in synergy with efforts to reduce poverty and achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
4. Building links with new debt advocacy targets at the national level – the department of foreign affairs, the national development planning agency (Bappenas) and the department of finance.
5. Re-mapping partners that will be involved in the debt advocacy project, and making modifications to the debt campaign by including several public figures.

### **4.4. Activities and Out put**

In the year 2004 and first semester of 2005, creditors and the Government of Indonesia shared the same position; they were optimistic on Indonesia's capability to pay and manage debt burden.

The creditors were not prepared to offer Indonesia a more comprehensive debt-rescheduling scheme, and largely disregarded any alternatives aimed at reducing the net present value of their loans. They viewed Indonesia's debt as nothing more than a liquidity problem, and were still optimistic about the prospects of its debts being paid off in the medium term.

The Government of Indonesia mentioned to the media that Indonesia's debt burden was still under control, could be paid and managed. Further, they suggested that asking for debt relief or debt reduction would raise problems for Indonesia's rating in the international markets.

At critical moments, such as the tsunami and spread of diseases in Indonesia resulting from poverty, INFID issued statements directed at the government and the public, calling for immediate discussion on measures to reduce debt and debt management.

INFID also issued a statement in the Tsunami Summit (6-8 January 2005), the Paris Club Meeting (12 January 2005) and the CGI Meeting (19-20 January 2005) reinforcing these views. INFID also was involved as an observer in CGI meetings, monitoring the Paris Club Meeting and the Tsunami Summit.

INFID utilized research results from 2004 (joint with IMDR) as its basic argument for debt reduction.

Informal and formal lobbying tactics of decision makers on the debt issue, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, the National Development Planning Agency, Bank Indonesia, and the Department of Finance, House of Regional Representatives (DPD), Indonesia Parliament, were also utilized. INFID also encouraged DPD to release an official Letter to Government and DPRRI to negotiate debt reduction.

In order to strengthen the capacity and involvement of Parliament in debt monitoring management, INFID facilitated and recommended to members of Indonesia Parliament to become members of the International Parliament (IPP).

Positive news included that the Department of Foreign Affairs organised a dialogue forum on strategies for Indonesia's external debt, using Argentina as the case study. Also, the National Development Planning Agency came up with the idea of a debt management unit for Indonesia, and the National Development Planning Agency held a seminar on borrowing strategies.

Calls for a debt cancellation for Indonesia reverberated among the public and in government in response to global events such as the G8 summit and the tsunami. This highlights that there has been broad acknowledgement of the debt problem from both the government and the people. But the GoI rhetoric and policy were not changed until the end of first semester of 2005.

In lobbying at the international level, INFID targeted G7 country members; including to the Government of Japan and Japanese Parliament. The hosts of INFID in Japan are PARC (*Pacific Asia Resource Centre*) and NINDJA (*Network for Indonesian Democracy, Japan*).



INFID put forward the proposal that the Netherlands government provide debt reduction or debt relief in view of Indonesia's financial crisis and poverty, and in the wake of the tsunami. The Netherlands government did not agree to provide Indonesia debt reduction, but has provided grants especially for the rebuilding of Aceh. INFID also lobbied Italian senators and made plans to

participate in a debt reduction campaign in Italy, at the end of May 2005. The Italian senators explained that the Italian constitution requires Italy to give debt relief to countries that are very poor or that have been struck by terrible disaster. The INFID LO in Brussels lobbied the European Union (EU) and Germany Government to reduce Indonesia's debt, and monitored the Paris Club meeting that took place in January 2005.

An IMF Civil Society meeting was held in the Hotel Borobodur, in Jakarta. According to Stephen Schwartz, Resident Representative IMF Jakarta office, this was an "outreach visit" from IMF headquarters, or a dialogue between the IMF and civil society, because there had been criticism in the past that the IMF never involved or listened to input from civil society. INFID expressed criticism of the stated aims of this meeting, because the

IMF team failed to adequately explain where the results would be taken and their plan on how to utilize them.

INFID also lobbied the delegation staff of the Indonesian President in New York. INFID proposed that the President address debt burden, and provide a call to action on the debt reduction to achieve MDGs his speech on Financing for Development at the World Summit 2005 (September 2005). The President speech mentioned INFID's proposal, and can be seen as a positive response by the Indonesian government.

Beginning with a change in the written statement and rhetoric of the President of Indonesia, some Ministry's also changed their oral statement in the media, such as Sri Mulyani (Ministry of National Planning Agency) who admitted that the Government was facing a state financing problem due to debt burden and debt payment.

At the end of October 2005, the Finance Ministry released Finance Ministry Decree No 477 of 2005, which dealt with Debt Management System and Policies.

After a Cabinet Reshuffle, Paskah Suzetta (new ministry of National Planning Agency) loudly voiced concern over the debt problems and provided his strategies to reduce debt burden. Paskah Suzetta along with Boediono (New Ministry Economic Coordinator) established a Monitoring Team for studying the effectiveness of debt.

The House of Regional Representatives (DPD) released an official letter to Parliament and the Government in order to establish an international negotiation for debt reduction.

The Parliament and the Government agreed to start a discussion on a draft of Debt Management bill (RUU Pengelolaan Utang) and members of Parliament prepared to established a caucus composed of members of parliament concerning the debt issue (Kaukus Anggota Parlemen untuk Utang/KAPU), which will decelerate in 2006.

Specifically within the forestry sector, the debt campaign project has made a fair amount of headway in implementing activities. Together with Indonesian Working Group on Forest Finance (IWGFF), INFID was involved in preparing filters for high-risk customers, which will be given to PPATK. INFID's role in this money laundering campaign is to criticise the conglomerates in the PPA (formerly BBPN) that are a burden to the national budget. The World Bank started negotiating to become involved in IWGFF discussion.

There were numerous press conferences were held throughout 2005: 1) to urge the GoI to pursue debt reduction, 2) on the lessons for Indonesia from Argentina's debt reduction, 3) on the importance of debt reduction to reducing poverty and hunger, 4) response to the G8 summit.

There were also road shows to various media sources conducted, including: Tempo Magazine, and various newspapers, such as Tempo, Kontan, and Daily Investor. Further, INFID's staff was encouraged to write articles in newspapers and INFID's News Letters.

INFID also gave input to actress Rieke Dyah Pitaloka (Oneng in the famous serial TV *Bajaj Bajuri*) to raise the issue of debt.

Networking activities in 2005 were: **Strategic Meeting on IFIs** in Accra, **NGO Forum on ADB** in Bangkok, **Asia Africa Conference Activities** (in Jakarta and Bandung), **Budget Monitoring Conference** conducted by IBP and BIC and the **IMF/World Bank Spring Meeting** in Washington DC, **Global Financial Prospects Meeting** organised by World Bank in Indonesia, **Civil Society Coalition for the Tsunami Meetings** in Indonesia (Jakarta and Aceh), **Regional Workshop on Debt in Indonesia**, organised by National Planning Agency (Bappenas) in Indonesia, **International Meeting on Debt Policy and Debt Management**, facilitated by the UN, New York, **Reality of Aid (RoA) Conference** in Paris, **Joint advocacy and Attending World Bank/IMF Annual Meeting**, Washington DC, **Meeting with INFID participants** in Jakarta to discuss the issue of debt in relation to mass movements, debt and poverty, **Focus group discussion** in Makasar. It was agreed that a team from INFID, ELSAM and JARI would be set up to prepare a module on Japan's ODA. **General Assembly Meeting & International Conference EURODAD** in Europe attending by LO, **Jubilee South Meeting** in Hong Kong and **People to people engagement for Asia Africa Solidarity** in Hong Kong.

These networking activities aimed to strengthen the advocacy work of civil society through sharpening of strategy, plan and the action agenda, sharing experiences and supporting each other. These networking activities were also productive for joint activities in lobbying and campaigning.

#### **4.5. Outcomes:**

##### **Lobbying & Campaigning**

The outcome of all activities in lobbying and campaigning on issues of Debt Reduction, include:

##### **Raised profile of the issue:**

- The problems of the debt burden on Indonesia's state budget;
- The problems of the debt burden on achieving the MDGs and poverty eradication;
- The problems of the debt burden on Aceh's Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
- The problems of debt management and ineffectiveness of Debt;
- The need for debt reduction to achieve MDGs, poverty eradication and Aceh's Reconstruction.

##### **Increased dialogue with Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- The transparency and accountability of debt management from both the country recipient and creditors;
- The borrowing strategy;
- The international negotiation for external debt (the government used debt swap as strategies, however, INFID called for debt reduction as a comprehensive solution to the debt burden);
- The disclosure policies, transparency and accountability and civil societies participation on debt management (especially for project/programme, which financing with debt);
- The Indonesian government and its creditors developing an information management system on debt and aid, which would be accessible for civil society.

### **Changed the opinion of Government and parliament on issues:**

- *'There is a real need for significant debt reduction or restructuring not only for the least developed countries but also for middle-income developing countries such Indonesia'* (President Speech at the UN, September 2005);
- Indonesia recommended the adoption of a debt swap mechanism that will enable developing countries to make use of resources that normally flow out to the creditor countries. Such a mechanism can greatly help developing countries attain the MDGs. The Indonesian Government believes that the proposed measures merit their serious consideration (President Speech at the UN, September 2005);
- The Indonesian Parliament urged the Government to involve Parliament in the decision making process of debt agreement due to the impact of debt to the national state budget.

### **Changed the rhetoric (in the media) of Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- *'Indonesia needs to reduce the stock of debt burden'* (Budiono, Ministry of Economic Coordinator, Paskah Suzetta, Ministry of National Planning Agency, Dradjat Wibowo, member of Parliament);
- Indonesia must manage debt and aid effectively;
- The Government of Indonesia must lobby to creditor countries for Debt Swap.

### **Policy changed:**

- The Draft of Debt management bill;
- The Finance Ministry Decree No 477 of 2005 "Debt Management";
- The establishment of the Monitoring Team for debt effectiveness;
- The draft of a concept on Indonesia Leading the CGI;
- The draft of a one door policy on debt management → to establish Debt Management Office;
- The official letter of House of Regional Representative.

### **Policy Changed (International):**

- Britain, Germany and Italy will provide a debt swap with social programs in an effort to reduce poverty. The debt swap with Britain is planned to amount as much as 49.2 million Euro, Germany as much as 76,3 million Euro in three terms (debt to education swap and debt to nature swap) and Italy provides debt swap to Aceh reconstruction as much as US\$ 31 million;
- Australia offered grants that amount to US\$ 500 and a soft loan (without interest, due date payment after 10 years and payment term for 40 years) amounting to US\$ 500 million. (Still in negotiation process and will be implemented in year 2007).

#### **4.6. Networking**

##### **Strengthened Civil Society by working with Participants and Network:**

- The maintenance of the INFID network through various activities;
- The re-establishment of network links with several organizations at the local, national and international levels, through joint activities and INFID presence at meetings;
- The greater synergy of aims/activities in networks/movements;
- The change in collaboration, trust or unity of civil society groups;
- This maintenance and re-establishment of the debt campaign network is very strategic social capital for debt advocacy during the year of 2005 and in the coming years.

##### **Enlarged the democratic space:**

- The greater acceptance and recognition of pressure from NGOs at national and international levels for debt reduction for Indonesia, and towards dealing with the problem of poverty in Indonesia;
- The existence of civil groups to input into a wider range of decisions.

## V. Halving Indonesian Poverty by 2015

### **5.1. Purpose**

Statement of purpose for the 2004-2009 period:

To ensure the adoption and inclusion of the MDGs in the PRSP, the application of the 20/20 rule in Indonesia's budget, and allocations of donors by GOI and CGI.

### **5.2 Output in 2004-2006 and indicators of the achievements in 2005**

1. Effective cooperation and joint action within the INFID network for campaign and integrated advocacy.

#### **Indicators:**

- Results of the research that can be used as a material for international campaigns.
- The presence of a joint international campaign.

2. Formulation of an alternative concept on poverty as well as water deregulation and power facilities drafted by CSO and its presentation in representative CGI Working Groups.

#### **Indicators**

- The presence of a guideline for a joint work contract between the private sector and the Urban Waterworks (PDAM) and between the Urban Waterworks and ADB, WB, and JBIC.
- The presence of a concept on public to public partnership.

3. Critical review on the Government report on the attainment of MDGs.

#### **Indicator**

- The presence of an alternative report on the attainment of MDGs (shadow report) by the civil society in Indonesia in the framework of the UN Millennium Summit.

### **5.3. Strategies**

This project adopts a three-fold strategy:

1. Strengthening social research and analysis of the impact of public policy on the poor as material for national and international campaigns.

2. Making the network effective to:

- a. Ensure efficient and effective work by dividing up responsibility for the preparation of accurate and credible data and information;
- b. Lobby decision makers;
- c. Conduct national and international campaigns;
- d. Strengthen its position as a pressure group.

3. Using the power of the media to voice ideas and opinions:

- a. Through press conferences;

- b. Journalist and mass media briefings;
  - c. Marches/peaceful action.
4. Creating a synergy of issues (poverty, debt and civil supremacy) in campaign and lobbying.

#### **5.4. Activities and Outputs**

Poverty revealed more of its face in a remarkable fashion prior to the start of 2005 when the tsunami hit Aceh on 26 December 2004. As the primary advocacy domain of INFID's Millennium Development Goal project, poverty was an ever present theme throughout the year. A second strategic moment was the Millennium+5 Summit, which occurred in September 2005.

INFID activities in the early part of 2005 included presenting the results of its 2004 activities at a pre-CGI advocacy workshop held on 12-13 January 2005. This workshop presented INFID position papers that would be the material for INFID advocacy at the CGI meeting at the end of January 2005.

In response to the tsunami, INFID provided statements for Paris Club member nations and the international community, along with a statement for the Tsunami Summit.

These statements responded to the suggestion made by some developed countries for a debt moratorium for tsunami-affected countries. INFID proposed a more structural option – debt cancellation. The debt moratorium initiative was not a significant solution in reducing the debt burden. INFID argued that the commitment from five countries to reducing Indonesia's external debt should be responded to with an offer of a more systematic mechanism of debt cancellation.

In the context of the MDGs, response to the tsunami must be coherent with poverty reduction efforts. The biggest disaster of this millennium, the tsunami is bound to have implications for the Indonesia's economic performance and poverty reduction efforts. At a time when Indonesia is heavily burdened with external debt, the tsunami forced us to dig even deeper to pay for quick response and post-disaster reconstruction.

In continuing to prioritise tsunami response in Aceh, Nias and North Sumatra and ignoring the fundamental problems of poverty as the basis for its poverty reduction policy, the GoI must be forced to cancel its increase of the price of refined fuel oil. The belief remains that this increase will have a domino effect on the price of other staple commodities. The CGI meeting must also be used to pressure for debt reduction from donor nations and IFIs as a better solution than a mere moratorium (postponement) on debt payments.

The research activity carried out during 2005 was to develop a shadow report on Indonesia's progress towards achievement of MDGs. The first steps in this activity involved holding an anti-impoverishment conference, collecting data, holding a supporting workshop on MDGs for the education cluster, and holding meetings with core groups on the shadow report on MDGs.

The basis for argumentation developed at the anti-impoverishment conference, and also formed the initial foundation for the development of a shadow report. This argumentation

was also presented at a poverty summit organised by the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and the World Bank at the end of April 2005.

The main argument is that the policy studies produced by the GoI in the past five years (2000-2005) do not pave the way towards the achievement of MDGs, but rather, could actually distance the country from the goal of halving poverty by 2015. The agreements that Indonesia has made with the World Bank, IMF and WTO, oblige the government to implement policies which withdraw subsidies aimed at helping the people, to open up its markets to imported products, and to adopt fiscal policies that do not benefit the poor. Parliament has also been forced to produce legalisation which facilitates the implementation of privatisation (such as the laws on water resources, electrical power, the education system, health, and other legal products). The country's labour policy and legislation has also been transformed to adopt the concept of labour market flexibility, such as the law on Dispute Resolution on Industrial Relationship (PPHI), the law on employment, and the law on Migrant Worker (PPTKILN).

INFID also supported activities related to the preparation of the shadow report for the education cluster, which was organised by Kapal Perempuan and E-net Justice. This activity, which took place in June 2005, involved the cluster preparing a critical review of goal 3 on education. This review concluded that Indonesia would be unable to achieve the targets for primary education stated in the MDGs. INFID also supported preparation of a shadow report for the Health cluster and the topic of fulfilment of children's rights. The reality facing Indonesia is one of hunger, malnutrition, epidemics of measles and polio, and a growing number of suicides among school children who are unable to pay their school fees.

The activities for July through September 2005 included the compilation of MDG reports on goal 8 and critical analysis of MDGs in terms of cross cutting issues.

Research activities carried out during 2005 involved drafting policies on infrastructure (water and power sectors), development, and poverty. Infrastructure development is a new trend in Indonesia's development policy. As far as the GoI is concerned, infrastructure development is the key to achieving two things: *first*, revitalisation of the role of the private sector, and *second*, reducing poverty. The government has targeted economic growth of an average 6.6% per year to 2009, to reduce poverty from the 2004 level of 16.6% to 8.2% by 2009. To achieve this rate of economic growth requires an investment to GDP ratio of 28.4% in 2009, compared with the actual 20.5% in 2004<sup>4</sup>. One of the biggest criticisms of the Infrastructure Summit was that this meeting was convened in a hurry, before a comprehensive and integrative infrastructure policy had been established.

The research on alternative models of privatisation is an ongoing process.

The aim of the lobby and campaign activities during 2005 was to communicate the content and substance of INFID priority subjects to those who play a role in making national and international policy on poverty issues.

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<sup>4</sup> Presentation by the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Aburizal Bakrie, at the Infrastructure Summit, 17-18 January 2005: Infrastructure Development Strategies in Indonesia.

The substance of INFID priority subjects are discussed in position papers and statements. The tsunami is an issue on which INFID has conducted advocacy at every opportunity, including; at the Paris Club forums, CGI forums, and international NGO forums. During this period, INFID also held a series of road shows to various embassies and IFIs to discuss INFID's advocacy materials.

On the issue of poverty, INFID lobbied the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare at the poverty summit. The outputs of the anti-poverty conference formed the primary material for lobbying activity. INFID remains involved in advocacy activities related to the substance of the PRSP, which GAPRI continues to handle. The 'tug of war' continues between ministers in the Indonesia *Bersatu* Cabinet over the rights based approach proposed by GAPRI.

INFID also undertook dialogue with Parliament to urge action on the problem of 'creeping' poverty. This dialogue advocated that the Indonesian Parliament pay serious attention on the poverty issue, and take proactive steps to prevent its spread. Parliament was also urged to form a special committee to investigate the spread of poverty and to present its results in a transparent manner to the public. Further, Parliament was also reminded of the state's responsibility in terms of meeting the basic needs of its citizens, and was called on to stop producing policies that could impoverish people, to revoke or amend policies that do not benefit the poor, and to remodel the format of the national budget to ensure its orientation towards improving people's welfare. This dialogue served to educate Parliament that civil society organizations are paying serious attention to public policy, especially those which are producing impoverishment.

At the international level, INFID also attempted to expand its network during this period. It reassumed its active role in the Social Watch network, and, along with PEKA and PKM, developed an initiative to establish Social Watch Indonesia. INFID also became active in the MDG network, Millennium Campaign. Further, INFID was involved in intensive international network activities, and participated in the Global Call to Action Against Poverty at the national, regional and international level.

INFID participated in a **workshop to discuss the concept of the UNDP country programme document (CPD)**. The aim of this workshop was to gather input from various sources on UNDP's Country Programme Document (CPD) for the 2006-2010 period. It presented the four main areas where UNDP's will be focused over the next four years, namely; (1) democracy and governance, (2) poverty reduction as a part of the effort to achieve MDGs, (3) crisis prevention and management, and (4) sustainable environmental management.

In preparation for the Millennium+5 Summit, INFID also focused on the issue of UN reform, which is a Kofi Annan initiative, which is striving to make the organization more efficient. In Indonesia, INFID along with CSIS and HRWG tried to facilitate Indonesian civil society to participate in lobbying in order to persuade the GoI to support UN reform. INFID concentrated on discussing the developmental issues discussed in the In Larger Freedom and Draft Outcomes documents. INFID also took part in discussion of these documents at a meeting of the Asian Civil Society Forum in Bangkok, Thailand. Currently, INFID continues to monitor and lobby the panel of 45 appointed by the GoI to

discuss the UN reform document and submitted criticisms and recommendations on the Draft of Outcome Document.

In regards to the report from 2004, in which the government did not report the achievement of Goal 8 of MDGs, INFID urged the government to submit a report of Goal 8 achievement. The result was that the Government of Indonesia submitted report regarding the achievement of goal 8 of MDG to the UN. Further, INFID also made critical reviews of the Government of Indonesia's Progress Report on the achievement of MDG goals.

INFID is also a participating group in the UN Millennium+5 Summit as a UN Ecosoc Consultative NGO, and has undertaken networking opportunities with international NGO's at the UN.

INFID also lobbied to Parliament and Department of Foreign Affairs (representative for the Government of Indonesia), and strongly recommended the ratification of International Convention on Economic Social and Culture Rights (ICESCR) and ratification of the International Convention on Civil Political Right (ICCPR) without reservations. The result was that the Government and Parliament officially gave approval for ratification without any reservations on September 30, 2005. The Government issued a declaration for the interpretation of Article 1 for both of the international conventions. Both of these conventions will be used by INFID as tools to encourage government to promote, protect, and fulfil the rights of the people.

INFID arranged a National Conference Against Impoverishment, which included approximately 150 people representing NGOs, CSOs, farmers, labourers, fishers, migrant workers, urban poor, woman and other marginalized sectors. It also took part in a National Conference Against Impoverishment, held on 25-27 April 2005 at Asrama Haji Pondok Gede, East Jakarta.

A significant activity during this period was the INFID initiative to mobilize the masses on June 1<sup>st</sup> and July 1<sup>st</sup> in the global campaign against poverty (GCAP). INFID together with GAPRI, E-net for Justice, Migrant CARE and UPC, formed the core group that laid the groundwork for the action on July 1. This core group then formed the Joint Committee Against Impoverishment (Koalisi Bersama Anti Pemiskinan-KBAP) which later became a loose anti-impoverishment NGO coalition consisting of hundreds of NGOs and mass organisations.



In 2005, INFID facilitated campaign activities for participants and networks to respond to numerous issues, including; the increase in the price of refined fuel oil, starvation, the Asia Africa Conference, President Decree No 36 of 2005, World Water Day, International Environment Day, International Labour Day, International of Human Rights Day and other poverty issues. These responses included statements, articles and interviews in

the mass media, peace movements (People Carnivals), and happening art.

Advocacy to the mass media, participants, and the public were the main targets of these campaigns and networking activities, in an effort to raise their awareness and strengthen networking with these groups.

INFID also provided support in the activities of working groups and participants in the form of financial and substantial support. The beneficiaries of this support are; Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (Jakarta), UPC (against President Decree No 36 of 2005), Farmer society (to against Rice Import), Solidaritas Perempuan (to participate GCAP campaign) student & Youth group in Yogyakarta and Solo (to participate CGAP campaign and monitoring on Regional state budget to achieve MDG), IGJ (preparation for Intervention in WTO meeting in Hong Kong). INFID was also involved in the campaign against poverty organised by P3M and NU (religion groups), the education campaign organised by E-net for Justice (National Education Day), and support for World Labour Day. Joint campaign, lobby and networking with KruHa (for water right Issue and the GoI Policies on Water) and WGPSR (for Power sector issue, especially impact of power sector policies to poverty).

### **5.5. Outcomes:**

#### **Lobby & Campaign**

The outcome of all activities lobbying and campaigning on issues and policies of debt reduction, include:

#### **Raised the profile of issues:**

- The complex problems of poverty;
- The injustice of the allocation of the Indonesian state Budget;
- The violation of economic, social, and culture rights;
- The problems of Aceh rehabilitation and reconstruction;
- The impoverishment process lead by GoI, IFI's and developed countries;
- The deduction of the debt to achieve the MDGs, poverty eradication and Aceh reconstruction.

#### **Increased dialogue with Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- The National Strategy on Poverty Reduction;
- The responsibility of the state to fulfil economic and social rights;
- The consequences of the ratification of ICESCR and ICCPR;
- The increased budget allocation for public services in state Budget in an effort to end poverty and change the opinion of Government and Parliament;
- *'There is a real need for significant debt reduction or restructuring not only for the least developed countries but also for middle-income developing countries such Indonesia'* (President Speech at the UN, September 2005)
- *'Indonesia recommend(s) the adoption of a debt swap mechanism that will enable developing countries to make use of resources that normally flow out to the creditor countries. Such a mechanism can greatly help developing countries attain*

*their MDGs. Indonesian Government believe that the proposed measures merit their serious consideration'* (President Speech at the UN, September 2005)

**Change the rhetoric (in the media) of Government of Indonesia and Parliament on issues:**

- The President of Indonesia made a statement suggesting that 199 regions of 440 municipalities/cities are poor;
- The Government of Indonesia admitting to the failure economic policies increasing number of people living in poverty;
- The Parliament strongly recommended to revise President Decree No 36 of 2005.

**Policy changes:**

- The ratification of the ICESCR (UU No 11 of 2005) and ICCPR (UU No 12 of 2005);
- The Government of Indonesia (National Planning Agency) submitted MDG progress report, including achievement of Goal 8;
- The Government of Indonesia (Department of Foreign Affairs) brought INFID's Critic and Recommendation on Draft position paper (the world Summit 2005), as material to use for lobbying and discussion in the pre-world summit 2005 (Finalization of the draft outcome Document) at the UN in New York;
- The Constitutional Supreme Court decided that the Government of Indonesia must implement the constitutional mandate to allocate 20% budget for education;
- The Government of Indonesia changed the National State Budget;
- The increased Budget allocation for education and health sector. The draft of state Budget 2006 allocated the health sector with Rp 11.450,4 trillion and the Final State Budget 2006 provided Rp. 13.523.5 trillion. The draft of state Budget 2006 allocated the education sector with Rp. 31.462,4 trillion and the Final State Budget 2006 provided Rp. 36.755.857.973 (UU No 13 of 2005 Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara Tahun 2006 – State Budget of Year 2006).

**Policy Changes (International):**

- Britain, Germany and Italy will make a debt swap with social program to reduce poverty. The debt swap with Britain is planned to amount as much as 49.2 million Euro, Germany as much as 76,3 million Euro in three terms (debt to education swap and debt to nature swap) and Italy provides debt swap to Aceh reconstruction as much as US\$ 31 million;
- Australia offered grants that amount to US\$ 500 and a soft loan (without interest, due date payment after 10 years and payment term for 40 years) amounting to US\$ 500 million. (Still in negotiation process and will be implemented in year 2007).

**5.6. Networking:**

**Strengthening Civil Society by working with Participants and Networks:**

- The maintenance of the INFID network through various activities;

- The re-establishment of network links with several organizations at the local, national and international levels, through joint activities and INFID presence at meetings, including the Social Forum;
- The greater synergy of aims/activities in networks/movements, gaining greater strategic social capital for advocacy in the coming years;
- The change in collaboration, trust or unity of civil society groups;
- The continued pressure from NGOs and the general public at the national and international level, which INFID has actively participated in, to reduce poverty, and to create global justice and equality;
- The creation of alternative ideas concerning root causes and solutions to poverty from a human rights perspective have been socialized to the public, through the media. As a consequence, the government and main actors in economic globalization do not dominate dialogue and doctrine on the poverty issue.

### **Enlarging democratic space:**

- The greater acceptance and recognition of pressure from NGOs at national and international levels for debt reduction for Indonesia, and towards dealing with the problem of poverty in Indonesia;
- The existence of civil groups to input into a wider range of decisions;
- The general public, economists, and academics are more concerned about discussing the issues of poverty. This is evidenced from the increasing number of articles in various media discussing poverty from a human rights perspective, especially from the perspective of economic, social and cultural rights;
- The public criticism of government officials regarding policy and their lifestyles, which are viewed as not being sensitive to the multi-dimensional crisis being suffered by the people.

## **VI. Advocacy Effectiveness, INFID Network Efficiency, and INFID Sustainability**

### **6.1. Purpose**

Statement of purpose for the 2004-2009 period:

To ensure the institutional sustainability and accountability of INFID as an international advocacy network organisation in promoting equitable and sustainable development in Indonesia.

### **6.2. Output 2004-2006 and Indicators of the achievement in 2005**

1. Ensuring an efficient decision-making process through INFID's bodies.

#### **Indicators:**

- The following-up on the formulation of policies based on the by-laws (4: PME, Quality Control, Int'l advocacy, Fund Policy);
  - The availability of a by-laws amendment.
2. Gaining higher performance of INFID's work through effective management system and operational procedures.

#### **Indicators:**

- The effective and regular planning of PME meetings (including development tools);
  - The execution of regular performance evaluation based on objective tools;
  - The revision and formulation of SOPs based on needs and organizational policies (advocacy of international strategy).
3. Ensuring professional performance of INFID staff.

#### **Indicators:**

- The optimising of the function of HRD (HRD should have the means and instruments to monitor and evaluate the performance of the staff);
- The fair re-staffing of processes "the right person at the right place" principle;
- The availability of sufficient resources and equipment, along with effective implementation of programs, and the sustainability of the organization.

#### **Indicators of the achievements in 2005:**

- The SOP used to improve the reserve fund policy;
- The SOP used for the welfare of the staff;
- The SOP used for sufficient and adequate office equipment;
- The up-to-date data base on the constituents of INFID, including INFID donors, participants, networks, and resource persons;
- The utilization of the database to support advocacy management (finance and personnel).

### **6.3 Strategies**

- A) Formulating policies;
- B) Preparing standard formats (reports, evaluation, etc);
- C) Developing and implementing quality control policy
- D) Integrating units and functions;
- E) Procuring and managing of funds;
- F) Recruiting and managing personnel;
- G) Procuring and managing facilities and equipment.

### **6.4. Activities and Outputs**

The use of an efficient decision-making process through INFID's bodies, and the implantation of organizational meetings, such as:

- A) Weekly meetings with Program/coordinator officers (POs) and Project Support Unit (PSU) in the secretariat office to update the political situation in national and international centres, and to provide progress of activities;
- B) Monthly meetings with all secretariat staff to update secretariat activities, to resolve problems, and to encourage participation of the staff in the decision-making process;
- C) Two Board Members meetings, in March and November. During the March meeting, the agenda was approved for the secretariat program and budget proposal; there was shared information and suggestion/directions, along with changed or formulated policies. In the November meeting, the performance of the Director and the INFID secretariat was evaluated. Also, the Board Members formulate a report for the general assembly, prepared a by-law amendment in order to propose to general assembly, and did a final check of the general assembly preparation;
- D) The Board Executive meetings in February, March, and August held for consultation between the Board Executive Members and the Executive Director;
- E) The General Assembly (GA) in November, included: the election of the new board members year for the 2005-2008 period, resolutions of general assembly on the draft amendment by-law (amendment only accepts one article about the change in work period for Board Members from 2 years to 3), GA mandated that the new Board Members to create drafting committee and to redraft the amendment by-law, GA mandated that the new Board for INFID program and revitalized the role of the participants (see resolution of The General Assembly: Result of board election and Program);



Higher performances of INFID's work through effective management system and operational procedures, the implementations were:

- A) Effective and regular PME meetings. Three time PME meeting April, July and October. Started from October INFID using new tools to review the input and outcome of the project in the PME process. Revised the format of strategic paper and work plan, which more clearly and in line with result base management.

- B) Preparing tools for regular performance evaluation, there are three models of tools, will be discussed and implemented in the next year.

In terms of professional performance of the INFID staff, the implementations were:

- A) Capacity building for HRD capability by training and assistance by consultants (from EED);
- B) Analysis Social Training (as planned -joint with Remdec). This training aim to get common understanding of all INFID's staff on changes of the economy, politic and social situation. However this training cannot implement due to limited facilitator who has experiences on this subject.
- C) Fair re-staffing processes, such as "the right person at the right place", **cannot** implemented due to the vulnerability of the staff composition. INFID has 17 personnel, but only 3 persons in charge in the substance matter (one person for Project 1 Civilian Supremacy, one for Debt reduction campaign and one for halving poverty in 2015). The other staff members are: three staff as PSU as technical support (media Campaign, Information and documentation, IT), four staff as financial administrations, one staff for Human Development Resource management, three staff as general support (front office, driver, janitor), and two staff as secretariat management (Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director), along with one staff as technical executive assistant, and one staff as a liaison officer. Ideally, the re-staffing can be implemented (only) if there is more than one person (rather, two or three persons) for each program. But the consequences of this idea include increasing the personal cost.

The availability of sufficient resources and equipment, the effective implementation of the program, and the sustainability of the organization managed by integrating issues of civilian supremacy, debt and poverty (for example using the poverty issue and its network to campaign for debt reduction, campaigning for debt reduction to ensure poverty eradication/reduction and to achieve MDGs). Also, the campaigning for the transparency and accountability of the military budget, since most of the military budget comes from credit, and creates debt (credit export facilities). Lastly, voicing the need of alternative financing for military weaponry procurement avoiding the increasing of debt stock.

Managing the information system (gathering, providing and distributing information) by the re-formatting of INFID's web site, developing a bilingual electronic newsletter, providing a database on INFID participants, network, and target of advocacy, progress on INFID's core issues in the media, media coverage on INFID's statements and comments, articles of INFID's core issues written by INFID's staff published in the media, and using season's greetings cards as part of the media campaign. Other activities included recording and documenting INFID's works in video format.



In terms of international advocacy, besides maintaining the international and regional networks, INFID started to become actively involved in the UN mechanism of decision-making. However, the problem is that these involvements are only based on a '*learning by doing*' process. Over the next years, training or any capacity building for international advocacy related using UN mechanism should be arranged.

### **6.5 Outcomes**

The outcome of all activities lobbying and campaigning on issues and policies of debt reduction, include:

1. The smooth transfer of leadership of the INFID secretariat (from Binny Buchory to Ivan Hadar), and the acceptance of the new leadership in the internal and external environments;
2. The coordination and formation of working teams within the INFID secretariat.
3. The improvement in resources and equipment for the staff to assist them in implementing projects and performing administrative activities;
4. The new mandate and leadership of the governance of INFID based on the General Assembly;
5. An improvement of the international advocacy role, especially advocacy regarding the UN mechanism system.

## VII. MEDIA RECORD

Month & No.	Title/Topic	Name of Media	INFID Personnel	Form: Statement/ Comment/Article
<b>January</b>				
1.	<i>Harus Ada Upaya Kurangi Utang</i> [Efforts Must be Made to Reduce Debt]	Kompas	Binny Buchori Ivan A Hadar	Comment
2.	<i>Indonesia butuh potongan utang</i> [Indonesia needs debt relief]	Bisnis Indonesia, Monday, 3 January 2005	Binny Buchori	Comment
3.	<i>MPR Minta Pemerintah Tanggapi Moratorium</i> [Legislature Requests Government Response on Moratorium]	BERITA UMUM	Binny Buchori	Comment
4.	<i>Harus Ada Upaya Kurangi Utang</i> [Efforts Must be Made to Reduce Debt]	KOMPAS, Thursday, 6 January 2005	INFID	Statement
5	<i>Indonesia, Tuntutlah Penghapusan Utang</i> [Indonesia, Demand Debt Cancellation]	Kompas, Saturday, 8 January 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Article
6	<i>Sidang Paris Club fokus ke moratorium utang</i> [Paris Club Meeting focuses on Debt Moratorium]	Bisnis Indonesia, Monday,10/01/2005	Ivan A. Hadar	Comment
7	<i>Indonesia tolak pinjaman lunak 300 juta euro Moratorium disepakati</i> [Indonesia rejects 300 million euro soft loan Moratorium agreed]	Kompas, Thursday, 13 January 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
8	<i>Infid Minta Paris Club Hapuskan Utang Indonesia</i>	Tempo Interaktif, Wednesday, 12 January 2005	INFID	Statement

	[INFID Asks Paris Club to Cancel Indonesia's Debt]			
9	<i>Moratorium utang</i> [The Debt Moratorium]	Dotcom daily. 4 January 2005	Binny B	Comment
	<i>CGI dan Utang Kita</i> [The CGI and Our Debt]	Kompas, Thursday, 20 January 2005	Ivan A Hadar	article
10	<i>Bantuan CGI Cuma Memberatkan APBN Mendatang</i> [CGI Aid Just Burdens Future Budgets]	Liputan 6 SCTV, 24 January 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
<b>February</b>				
1	<i>Kompensasi BBM Belum Sesuai dengan Kebutuhan Masyarakat</i> [Compensation for Rise in Fuel Prices Does not Answer People's Needs]	Investor Daily Online Monday, 07 March 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Comment
2	<i>Demonstrasi Menolak Rencana Kenaikan Harga BBM</i> [Demonstrations against the proposed hike in fuel prices]	Liputan 6 SCTV, 01 February 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
3	INFID agrees with conditions on proposed hike in fuel prices: 1) No rise in the price of kerosene, which would burden the poor 2) INFID also requests that the price of premium rise by no more than 20% and the price of super (pertamax) by no more than 40% 3) The price should be increased gradually over a six-month period.	Liputan 6 SCTV, 02 February 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment

<b>March</b>				
1	<i>Menggalakkan Diplomasi Penghapusan Utang</i> [Motivating Debt Cancellation Diplomacy]	Pena Indonesia News Agency, 22 March 2005	Ivan A Hadar	article
2	<i>LSM: Penurunan Subsidi BBM Bukan Solusi Tepat</i> NGOs: Reducing Fuel Subsidies is Not the Answer]	TEMPO Interaktif, Jakarta, 5 March 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Comment
3	<i>Pemberantasan Korupsi Belum Memuaskan</i> [Efforts to Eradicate Corruption Inadequate]	Republika Online, Jakarta 28 March 2005	Coalition/ INFID	Comment
<b>April</b>				
1	<i>Menggagas Koalisi Asia Afrika untuk Penghapusan Utang</i> [An Asia Africa Coalition for Debt Cancellation]	Sinar Harapan, 25 April 2005	Chris Wangkay	article
2	<i>“Wolfie”, Bank Dunia, dan Kita</i> “Wolfie, the World Bank, and US”	Kompas, Tuesday, 05 April 2005	Ivan A Hadar	article
3	NGOs plan to hold rival Asia-African Summit events	The Jakarta Post, Jakarta, April 06, 2005	Chris Wangkay	Comment
4	<i>Bantuan Negara Donor Harus Transparan</i> [Donor Aid Transparency A Must]	Republika, Thursday, 07 April 2005	Dian Kartika Sari	Comment
<b>May</b>				
1	Soal Kenaikan Anggaran Dephan “LSM Desak Pemerintah Audit Dulu Anggaran Pertahanan”	Investor Daily, 20 May 2005	Koalisi/INFID	Statement

	[On Increasing the Department of Defence Budget: NGOs Demand Audit of Military Budget]			
<b>June</b>				
1	<i>Rencana Pembentukan Bakorinda Tuai Kritik</i> [Plans to Revive Bakorinda Draw Criticism]	Sinar Harapan, Wednesday, 15 June 2005	Coalition/ INFID	Statement
<b>July</b>				
1	Stop pemiskinan [Stop Poverty]	Investor daily newspaper, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty/ INFID	Photo News
2	Stop pemiskinan [Stop Poverty]	Suara pembaharuan, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty / INFID	Photo News
3	Anti Pemiskinan [Against Poverty]	Bisnis Indonesia, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty / INFID	Photo News
4	Stop Pemiskinan [Stop Poverty]	Republika, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty / INFID	Photo News
5	Stop Pemiskinan [Stop Poverty]	Media Indonesia, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty / INFID	Photo News
6	<i>Kebijakan Pemerintah Penyebab Hidup susah</i> [Government Policies Make Life Difficult]	Kompas, 2 July 2005	Coalition Against Poverty / INFID	Comment
7	<i>G8 Didesak Hapus Utang Indonesia</i> [G8 Urged to Cancel Indonesia's Debt]	Republika Online, Thursday, 07 July 2005	INFID	Statement
8	<i>Manfaatkan momentum untuk minta pengurangan</i>	Bisnis Indonesia,07-JUL-2005	Ivan A Hadar	article

	<i>utang</i> [Using occasions to request debt cancellation]			
9	<i>Kaji ulang kebijakan industri</i> [Review industrial policy]	Bisnis Indonesia,07-JUL-2005	Wahyu Susilo	article
10	<i>Negara G-8 Diminta Hapus Utang</i> [G8 Nations Asked to Cancel Debt]	Bisnis & Keuangan Thursday, 07 July 2005	INFID	Statement
11	<i>Rezim SBY-Kalla Antirakyat Miskin</i> [The SBY-Kalla Anti Poor Regime]	Investor Daily Cetak, 12 July 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Suara Pembaca
12	<i>Penolakan Uji Material UU SDA</i> [Against Review of Natural Resources Law]	Media Indonesia Online, Saturday, 23 July 2005 00:00 WIB	Wahyu Susilo	Comment
13	<i>Akses Masyarakat ke Sumber Air Makin Kecil Pemegang Hak Guna Usaha Berpeluang Eksploitasi Air</i> People's Dwindling Access to Water Sources: The use of enterprise use rights for exploitation of water	KOMPAS, Saturday, 23 July 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Comment
<b>August</b>				
1	<i>MDGs dan Kemiskinan di Indonesia</i> MDGs and Poverty in Indonesia	Kompas.Com, 01 August 2005	Wahyu Susilo	article
2	Govt urged to better manage foreign debt, request cut	The Jakarta Post, August 03, 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
3	<i>Kebebasan Tanpa Kesetaraan dan Persaudaraan</i> Freedom Without Equality and Fellowship	Kompas, 02 August 2005	Ivan A Hadar	article

<b>September</b>				
1	<i>MDGs Saja Tidak Cukup!</i>	Kompas, 19 September 2005	Fabby Tumiwa	Artikel
2	Indef Usul Lembaga Pengelola Utang Luar Negeri	KoranTempo, 22 September 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
3	Inflasi bisa lampau 8,6%	Bisnis Indonesia	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
4	<i>Jujurlah terhadap Realitas Kemiskinan!</i>	Kompas, 15 September 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Artikel
5	INDONESIA: Fuel increase and its impact on the poor	ABC Radio Australia, 15 September 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
6	<i>Reformasi PBB, AS, dan Kita</i>	Kompas, 17 September 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Artikel
7	Subsidi Langsung Rp 100 Ribu Ditentang	KoranTempo, 11 September 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Comment
8	Aksi Putih, Anti Kemiskinan di HI	KoranTempo, 10 September 2005	Ratna Yunita	Comment
9	Delegasi Indonesia Seharusnya Proaktif. Desakkan Penghapusan Utang dan Sistem Perdagangan yang Adil	Kompas, 16 September 2005	INFID	Comment
10	Pidato SBY dalam Forum PBB Progresif, tetapi tidak Membumi	Media Indonesia, 19 September 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Artikel
11	Reformasi PBB, AS, dan Kita	Kompas, 17 September 2005	Ivan A Hadar	Artikel
<b>Desember</b>				
1	<i>Membaca APBN 2006</i>	Kompas, 5 December 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Artikel
2	Negara Tumbal	Kompas, 14 December 2005	Wahyu Susilo	Artikel

